Trade unions in an era of globalisation by Ragoobur, Satiumsingh
Ragoobur, Satiumsingh (2004) Trade unions in an era of 
globalisation. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11381/1/408055.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
TRADE UNIONS IN AN 
ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
by 
SATIUMSINGH RAGOOBUR 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
September 2004 
0 11 ý00'1 
kpto-s 
ITY Ot 
Iz 
Contents 
Acknowledgments vi 
Abstract Vil 
1. Introduction I 
2. Union Bargaining in an Open Economy 
2-1 Introduction 
2-2 Product market models 8 
2-3 International trade and the strategic behaviour of trade unions 13 
2-3-1 Foreign competition and union behaviour 13 
2-3-2 International competition, outsourcing and union bargaining 23 
2-3-3 Distinguishing between one-way and two-way trade 26 
2-3-4 Endogenous trade 28 
2-4 The effect of intemational competition on the extent of unionisation 29 
2-4-1 Foreign competition and the demand for union representation 30 
2-4-2 Foreign competition and employer resistance to unionisation 31 
2-5 Summary and conclusion 33 
3. Import Competition and the Decline of Coverage 
in Britain: Is There a Link? 36 
3-1 Introduction 36 
ii 
3-2 Data description 38 
3-2-1 Union data: The New Earnings Survey Panel Data-set (NESPD) 38 
3-2-2 Union decline in Britain revisited 42 
3-2-3 Industry trade data 47 
3-3 Accounting for the decline of union coverage in UK manufacturing: 
the role of foreign competition 50 
3-3-1 Predictions from theory 50 
3-3-2 The empirical strategy 52 
3-4 Foreign competition as a compositional factor 53 
3-5 Estimating the non-compositional impact of foreign competition on 
union coverage 55 
3-5-1 Simple univariate analysis 55 
3-5-2 Multivanate econometric model 62 
3-6 Summary and conclusion 80 
Appendix 3A 82 
4. The Influence of Foreign Competition on Trade Union 
Recognition at the Workplace 115 
4-1 Introduction 115 
4-2 Theoretical Issues 117 
4-2-1 Foreign competition and the probability of recognition 117 
4-2-2 The importance of establishment set-up date, union recognition 
and foreign competition 118 
4-3 Data characteristics 119 
4-3-1 The WIRS Time-Senes Dataset 119 
iii 
4-3-2 The measures of foreign competition 121 
4-3-3 Sample construction 123 
4-3-4 Some descriptive statistics 124 
4-4 Econometric methodology 126 
4-4-1 The variables used 126 
4-4-2 Specifications 130 
4-4-3 Estimation method 131 
4-5 Empirical results 132 
4-5-1 Foreign competition at current time 132 
4-5-2 Foreign competition at establishment set-up date 137 
4-5-3 Testing for specification errors 139 
4-6 Summary and Conclusion 140 
5. Foreign Competition and the Union Wage Gap: 
The Case of UK Manufacturing 143 
5-1 Introduction 143 
5-2 A review of the empirical literature 145 
5-2-1 Studies using UK data 145 
5-2-2 Studies using US data 147 
5-3 Data and empirical methodology 151 
5-3-1 Data 152 
5-3-2 The variables 155 
5-3-3 Econometric Modelling 166 
5-3-4 Estimation strategy 170. 
5-4 Results 175 
IV 
5-4-1 An analysis of the results 182 
5-4-2 The effect of foreign competition over time 185 
5-5 Summary and conclusion 188 
Appendix 5A 191 xF 
Appendix 5B 197 
6. Conclusion 199 
Bibliography 204 
V 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisors, Richard Disney and Richard Upward, for 
their time, effort and invaluable guidance. It has been a long journey and I could not 
have completed it without their help and advice. 
I am also grateful to Professor David Greenaway and the Leverhulme Centre 
for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy for funding my research. I thank 
David Paton for generous part-time teaching offers. 
I thank all my friends for their camaraderie and support. I thank my mum for 
her constant care and affection and my brother for always being there for me. This 
thesis has become a reality thanks to Verena whose love and conviction has kept me 
going. My final thoughts are for my father. I thank him for giving me strength and 
courage when I needed it most. 
vi 
Abstract 
The objectives of this thesis are twofold. First, to investigate the link 
between foreign competition and the decline of unionisation in Britain during the 
1980s and early 1990s. Second, to examine the impact of international trade on the 
wage bargaining strength of trade unions as measured by the union wage gap of 
individual workers. 
The study focuses primarily on the manufacturing sector given that it has 
suffered the heaviest decline in unionisation and is the most tradable and open sector 
of the UK economy. An important aspect of the thesis is the data used. The empirical 
analyses are carried out using labour market information from large individual and 
finn level surveys such as the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset and the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey matched with industry trade data compiled 
from the OECD's Intemational Trade by Commodities Statistics. 
The results demonstrate that foreign competition had, at most, a weak 
impact on the extent of unionisation in UK manufacturing. It seems more likely that 
the anti-union policy pursued by Thatcher's Conservative Governnient restricted the 
exercise of union power whilst providing employers with the opportunity to reaffirm 
their prerogatives and marginalize the union movement. On the other hand, we do 
find that increased openness to international trade served to moderate union wage 
demands during the 1980s. Although, it would appear that the disciplining effect of 
foreign competition diminished over time as the union mark up was not adversely 
affected towards the mid-1990s. 
vii 
Introduction 
The British industrial relations landscape of the post-war period changed C7 --
dramatically in the closing decades of the 20th century following an unprecedented 
decline of trade union presence and influence at the workplace. Aggregate 
membership density fell from 53% in 1980 to 29% in 1999, reflecting a loss in 
excess of five and a half million union members. There was a steady collapse of the 
collective bargaining process as the proportion of establishments recognising trade 
unions for bargaining purposes dropped from 64% in 1980 to 42% in 1998 (Millward 
et al., 2000) and coverage' by major union agreements fell from 48% to 29% 
between 1980 and 1995. 
A number of explanations have been put forward for declining unionisation in the 
UK. Business cycle models (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Booth, 1983; Carruth & 
Disney, 1988) contend that the rise in real earnings, particularly amongst white-collar 
workers, and the high levels of unemployment that accompanied the economic 
recession of the early 1980s were not conducive to the union movement. Similarly, 
anti-union legislative and public policy changes introduced by Thatcher's 
Conservative Government is also blamed for the decline of trade unions (Freeman 
1 Computed from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset. 
and Pelletier, 1990). Other common explanations include structural changes in the 
economy such as the shift in employment from traditional union strongholds in 
manufacturing to the less unionised service sector, privatisation and an increased 
prominence of small firms (Towers, 1989; Green, 1992; Millward et al., 2000). 
Changes in the composition of the labour force, with a greater participation of part- 
timers, female and youths, are also believed to have been a contributory factor 
(Towers, 1989; Green, 1992). Furthermore, empirical evidence points to the failure 
of trade unions to achieve recognition in newer plants established after 1980 as an 
important factor explaining the decline of union presence and influence at the 
workplace (Disney et al., 1995; 1996; Machin, 2000). This could be due to increased 
employer resistance and weak organising efforts by trade unions, which in turn, may 
have been motivated by greater product market competition (Machin, 2000) and 
rising foreign competition during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In fact, international trade and investment have grown consistently faster than the 
world economy in recent decades as a consequence of the globalisation process. 
Driven by lower costs of transportation, better communication systems and the 
removal of major barriers to trade, globalisation has led to greater integration of 
world economies and an intensification of foreign competition in the product market. 
The escalation of intemational competition in Britain is particularly pronounced in 
the manufacturing sector, where the share of foreign goods in domestic demand has 
risen from 26% in 1980 to 34% in 1990 and over 40% in 1995. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the implications of trade openness for labour 
unions in the UK. Because foreign competition may affect both the extent of 
2 
unionisation and the bargaining strength of unions, the study provides an empirical 
assessment of 
1. the role of foreign competition in explaining the decline of trade unions during 
the 1980s and early 1990s and; 
2. the effect of international competition on the union wage gap of individual 
workers. 
No previous empirical study looks at the relationship between international trade and 
unionisation in Britain while the evidence from UK data on the influence of foreign 
competition on union wage bargaining is very sparse. 
Our study focuses primarily on the manufacturing sector given that it has suffered the 
heaviest decline 2 in unionisation and is the most tradable and open sector of the UK 
economy. An important aspect of the thesis is the data used. The empirical analyses 
are carried out using labour market information from large individual and firm level 
surveys such as the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) and the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) matched with 4 digit SIC industry- 
level trade data compiled from the OECD's Intemational Trade by Commodities 
Statistics (ITCS). 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 explains the economic theory of 
trade unions in an open economy context. We consider the different channels through 
which international trade may influence union bargaining. Theory suggests that 
2 The proportion of manufacturing workplaces with union members fell from 77% 'in 1980 to 42% In 
1998 compared to a decline from 50% to 35% over the same period in private services. Union 
recognition in manufacturing declined from 65% to 30% between 1980 and 1998. The corresponding 
figures for services are 41 % and 23 % (Millward et al., 2000). 
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increased foreign competition is likely to reduce union employment but the impact 
on the union mark up is less clear-cut, depending on parameters such as factor shares 
and the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. Using these theoretical 
predictions, we then infer the effect of foreign competition on the extent of 
unionisation. 
Chapter 3 investigates the empirical link between industry coverage of collective 
bargaining agreements and import competition in the product market. We distinguish 
between the compositional and non-compositional impact of foreign competition on 
union coverage. Import penetration may lead to a change in industry composition, 
shifting employment from the highly unionised industries to the least unionised ones 
(the compositional effect) while, at the same time, causing particular sectors to 
become intrinsically less unionised, irrespective of any shifts in industry composition 
(the non-compositional effect). Hence, the empirical strategy involves the use of a 
basic shift share analysis to quantify the decline in coverage caused by foreign 
competition altering the employment composition of manufacturing industries. The 
non-compositional effect of import competition is examined through a multivariate 
econometric model that includes controls for some of the main hypotheses explaining 
union decline in the UK. The analysis uses 4-digit industry-level data on national 
union coverage from the NESPD matched with industry trade variables for UK 
manufacturing during the period 1983-95. 
Chapter 4 provides further evidence on the relationship between unionisation and 
openness. It examines the influence of foreign competition on the probability of trade 
unions achieving recognition at the workplace, using establishment- level data from 
4 
WIRS. It extends the industry-level analysis in chapter 3 as follows. First, the use of 
establishment-level data enables one to capture the micro-processes behind the 
impact of foreign competition on trade union presence and influence at the 
workplace. Second, the union measure here comprises all types of bargaining 
agreements and not just major agreements. Third, the chapter not only considers 
foreign competition at current time but also at (or around) the establishment set-up 
date. In essence, we test the hypothesis that trade unions are less likely to gain 
recognition where firms are faced with international competition in the product 
market using three different measures of foreign competition. The first is created 
from management responses to a question in VVIRS regarding whether the firin 
operates in international markets. Since firms operating primarily in international 
markets have to compete with foreign rivals, this serves as a fitting basis on which 
the influence of foreign competition on union recognition can be analysed. The 
second measure relates to industry trade variables at current time, i. e. at the relevant 
year of survey. Thirdly, it is argued that the probability of recognition may depend 
on product market conditions around the establishment set-up date (Disney et al. 
19955 1996). This is captured by age-dated trade measures of foreign competition. 
The second objective of the thesis is to examine how international competition 
affects the wage bargaining strength of trade unions. In this context, chapter 5 
matches individual earnings and union status from the NESPD with industry trade 
variables such as to analyse the influence of foreign competition on the union wage 
gap of British manufacturing workers during the penod 1982 to 1995. Because of the 
endogenous selection of union status by workers, different estimation techniques are 
used such as to reach a better assessment of the true effect of openness on the union 
5 
mark up. Given the long time series of the dataset, it is also possible to describe the 
movement of the foreign competition effect on union wage setting over time. In 
addition, we consider the case of blue-collar and white-collar workers separately 
since international competition and union bargaining are likely to have dissimilar 
implications for the wages of the skilled and unskilled. 
Finally, chapter 6 suminarises the main empirical results and offers some avenues for 
future research. 
6 
The Theory of Trade Unions 
In An Open Economy 
2-1 Introduction 
The process of globalisation, driven by lower transport costs, technological advances 
and political measures designed to unilaterally reduce man-made barriers to trade, 
has led to a closer integration of world economies, enabling a Ereer movement of 
goods, services, capital and people. The scale of the changes witnessed in recent 
years has inevitably sparked an ongoing debate about the likely economic outcomes 
of a global market and at the heart of these discussions lies the effect of international 
trade liberalisation and expansion on labour. In fact, increased imports from newly 
industrialised and low wage countries and a greater exchange of similar goods 
between the major developed economies have led to rising foreign competition in the 
product market. It has, in turn, motivated the outsourcing of activities to cheaper 
locations as firms seek to remain competitive. What are the implications of these 
developments for the bargaining abilities of trade unions and for the union movement 
itself.? 
To examine these issues, this chapter considers the specific theory of trade unions in 
the context of an open' economy. We separate the impact of trade on union 
bargaining into two channels. First, product market/rent sharing models suggest that 
foreign competition may influence union bargaining strength by changing the degree 
of competition in the industry and the profits/quasi-rentS2 available to be shared 
between unions and finns. This is explained in section 2-2. Second, in section 2-3, 
we examine how international trade may alter the strategic behaviour of trade unions 
in the sense that they can make trade-offs between wages and employment when 
faced with foreign competition in the product market. Then, drawing from the model 
predictions, section 2-4 explores the effect of foreign competition on the extent of 
unionisation. Finally, section 2-5 concludes. 
2-2 Product market models 
The relationship between foreign competition and union bargaining can be analysed 
within a product market or rent sharing model whereby international trade influences 
union bargaining through increased competition in the product market and reduced 
profitability or quasi-rents. In Layard et al. 's (1991) model, bargaining is over wages 
only while employment is set unilaterally by the firm. The union's utility function is 
linear in wages (i. e. union members are risk neutral), 
Lw + (m 
- 
L)r (1) 
1 For a review of the theory of trade unions in the closed economy see Oswald (1985), Ulph and Ulph, 
(1990) and Booth (1995). 
2 Abowd and Farber (1990) define quasi-rents as revenue minus material and labour costs. 
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where w is the union wage and r is the alternative wage earned from employment in 
the non-union sector. L and m are union employment and membership levels 
respectively. 
The finn's profit function is 
/7- 
= pf[L(w)] 
- 
wL(w) 
-k (2) 
where p is the product price, f[. ] is the production function, w is the wage rate and k 
is fixed capital costs. Assuming zero fallback profit for the fin-n in the event of a 
strike, the resulting union wage gap from the maximisation of the generalised Nash 
bargain can be written as 
w-r 
a)wL 
(3) 
The parameter a is the relative bargaining strength of the trade union and e is the 
elasticity of labour demand. Equation (3) also expresses the union wage differential 
as a positive function of profits/quasi-rents (n), indicating that the union is able to 
achieve a higher mark-up the greater the level of profit earned by the firm. 
Suppose product demand is deterinined by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function, q= p-17 
, 
where p is price and )7 is the price elasticity of product demand 
and., the production function is Cobb Douglas, q=P K'-" 
, 
where ý represents labour 
share. Profit maximisation now implies 
9 
Max /T = pq - wL -k 
w 
-wL-k 
= 
[L"K'-" ]' 
- 
wL 
-k (4) 
where 1-1171. K is the product market competition parameter and shows that the 
higher the degree of competition in the product market, the greater the elasticity of 
product demand. 
Solving the first order condition from (4) yields q' = wL such that the firm's profit A /C 
function (ignoring capital costs) in the short run becomes 
WL WL (5) 
It implies that profit is inversely related to product market competition. Rearranging 
, IT -, ý/C equation (5) as and substituting in (3) generates the following 
wL A/C 
expression for the union wage differential, 
w-r 1 a(1-AK) 
=-+ 
ws (1-a)Aic 
(6) 
Equation (6) shows that the union wage gap depends on union power (a), the 
elasticity of labour demand (e), labour intensity (A) and product market competition 
(K). As such, the underlying implication of Layard et al. 's analysis is that increased 
10 
foreign competition in the product market may serve to reduce the unlon mark up 
through a decrease in the amount of quasi-rents available to be shared between the 
union and the finn. 
Vandenbussche and Konings (1998) examine the impact of international competition 
on union wages in terms of a change in the domestic product market structure. They 
consider a domestic unionised monopoly firin employing one unit of labour (L) to 
produce one unit of a homogenous good X The production function is Q=L and 
product demand is given by a linear function of the form P(Q) =a- bQ, where Q is 
the monopolist's output. Using the production and demand functions, the finn's 
profit is given by. 
(a_w)2 
)T = 
4b 
(7) 
where w is domestic union wages. The union's utility depends on both wages (w) and 
employment (L), 
U(w, L) 
= 
(W- Wa)OL (8) 
w,, is the alternative wage and 0 is a parameter of wage preference. Since there is no 
production in case of conflict between the finn and the union the threat points of the 
two parties are zero. Hence, with no trade, maximisation of the Nash bargain yields 
the equilibnum union wage (w') and union employment (L'), 
11 
wm 
= 
afl 
2 
a(2 
- 
3b 
where, 61s the relative bargaining strength of the trade union. 
International competition in the form of a foreign firm exporting to the domestic 
market may erode some of the monopoly power of the domestic firm and influence 
national wage negotiations and employment. Assuming the domestic and foreign 
finns engage in Cournot competition, equilibrium output and the profit of the 
domestic firm will depend on the given foreign wage rate (w, ). It can be shown that 
under competitive conditions the union wage (wj) and employment (LI) are 
detennined by 
wi 
= 
6(a+ W2) 
4 
(a+ W2)(2-, g) 
6b 
From equation (11) if W2= a, foreign wage is too high to allow import penetration in 
the domestic market and the equilibrium wage and employment are equal to those 
under monopoly. For a> W2 zý? 0 there is international competition in the domestic 
market. The firm's market share decreases and as a consequence the domestic 
union's wage is reduced (since w, < w'). The effect of import competition on 
domestic union employment depends on both the foreign wage and the bargaining 
12 
strength of the trade union. Foreign competition in the domestic market is likely to 
result in job losses, especially under weak union power. 
2-3 International trade and the strategic behaviour 
of trade unions 
The product market models do not fully capture the strategic behaviour of trade 
unions. In face of foreign competition, unions may typically trade off wages for 
employment or vice versa. And so the predictions about the outcomes of union 
bargaining in an open economy context may not be clear-cut. 
2-3-1 Foreign competition and union behaviour 
Hill (1984) examines union behaviour in response to import competition within a 
general equilibrium trade model. He assumes an open economy with two sectors: a 
unionised import-competing sector 1 and a non-union, non import-competing sector 
2. The unionised industry is made up of perfectly competitive finns which take the 
price level as given and use only labour (L) and capital (K) to produce good 1, an 
imperfect substitute for imports. The union takes into account the trade-off between 
the union wage and union employment and chooses the optimal wage-employment 
policy by 
Max 
L'Uj J+ 
m 
Uf 
W2 
I 
m C(P) C(P) 
(13) 
13 
subject to LI :5M, where M is union membership, LI is union employment; w, andW2 
are the union and non-union wages respectively; p is the relative price of commodity 
1 and c(p) is a cost of living index; L' is the probability of finding a union job and M 
M-L, 
M is 
the probability of being employed elsewhere. 
Assuming union members are risk neutral, the optimal union wage gap is derived as 
function of the elasticity of demand for union labour (17), 
W, 
--77 
W2 q-1 
)7 = 
ýIokj 
where o-I and 0,, are the elasticity of factor substitution and the share of 
capital in the union sector. 
The change in the union wage gap from differentiating (14) is obtained as 
0-1-1 Wl 
-W2 
0-1 
- 
OKI 
)o 0ww 
-i K, L, 
01-0ýýý6001 
1) (15) 
where r, is the return to capital and 0,1 is the share of labour in sector 1. (o is the 
elasticity of the union differential with respect to the wage-rental ratio. This depends 
on o-1. For instance, co<O when o-, <] and co>O when o-, >]. As such, equation (15) 
expresses the percentage change in the union wage gap ý4 w ( Vl- ^2) as a function of the 
14 
elasticity of factor substitution (a, ) and the percentage change in relative factor 
prices (W in the unionised sector. 
The model assumes sector-specific capital and that wages and capital rents can only 
vary in response to changes in commodity prices. Thus, taking the product price in 
sector 2 as the numeraire and ^ as the percentage change in the relative price of the P 
union good, the relationship between product prices and factor prices can be written 
as 
OL 
I 
Wl + OK, rl 
w +0 i' 2K2 t 
9L2 
2 
To see how the model works, consider an increase in import competition. This 
reduces the relative price of the import-competing union good (p) and factor prices in 
the union sector. Labour is redistributed from the union sector 1 to sector 2. The 
marginal product- of labour in the non-union sector decreases and consequently, so 
does the non-union wage. However, the union mark up (determined by the change in 
union wages relative to non-union wages) will depend on the value of the elasticity 
of factor substitution (ol) and factor intensity in the union sector. If sector I is capital 
intensive, the decline in product price will lead to a drop in the rental rate of capital 
(ri) relative to the union wage (wj) causing the wage-rental ratio in the union sector 
(ý'v 
-i, ) to rise. Supposing the elasticity of factor substitution is less than unity W, r 
(oj<]), from equation (15) it follows that union wage gap decreases (since (I-^) WI W2 
is negative). 
15 
Intuitively, the relative decline in the cost of capital serves to lower the capital share 
and increase the elasticity of labour demand (q) in the unionised sector. 
Therefore, the union wage differential is lowered. But, for a higher elasticity of 
factor substitution in sector 1 (o, >I), the wage differential will rise in response to an 
intensification of international competition. This is because unionised finns can 
substitute relatively cheap capital for labour. As capital's share increases, the union 
labour demand elasticity falls and the trade union is in a better position to bargain for 
higher wages. Opposite results are expected where production of the import 
competing good is relatively more labour intensive. 
Hill subsequently extends the model to accommodate perfect capital mobility 
between the two sectors, thereby allowing the economy to move towards a long run 
equilibrium state characterised by equal rental rates of capital, unit cost equal to the 
price of each commodity and full employment of both labour and capital. The main 
short run conclusions from the specific-factors model are preserved and union 
response to import penetration is dependent on the characteristics of the unionised 
industry, particularly with regards to the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour and the factor intensities. Hill's predictions are summansed in table 2.1 
below. 
Table 2.1: Effect of an increase in foreign competition on the union wage mark up 
Union Sector Capital intensive Labour intensive 
Factor substitution >I 
Factor substitution <I 
Increase 
Decrease 
Decrease 
Increase 
16 
Unlike Hill, Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) use a partial equilibrium framework to 
illustrate the effect of foreign competition on union bargaining and model the trade 
impact in terms of a demand shock rather than a change in relative prices. They 
assume production in the unionised import-competing industry is organised 
according to the CES technology with labour and sector- specific, long-lived capital 
as the only factors of production. The union wage is determined by the maximisation 
of an aggregate union welfare function subject to the industry's derived demand for 
labour. The optimum condition is obtained as 
U'(wi)Wi 
U(WI) 
- 
U(W2) 
where e =- o-(l 
- 
0, )+ OL fl 
(18) 
w, and w2 are the union and reservation wage rates. F, is the elasticity of labour 
demand, expressed as a function of the elasticities of product demand 0, factor 
substitution (o) and the share of labour (OL) in the union sector. 
Lawrence and Lawrence argue that the change in union wages following an import- 
induced downward shift in product demand can be divided into two stages. First, the 
demand shock may lead to permanent capacity 3 reductions or a decline in capacity 
growth. In both cases, the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital and 
the elasticity of derived demand for labour are sigmficantly reduced. This is referred 
3 Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) refer to the permanent reduction in capacity as the end-game and the 
decline in capacity growth as the slow game. 
17 
to as the elasticity or substitution effect. Second, there is a contraction or demand 
effect which shifts the labour demand curve to the left, as a result of the fall in the 
product demand per se. The elasticity effect alone pushes unions to raise wages and 
the more industry-specific or long-lived capital is, the greater the rise in union wages 
will be. The contraction effect, on the other hand, lowers union wages. Therefore, the 
wage outcome will depend on the strength of these two forces, although it can be 
shown that the elasticity effect will unambiguously dominate when the production 
technology is Cobb-Douglas (i. e. elasticity of substitution is equal to 1). 
w 
I 
0 
2 
L 
Figure 2.1: The elasticity and demand effects of international competition 
Consider figure 2.1. Suppose the initial equilibrium is at point A. the elasticity effect 
of international competition is shown by the demand curve rotating from D0 to D' 
The demand effect shifts D' down to D2 where a new equilibrium is obtained at C. 
Since the elasticity effect is greater than the demand effect, the corresponding union 
wage rate wI imply that trade unions are able to secure higher wages without a 
significant loss in employment. However, union wage demands are ultimately 
18 
bounded by a shut down point. As competition from imports gets more intense, a 
sequence of declines in demand could threaten plants with closure. Unions would 
then be forced to accept lower negotiated wages. This is illustrated by the 
equilibrium point E. Note that the trade shock unequivocally reduces the level of 
union employment in the industry. Table 2.2 summarises Lawrence and Lawrence's 
main predictions. 
Staiger (1988) also examines the relationship between union behaviour and declining 
demand in the union sector due to foreign competition. His analysis differs from 
Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) to the extent that it is based on a two-country, three- 
sector general equilibrium model and considers a range of heterogeneous union 
goods rather than a single homogenous product. In the domestic country, sector I is 
an import-competing union sector, producing commodities heterogeneous in labour 
intensity. Sector 2 uses non-union labour and capital in fixed proportions to produce 
a composite good and sector 3 produces an intermediate good using only non-union 
labour. The wage rate in sector I is set by a single rent maximising union. Domestic 
union rents are written as 
(w--W)L(w) (19) 
19 
Table 2.2: Effect of declining demand for domestic product due to import competition 
where w and T are the union and non-union wages respectively. L(w) is union 
employment. The first order condition of the union maximisation problem yields an 
optimal union mark up (p), 
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(20) 
q is the elasticity of the derived demand for domestic union labour, which will be 
determined by changes in the demand for each union good and changes in the scope 
of domestic production. 
Assuming there is no technological cost advantage between the two countries, the 
only basis for trade is the existence of a domestic union wage premium. With free 
trade, the availability of cheap imports causes a reduction in the demand for the 
domestically produced union goods. It is the most labour intensive goods that are 
worst hit by foreign competition. Since labour costs at home are relatively high, 
labour intensive domestic firms cannot compete in the product market. And so, as the 
production of the marginal or relatively more labour intensive products is lost to 
foreign rivals and the domestic import-competing union sector eventually tends to 
specialise in the least labour intensive range of union products. Thus, the scope of 
domestic production is reduced leading to a higher elasticity of the derived union 
labour demand and lower union wage demands. Further, as idle resources from the 
union sector are reallocated to the non-union sector, a greater demand for the 
services of domestic non-union labour is generated, thereby raising the non-union 
wage. So the union wage mark up decreases. However, there will be a decline in the 
average labour intensity of production in the union sector as the most labour 
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intensive production is shifted abroad. This serves to reduce the elasticity of derived 
demand for union labour such that it is possible for the rent maximising union to 
raise its mark up. Therefore, the overall impact of foreign competition on the union 
wage differential depends on the strengths of these two effects. 
The implications of the model for union employment is less ambiguous to the extent 
that a reduction in the domestic scope of production due to foreign competition leads 
to lower employment for union labour. Table 2.3 sums up the main predictions as 
follows. 
Table 2.3: Foreign competition, the scope of production and union behaviour 
Employment Union mark up 
Foreign competition Fall Depends on the elasticity of demand for 
union labour following: 
1. change in scope of production 
2. change in labour intensity 
1>2 Fall Decline 
I<2 Fall Rise 
Whilst Hill (1984), Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) and Staiger (1988) assume 
exogenous union membership, Grossman (1984) examines the implications of 
international competition in a formal model of endogenous membership and where 
the process of decision-making within the trade union is determined by the seniority 
system. He considers a small open economy with two tradable sectors. The nonunion 
sector uses labour alone to produce commodity X whereas the union sector requires 
labour and sector-specific capital to produce the union good Y. Employment in the 
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union sector is characterised by a lay-off and rehire rule based entirely on seniority. 
Union members are indexed by 1 (=- [0, L] where L is the size of the union. The index 
i=0 represents the most senior member, i=L is the least senior member and i= L12 
the median worker. All workers are aware of their relative ranking. The probability 
of employment for a union member with seniority index i is given by 
, 
Tj =pr[vmp(i) =? (21) 
where vmp is the value of marginal product and w is the union wage demand. The 
union has monopoly power and sets wages by maximising the expected utility of the 
median member given by 
UL12 
= )TL12 U(W) + (I-)TL12) UN (22) 
where TL12 is the probability of employment of the median worker and r is the 
reservation wage. 
An intensification of foreign competition in the union sector raises the probability of 
the least senior workers being made redundant first. For a given union size, they will 
vote for a lower wage. But at the same time, international competition may cause the 
union to shrink (at a given wage) as the worsening conditions in the industry force 
workers to exit the union sector and seek for a more secured position elsewhere. 
Under the seniority rule, those who leave first are least senior and have the lowest 
wage demands. Thus, a more senior median worker emerges who may be less 
concerned with employment and vote for a higher wage demand. 
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For a flexible production technology with the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital greater than one, it is plausible that union wages will rise as the 
size of the union decreases. However, for very low elasticities of factor substitution 
and risk averse union members a large union could continue to exist, preferring to 
safeguard union jobs at the expense of wages. In these circumstances, the trade union 
could even expand with foreign competition. The Cobb-Douglas production ftinction 
(the elasticity of factor substitution equal to unity) causes workers to simply move in 
and out of the union sector. Here the union wage is said to be sticky since it does not 
change with import competition. It follows that union wages and employment may 
either fall, rise or stay constant depending on the underlying production function in 
the industry. Table 2.4 shows the key conclusions from the Grossman (1984) model. 
Table 2.4: Effect of foreign competition on union size, seniority, union wage and employment 
Union size Median voter Wage Employment 
(Yj >11 Small More senior Rise Fall 
Cyl <II Large Less senior Decrease Increase 
Note: o-I denotes elasticity offactor substitution in the union sector 
2-3-2 International 
bargaining 
competition, outsourcing and union 
Foreign competition in the domestic market may also result in the outsourcing of 
activities to cheaper locations abroad by domestic firms seeking to remain 
competitive. Mezzetti & Dinopoulos (1991) analyse the bargaining outcome between 
a union and a domestic multinational firm where the latter has the option of shifting 
production to cheaper locations abroad in response to increased import competition. 
23 
They develop a simple partial equilibrium model of a unionised domestic firm 
competing with a foreign firm in the home market. Both firms use only labour to 
produce a homogeneous commodity. Domestic union wage and employment are 
deten-nined by efficient Nash bargaining. The objective function of the labour union 
is given by 
U(w, L)=(w--w)OL' (23) 
where w is the union wage, W is the non-union wage and L is employment in the 
union sector. The union cares for both employment and wages. It is wage onented if 
Profits for the domestic fin-n are 
-T(X, Y)=P(X+Y)X-WX (24) 
where P(. ) is the inverse demand function and x and y are the outputs of the home 
and foreign firins respectively. A bargaining disagreement produces zero levels of 
union utility and profits associated with no employment in the union sector so that 
the generalised Nash product is 
OX; v p ]-a w x wx] ff w (25) 
where a denotes the relative bargaining power of the union. The first order condition 
yields the negotiated wage, 
24 
(1-k)(P + xP) + kP 
where k is a positive constant. 
(26) 
Now, suppose the home firm can credibly threaten to switch production abroad (at no 
cost 4) if domestic labour costs are too high and it faces increased competition from 
imports in the product market. Then in the case of a conflict between the union and 
the firm the threat point of the union remains zero but by supplying the domestic 
market from abroad, the firm can earn a reservation profit, 
v= A-w* X^ 
-ti (27) 
where i is the home firm's output when producing abroad, w* is the foreign wage 
and t is a specific tariff imposed on goods when entering the domestic market. The 
generallsed Nash bargain becomes 
p ]-a -)OXrla X_wx_ V/j W- w (28) 
Maximising (28) with respect to x and w generates the bargained wage rate in the 
presence of a threat to shift production abroad, 
(I 
-k) (P + xP )+ k(P- Vlx) 
For instance, assuming the domestic firm already has production plants abroad. 
(29) 
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Equation (29) above reveals a lower union wage compared to the negotiated wage 
level obtained in (23) when there is no threat of relocation. The model, therefore, 
implies that in face of foreign competition the domestic fim-i can improve its 
bargaining position vis a vis the trade union and reduce the bargained wage when it 
can credibly threaten of relocate abroad. 
2-3-3 Distinguishing between one-way and two-way trade 
According to Naylor (1998; 1999) unions may respond to increased openness in 
different ways depending on the nature of the prevailing trade regime, i. e. whether 
one-way (inter-industry) or two-way (intra-industry). Under one-way trade domestic 
finns face competition from imports but cannot export to foreign markets. Two-way 
trade indicates the presence of both import and export activities. Consider a domestic 
firm I, organised by a monopoly union and, a non-unionised foreign firm 2. If trade 
costs (t) are initially prohibitive, both firms supply their respective markets. But as t 
falls, the domestic firm will face increasing competition from imports. When trade is 
only one-way, the implications for the union wage outcome can be explained as 
follows. 
In figure 2.2, starting from the equilibrium point a, import penetration causes labour 
demand (Ld) to become more elastic and shifts it from Ld to LdI. The union trades off 
wages (w) for employment (L) so that the equilibrium is at point b. However, further 
increases in import competition could eventually lead to plant closures reducing 
union wages even more as well as decreasing union employment. This is shown by 
the equilibrium point c. 
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Figure 2.2: Union bargaining under one-way trade 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the equilibrium union wage rate under two-way trade when firm 
I not only faces competition from abroad but can also export. The total amount of 
union labour demanded is derived from the demand for the firm's product arising 
from both domestic consumption and the export market. This particular feature 
produces a kink in the downward sloping total labour demand curve, with an upper 
inelastic portion and a lower more elastic segment. At high wages, the home firm 
does not export but at sufficiently low wages it is able to produce for home as well as 
foreign consumers. A fall in trade costs, from t to t* increases foreign competition 
and reduces domestic demand for fin--n l's product. However, if the rise in exports 
outweighs the fall in domestic demand, total labour demand will increase. Increased 
import competition causes the upper segment of the labour demand curve to shift to 
the left while the growth of exports shifts the lower part to the right. Assuming the 
union's preferred wage lies on the lower portion of the labour demand schedule, it is 
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possible for the monopoly union to raise the wage rate as shown by the equilibrium 
moving from e to e *. 
w 
L 
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium under two-way trade 
Hence 
, 
it can be argued that increased openness enables labour unions in exporting 
firms to demand higher wages, whilst those in non-exporting establishments are 
likely to accept wage concessions. 
2-3-4 Endogenous trade 
Using the above model, Naylor (1999) argues that pattern of international trade is 
likely to be endogenous. Typically, the prevailing trade regime (i. e. whether one-way 
or two-way) is dependent upon the union wage strategies. For instance , if utl ity 
derived by the union under one-way trade is greater than that under two-way trade 
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(U one-way 
>U "' ) the union chooses a high wage strategy. This does not allow the 
firm to compete in the export market and as a result, trade is of the inter-industry 
nature. On the other hand, when U"'-"Y < U"-'ay the union chooses a low wage 
strategy promoting two-way or intra-industry trade. The union is indifferent between 
the two regimes when U one-way = Utwo-way. It can be shown that this occurs at a 
critical initial level of trade cost ( t, ). As such, if the actual level of trade cost exceeds 
the critical level (t > t, ), the utility associated with a high wage strategy is greater 
and so the union is concerned with selling exclusively to the home market. For low 
initial trade costs (t < t, ), the union chooses a low wage strategy enabling two-way 
trade to take place. 
2-4 The effect of international competition on the 
extent of unionisation 
Having explored the influence of openness on union bargaining, this section 
examines the implications of international competition for unionisation. Changes in 
the extent of unionisation can be analysed in ternis of fluctuations in the supply of 
and demand for union representation (Abowd and Farber, 1982; Farber, 1983; Farber 
1990). The simple supply-demand model assumes that unionisation is determined by 
two main factors: the level of worker demand for union representation and employer 
resistance to union organisation. 
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2-4-1 Foreign competition 
representation 
and the demand for union 
The demand for union representation relates to the benefits of unionisation and is 
primarily governed by the union's ability or workers' perception of the union's 
, 
J-.. 
ability to improve pay and conditions (Farber and Saks, 1980). It implies that 
workers' demand for union representation is a positive function of union wages. As 
such, it seems plausible that international competition may affect the attractiveness 
of unionism through its effect on the union-firm wage bargaining outcome. From 
section 2-2, the product market models of union bargaining suggest that foreign 
competition reduces union bargaining power and therefore, we expect a negative 
impact of trade on unionisation. However, as seen from the model predictions in 
section 2-3, when trade unions display strategic behaviours, much will depend on 
industry characteristics, in particular, factor intensities and the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital. The nature of the trade regime may also be 
important (Naylor, 1999). Under inter-industry trade, union wages and the demand 
for union representation are more likely to decline than under intra-industry trade. 
Similarly, if domestic firms have the option of shifting production abroad, trade 
unions may be forced to accept lower wages, thereby reducing the benefits of 
unionisation (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991). 
Further, Grossman's (1984) analysis suggest that the underlying demand for 
unionisation amongst union workers may be positively related to their employment 
prospects. The worsening probability of employment in unionised industries hit by 
rising international competition may force workers out of the union sector in search 
30 
of more secured positions elsewhere. The extent of unionisation shrinks, ceteris 
panbus. 
2-4-2 Foreign competition and employer resistance to unionisation 
Employer resistance to unionisation aims at reducing the success of organising 
efforts by trade unions. It may take the form of positive labour relations, improving 
pay and conditions, providing union-like fringe benefits, increasing communication 
with workers and individualising the employee-employer rapport (Abowd and 
Farber, 1990). This is likely to reduce the demand for representation among union 
and nonunion workers. Employers may also implicitly or explicitly engage in unfair 
practices and lobbying designed to discourage worker interest in unions and 
undermine union. organisation (Abowd and Farber, 1990; Farber, 1990). Therefore, 
as we explain below, foreign competition may decrease the opportunity and 
propensity to unionise by directly and indirectly increasing management incentives 
to oppose trade unions at the workplace. 
Increased competition from abroad reduces profitability/quasi-rents and wears down 
the market power of domestic finns (Layard et al., 1991; Konings and 
Vandenbussche, 1998). As a consequence, firms may not be able to continue 
operating alongside rent-sharing trade unions (Abowd and Farber, 1990; Disney et 
al., 1996) especially if the latter can extract higher wages despite the declining 
industry demand caused by imports (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985; Staiger, 1988). 
Hence, in the face of economic threat, employers may resist unions more strongly, 
reducing the likelihood of unionisation. On the other hand, it is possible that foreign 
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competition may induce unions to moderate their wage demands (as indicated by the 
model predictions in section 2.3). But this may lead to more resources being 
available for management to fight unionisation harder. 
Foreign competition may also represent an indirect opportunity for employers to 
oppose trade unions through organisational changes. The pressure to compete 
internationally is 
-a key factor motivating the restructuring of production and work 
systems. In general, the survival of domestic firms relies on the ability to reduce 
product development time and enhance innovation; improved performance and 
productivity; and a commitment to quality and flexibility that allows swift 
adjustments to market conditions (Committee on Techniques for the enhancement of 
Human Performance: Occupational Analysis, 1999). These factors would normally 
necessitate extensive reorganisations of the labour force along the following lines. 
Improvingfunctionalflexibility. This requires employees to work within versatile and 
resourceful teams, engage in job rotation and multitasking as well as collaborating in 
problem solving. However, it can be detrimental to union organisation since 
management can seize the opportunity to enhance its control over the workforce and 
manipulate workers into associating themselves more closely to the cause and 
mission of the firm rather than that of labour unions. 
Achieving numerical flexibility. Firms can adjust the size of the workforce and the 
number of hours worked. In particular, part-time, temporary and shift working 
arrangements can be introduced, targeting more female and youths participation. But 
part-timers, women and youths are less likely to be unionised. The use of capital 
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intensive technology can also play in favour of management as the scope of trade 
union influence in the production process would be considerably constrained. 
On a wider note, since unions may cause efficiency losses (Kuhn, 1998), generate 
higher costs and lower profits (Addison & Hirsh, 1989), in times of increasing global 
competition firms, governments and the public in general may cultivate negative 
views toward labour unions and collective bargaining. Eventually, this could not only 
motivate adverse management policies against trade union representation at the 
workplace but also facilitate the introduction of anti-union legislation designed to 
weaken the whole process of collective bargaining. 
2-5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the implications of openness for union bargaining and the 
extent of unionisation. Product market models suggest that foreign competition 
reduces the bargaining abilities of trade unions by decreasing the level of quasi-rents 
and firms' market power in the domestic market. It is also argued that international 
trade may influence the strategic behaviour of unions to the extent that they can 
trade-off wages for employment or vice-versa. As a result., foreign competition may 
have a negative or positive impact on union wages, depending on factor shares and 
the elasticities of substitution between capital and labour in the import competing 
union sector. The effect of foreign competition on union employment is, however, 
less ambiguous and 
, 
in most cases, international competition seems likely to result in 
a decline in employment. We found that the existence of a threat to shift production 
abroad, in response to increased foreign competition in the domestic market, acts as a 
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significant restraint on union bargaining power. In addition, the effect of 
international trade on union bargaining may depend on the nature of the trade 
regime, i. e. one-way (inter-industry) and two-way (intra-industry). Under one-way 
trade, unions may choose to moderate their wage demands in order to protect 
employment while it is possible to raise wages under two-way trade, when both 
import and export activities take place. Besides, the pattem of trade may itself be 
endogenously detennined by the wage policies adopted by trade unions. For instance, 
a high (low) union wage strategy promotes inter- (intra-) industry trade. This will 
have implications for any empirical estimation. 
Given the predictions from the models of international trade and union bargaining, 
the second part of the chapter inferred the effect of foreign competition on 
unlonisation through a simple supply-demand model. Two important determinants of 
umomsation are the demand for union representation and employer opposition to 
trade unions at the workplace. As such, foreign competition may influence the 
demand for union representation by altering the bargained wage rate and the 
employment prospects of workers in the union sector. It may also impact upon 
employer resistance to union organising both directly, via changes in profitability 
and indirectly, as a result of the restructuring of production and work systems. 
Thus, in theory there may be a link between openness to international trade and the 
extent of unionisation. If so, could rising international competition in the product 
market explain the decline of trade unionism observed in the UK since 1980? Using 
the theoretical background developed in this chapter we investigate this issue 
empirically in chapters 3 and 4. Another interesting implication of the literature 
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survey presented here is that the predictions about trade unions' abilities to bargain 
higher wages in the presence of foreign competition are crucially dependent upon the 
specific assumptions of the model in question. It would appear that this is essentially 
an empirical issue. Therefore, in chapter 5, we examine the influence of international 
competition on the union bargaining strength using data from the UK manufacturing 
sector. 
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Import Competition and 
the Decline of Coverage 
0 
in Britain lo Is There a Link? 
3-1 Introduction 
The closing decades of the 20th century was an era of rapid globalisation marked in 
particu ar by the liberalisation and growth of intemational trade. At the same time, 
union representation of employees was in decline and trade unions found their 
institutional position in the labour market increasingly undermined. In Britain, the 
weakening of orgamsed labour has been explained by a combination of factors, such 
as legislative changes, the political and macroeconomic climate, sectoral shifts and 
changes in the composition of the workforce, hostile management practices, falling 
demand for uniornsation and a lack of union organising efforts. Whilst some authors 
(for example, Freeman, 1985; Machin, 2000; Farber and Western, 2001) also argue 
that increased competitive pressures in the product market may have reduced the 
benefits of collective action and increased management incentives to exclude trade 
7y 
unions at the workplace, there is no detailed evidence of any link between 
international competition and the diminishing scope of trade unionism in the UK. We 
aim to make an empirical contribution by investigating whether the rapid decline in 
the coverage of collective bargaining in the manufacturing sector, during the course 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, can be explained by import competition in the goods 
market. 
In this context, this chapter matches 4-digit industry level data on major coverage 
from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) to industry trade variables 
compiled from the OECD's Intemational Trade by Commodities Statistics. The 
empirical strategy is divided into two parts. First, a shift share analysis is used to 
quantify the compositional effect of import penetration on union coverage. This is 
defined as an import-induced industry re-composition, causing the employment share 
in highly unionised sectors to fall while raising the share of employment in the least 
unionised industries. Second, we examine the influence of foreign competition on the 
extent of union coverage, irrespective of any compositional shifts, by forinulating a 
multivariate econometric model whereby different sets of hypotheses explaining 
union decline in the UK are taken into account. Moreover, since the pattern of trade 
may depend on union strategies (Naylor, 1999) we test for the potential endogeneity 
of trade flows. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3-2 describes the union and trade data 
sources and briefly reviews the existing literature on trade union decline in Britain. 
Section 3-3 considers the predictions about foreign competition and unionisation 
from the theory and sets out the empirical strategy. We perform the shift share 
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computations in section 3-4. Section 3-5 explains the econometric analysis and the 
main findings are summarised in section 3-6. 
3-2 Data description 
3-2-1 Union data: The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset 
The analysis in this chapter uses the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) 
for data on coverage. This is the longitudinal version of the New Earnings Survey 
(NES), conducted under the 1947 Statistics of Trade Act by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). The survey has a potential sample, conditional on a 100% response 
rate, of around I percent of all civilian employees covered by the tax and national 
insurance system in the UK (Elias and Gregory, 1994). Since the data are collected 
from employers, there is a high response rate and accuracy of the information 
provided. The sampling frame is based on individuals whose National Insurance 
numbers (NINO) end in the digits "14" (ONS, 1997) and as the NINO is issued in a 
completely random way to each individual employee of minimum school leaving 
age, this method provides a random sample of employees in the UK. The coverage of 
the survey is, however, subject to the following caveat. Because of its reliance on tax 
records, the NESPD under-represents a proportion of employees, especially part time 
workers, whose earnings fall below the 'pay as you earn' taxation threshold (Elias 
and Gregory, 1994). This is also likely to result in a series of discontinuous records 
for individuals who do not appear in the panel dataset in particular years when their 
eamings are below the tax threshold. 
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One of the main features of the NESPD is the relative stability of its sample design. 
It provides a consistent source of labour market data on individual workers observed 
during the 1975-2001 period. Aggregation of information from the individual to the 
industry level (up to 4 digit SIC) is quite straightforward and the availability of a 
longitudinal component makes it possible to control for unobservable fixed effects. 
Another advantage is that the data can be matched with other datasets especially at 
the industry level, enabling the analysis of a wide range of economic issues. 
The principal variables contained in the survey are as follows. There are three 
measures of earnings: weekly, hourly and annual. It also records the total number of 
hours worked in a week; job tenure, i. e. whether an employee has spent more than 12 
months in the same job; the type of employment, whether the individual is working 
part time or full time; occupation; industry; sector (private or public); and region. But 
there is very little information on personal characteristics apart from age and gender. 
For instance, the survey does not provide any measure of educational attainment of 
individuals. Similarly, many firm-level characteristics are not included. 
Our main interest, for the purposes of analysis in this chapter, lies in the union 
measure available in the dataset. The NESPD ives coverage by a major' union 9 
agreement excluding any type of company/district/local bargain. However, the use of 
this variable as a measure of unionism may be problematic for two reasons. First, in a 
study of union coverage differentials for the period 1975 to 1994, Andrews et al. 
(1998a) argue that major coverage represents only two thirds of all union agreements 
ise pay barg i ing implies that in the UK. Second, govemment policy to decentrall aim 
Major agreements refer to Union bargaining at the national or *industry level. 
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national/industry level agreements may have become relatively less important over 
time compared to local agreements (Andrews et al., 1998a). 
To assess the extent of these problems, in table 3.1 we compare major coverage from 
the NESPD, i. e. the proportion of workers covered by a major union agreement, and 
union recognition, measuring the proportion of workplaces that recognise trade 
unions for bargaining purposes. This variable is taken from the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (VVIRS) and comprises all types of collective bargaining 
agreements. We find that major coverage is much lower than recognition at the 
workplace. This could be due to the fact that the NESPD considers the proportion of 
individuals while WIRS measures the proportion of firms. Although if we look at the 
ratio 2 of major coverage to recognition, it appears to decrease over time, suggesting 
that collective bargaining at the national/industry level has indeed fallen more rapidly 
than local bargains and so major coverage will be considerably lower than the 
coverage by all union agreements. Consequently, union decline measured by major 
agreements may be misleading. 
Nonetheless, the variable in NESPD does represent a consistent annual measure of 
union coverage, recorded over a period of time spanning two decades. In addition, as 
we describe below, different measures of union presence and influence, including 
major coverage, show a similar declining trend of trade unionism since the 1980s. 
The ratio of overall major coverage to overall recognition falls from 0.75 m 1980 to 0.66 in 1990. 
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Table 3.1: Trade union presence, overall and by broad sectors, 1980-1998 
1980 1984 1990 1995 1998 
Major Coverage' 
Manufacturi g 27 28 15 10 
Private services 14 16 7 8 
Public Sector 89 90 85 74 
Overall 48 49 35 29 
Recognition b 
Manufacturing 65 56 44 30 
Private services 41 44 36 23 
Public Sector 94 99 87 87 
Overall 64 66 53 42 
Workplace presence b 
Manufacturing 77 67 58 42 
Private services 50 53 46 35 
Public Sector 99 100 99 97 
Overall 73 73 64 54 
Membership density' 
Manufacturing 39 31 27 
Private services 18 15 13 
Public Sector 60 58 
Overall 53 43 38 32 30 
Source: a. New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset; b. Millward et al. (2000); c. Broad sectors computed 
from Labour Force Survey (LFS) and overall membership density obtained from the Employment 
Gazette and Labour Market Trends. 
Notes: 
1. Major Coverage means the proportion of workers whose pay is set by a major agreement; 
Recognition: proportion of worAplaces that recognise unions for collective bargaining purposes; 
Workplace presence: proportion of establishments with union members; Density: the proportion of all 
paid employees who are union members. 
2. Allfigures are in percentages. 
Overall workplace presence (the proportion of workplaces with union members) and 
aggregate membership density (proportion of all paid employees who are union 
members) fell from 73% in 1980 to 54% in 1998 and 53% in 1980 to 30% in 1998 
respectively. There is a similar pattem for the coverage of collective bargaining. The 
NTESPD suggests a steady collapse of coverage by major union agreements in recent 
decades. Major coverage in all sectors fell from 48% in 1980 to 29% in 1995 and 
likewise, union recognition at the workplace fell from 64% in 1980 to 42% in 1998. 
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Figure 3.1 below plots the movement over time of overall major coverage from the 
NESPD and union recognition from WIRS. As can be seen, the two measures of 
collective bargaining share an ahnost identical declining trend. Thus, it can be argued 
that when examining union coverage over time, major coverage may represent an 
appropriate proxy, albeit being at a lower level than coverage by all union 
agreements. 
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3-2-2 Union decline in Britain revisited 
Table 3.1 and figure 3.1 above highlight the unprecedented decline in British trade 
unionism since 1980. Union presence and influence fell in all sectors of the economy 
but it would appear that manufacturing suffered the heaviest decline. For instance, 
workplace presence in manufacturing fell from 77% in 1980 to 42% in 1998 and 
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Year 
Figure 3.1: Major coverage and union recognition over time 
aggregate density dropped from 39% to 27% between 1990 and 1998. Coverage by a 
major agreement and union recognition in manufacturing industries were more than 
halved over the same period, falling from 27% in 1980 to 10% in 1995 and 65% in 
1980 to 30% in 1998 respectively. The decline of trade unions was somewhat less 
dramatic in services and the public sector. At this stage it is useful to revisit some of 
the common explanations advanced by researchers for the weakening of the union 
movement in the UK. 
The business cycle explanation. The business cycle theory of unionisation stems 
from the seminal work of Bain and Elsheikh (1976), predicting that unionism is 
likely to decline during a depression when the rate of price inflation is falling and 
unemployment is high. In effect, a decrease in inflation raises real earnings and 
reduces workers' incentives to unionise while high unemployment lowers the 
proportion of union workers in employment and increases the bargaining power of 
employers (Booth, 1983). Conversely, union presence is expected to grow when 
there is economic prosperity. UK evidence from Carruth and Disney (1988) reveals 
that union decline was only partly related to the business cycle. They argue that in 
the steady state union density is negatively related to real wage growth but that it 
exhibits dynamics over the cycle related to unemployment and inflation. 
Industrial relations reforms. The aggressive trade union refornis enacted by Mrs. 
Thatcher's Conservative government is an important explanation of union decline in 
the UK. SiX3 pieces of industrial relations legislation were passed by successive Tory 
administrations during the 1980-93 period. They aimed at directly undermining 
3 1980,1982,1988 and 1990 Employment Acts, 1984 Trade Union Act and 1993 Trade Union 
Reform and Employment Rights Act. 
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union organisation and union bargaining power. There are some disagreements 
regarding the relative significance of these legislative changes on the extent of 
unionisation. Freeman and Pelletier (1990) blame most of the 1980s union decline on 
the unfavourable legislation endorsed by the Thatcher government. Though, critics 
argue that their approach is unden-nined by the assumption of a unilateral 'cause and 
effect' relationship between legislation and union decline. In fact, Disney (1990) 
suggests that falling unionisation may have helped the introduction of anti-union 
legislative changes. This is supported by the cautious stance adopted by the 
government in the beginning of the 1980s and the 'step by step' changes in 
legislation introduced afterwards. Moreover the precipitate decline in the early 1980s 
cannot be statistically explained by legislation that took place throughout the period. 
Brown and Wadhwani (1990) also question the effectiveness of the early union 
reforms and the slowing of the rate of union decline after 1983 is contrary to the 
legislative change explanation. Meanwhile, Waddington (1992) points out that the 
impact of legislation was conditioned by a range of other influences especially the 
structural and economic changes at the time. 
Compositional changes in the make-up of the labour force. Compositional changes, 
resulting mainly from a shift in employment from the traditional union strongholds in 
male dominated, blue-collar manufacturing to white-collar services and the increased 
labour market participation of women and part-timers, are also believed to be a 
significant contributory factor in the decline of unionisation (Towers, 1989; Booth, 
1989). An increasing number of small firms operating in the service sector emerged 
in place of the larger manufacturing workplaces and there was also a spatial shift in 
employment to less unionised, south-eastern areas of Britain (Millward et al., 2000). 
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The privatisation of public workplaces was also an important factor. Whilst Carruth 
and Disney (1988) and Freeman and Pelletier (1990) report no evidence of 
compositional effects on unionisation up to the mid-1980s, Green (1992) shows that 
the combined effect of compositional change according to industry, gender, 
occupation, age, region, establishment size and full time or part time status may have 
accounted for around 30% of the fall in union density in the late 1980s. It is also 
argued that the change in the sectoral structure of employment from manufacturing 
to services was relatively more important than other workforce composition changes 
(Waddington, 1992; and Green 1992). But when compared to within industry 
behavioural influences, the contribution of compositional change to union decline in 
the 1980s and 1990s is found to be quite small (Green 1992; Forth, 2000; Bryson and 
Gomez, 2002; Machin, 2002; Charlwood, 2003). 
Worker attitudes. A shift in worker preferences against union representation is 
another reason cited for declining trade unionism in Britain. It is plausible that 
workers' perception of the effectiveness of labour unions, which arguably lost some 
of their 'power appeal' in the 1980s, changed over time. In addition, the attraction of 
joining the union movement may have diminished as a consequence of union-like 
services being provided by employers themselves. The growth of individualist 
attitudes and values amongst workers may have also reduced their willingness to 
unionise. Further, Millward et al. (2000) argue that the introduction of 'alternative 
work practices' (AWPs) such as profit sharing, employee involvement and team 
working is likely to have decreased the demand for trade unions. However, recent 
micro-level studies fail to confirm that AWPs contributed to union decline (Machin 
and Wood, 2004) and generally speaking, there is little evidence that the extent of 
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unionisation in Britain fell because of employee attitudes changing the propensity to 
unionise (Charlwood, 2003). Charlwood (2003) argues that the aggregate attitude 
towards trade unions in the 1990s was favourable yet union decline continued. It 
would seem that the weakness and ineffectiveness of union organisation were 
probably more to blame. 
Management initiatives to restrict union availability. Another factor explaining the 
decline of unionisation is management resistance to union organising. This is 
evidenced by the failure of trade unions to achieve recognition at new establishments 
set up after 1980 (Disney et al., 1995,1996; Machin, 2000). Wifle fonnal de- 
recognition has generally been rare in the UK (Beaumont and Harris, 1995), trade 
union coverage fell at continuing workplaces as a result of the de-collectivisation of 
pay bargaining (Charlwood, 2003). This refers to a situation whereby management 
discontinues bargaining relationships with the union although the latter is allowed to 
retain institutional presence at the workplace. In fact, during the 1980s and the 
1990s, management initiatives were increasingly aimed at establishing greater 
influence over employees, reasserting managerial power and reducing the role of 
trade unions (Waddington and Whitston, 1997; Fairbrother, 2000). By weakening the 
collective bargaining process, employers also undermined the social custom of 
unionism, leading to a decline in the incentives to unionise (Charlwood, 2003). These 
developments suggest that management took advantage of existing legislative 
restrictions on union power to marginalize the process of collective bargaining and 
the union movement. Moreover, it is argued that economic changes such as increased 
competition in the product market could increase management motivations to restrict 
union availability at the workplace whilst raising the costs and lowering the benefits 
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of collective action by trade unions (Machin, 2000; Farber and Western, 2001; 
Charlwood, 2003). 
3-2-3 Industry trade data 
None of the above studies consider the role of foreign competition in any detail, so to 
investigate the influence of international competition on unionisation, we match 
industry trade variables to union coverage from the NESPD. However, the trade data 
is available for the manufacturing sector only and so the present analysis is unable to 
control for sectoral shifts from manufacturing to services which, as argued above, is 
an important explanation of union decline in the UK. Compilation of the industry 
trade data involves the following steps. 
1. We gather a detailed record of UK merchandise trade from the OECD's 
International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS, Revision 2) database 
which, gives the values of annual UK imports and exports for each tradable good. 
The commodities are classified into five major groups according to the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC): 
(1) food, beverages and tobacco; 
(2) crude materials, ammal and vegetable oils and fats; 
(3) mineral fuels and lubricants; 
(4) chemicals and manufactured goods classified by materials; 
(5) machinery and transport equipment. 
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2. Matching the commodities to their corresponding industries is achieved through 
the concordance 4 of the SITC codes (at the 4-digit level of disaggregation) to the 
4-digit 1980 UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC80). For instance, 'butter' 
(SITC code: 0230) and 'cheese' (SITC code: 0240) are matched to the industry 
C preparation of milk and milk products' (SIC80: 4130). Hence, for any given 
year, aggregating over the import and export values of all goods within each 
respective industry yields the total yearly import and export by 4-digit 
manufactunng industries. 
3. The industry trade values are then merged to gross industry output (at the 4-digit 
level) ftom the Census of Production. Data on output is available from 1982 to 
1995, with 1992 missing. Since the UK industry codes changed from SIC80 to 
SIC92 in 1992,, we maP5 all data based on SIC92 from 1993 onwards to SIC80 
before merging. 
Using the combined coverage-trade dataset 6, annual import penetration ratios and 
export shares for industry i at time t are computed as follows. 
Import Penetrationit = 
(importit) (1) 
(grossoutputit 
- 
exp ortit + importit 
Export sharei, 
exp ortit (2) 
grossoutputit 
4 This is shown in table 3A. 2 in the appendix. 
5 The SIC80-SIC92 correspondence is available from the Office for National Statistics. 
6 Construction of the coverage-trade dataset is surnmarised in table 3A. I *in the appendix. 
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The (coverage-trade) dataset contains 2380 observations, corresponding to an 
unbalanced panel of 200 4-digit. manufactunng industries observed during the period 
1982-95 (excluding 1992). 
In figure 3.2 below, we plot the overall trend in import penetration calculated firom 
the industry trade data and union coverage for manufacturing over the period 1982- 
95. It reveals an increasing level of foreign competition, with the share of foreign 
manufactured goods in the UK domestic market rising from 26% in 1982 to 34% in 
1990 and over 40% in 1995. On the other hand, there is a declining pattern in union 
coverage, falling from 28% in 1982 to 10% in 1995. 
e Coverage (%) 6 Import penetration ratio (%) 
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Figure 3.2: Import penetration and union coverage in UK manufacturing 1982-95 
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3-3 Accounting for the decline of union coverage in 
UK manufacturing: the role of foreign competition 
From the above discussion, it appears that the decline of trade unions coincided with 
increased international competition in the product market. However, the overall 
association etween the variables does not necessarily prove that foreign competition 
had a causal effect on coverage. As such, this section examines the theoretical 
predictions about international competition and unionisation and presents our 
empirical strategy for assessing the role of foreign competition in the decline of 
coverage in UK manufacturing. 
3-3-1 Predictions from theory 
The theoretical review in chapter 2 suggests two channels through which import 
penetration is likely to influence unionisation. These will have important 
implications for our empirical methodology. 
1. Import competition as a compositional factor. Grossman (1984) provides some 
clear predictions about the relationship between foreign competition and union size. 
His median voter model shows that 
, 
in the presence of rising foreign competition, 
where there is a high elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, senior 
union members will prefer to maintain wages at the expense of future employment, 
thereby reducing the size of the trade union. Under such circumstances, import 
competition may effectively lead to a decrease in the size of the union intensive 
sectors. Therefore, the decline of union coverage in manufacturing could be 
explained by import penetration causing industries with high proportion of workers 
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covered by bargaining agreements to shrink. Consequently, this could lead to an 
import-induced industry re-composition whereby the share of employment in sectors 
associated with high import competition and low rates of coverage would rise whilst 
employment share in the traditionally highly unionised but less import penetrated 
industries would decline. 
2. Import competition as a non-compositional effect. Import competition can also 
reduce unionisation irrespective of any compositional change. The demand for 
unionisation is likely to be a positive function of the wage outcome of union-firm 
bargaining so that a negative import competition effect on wages implies that there 
are fewer workers willing to stay unionised. As union wages and hence, the 
perceived benefits of unionism falls, there will also be a reduced incentive for labour 
unions to engage in efficient collective action. The theoretical models in chapter 2 
show that import competition may lower the union wage gains under given 
conditions. According to Layard et al. (199 1), increased product market competition 
reduces the amount of rents available to be shared between the firm and the union, 
thus decreasing the union mark up. Hill (1984) predicts a negative impact of import 
penetration on the union wage gap when the union sector is labour intensive and the 
elasticity of factor substitution is greater than one. Grossman (1984) shows that 
increased competitive pressure from abroad may lead to lower negotiated wages if 
the median voter chooses to safeguard employment. The union mark up may also fall 
if import competition causes a sufficiently large fall in the demand for goods 
produced in the domestic union sector (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985) and leads to 
production of import competing union goods being lost to foreign rivals (Staiger, 
1988). In addition, a credible threat of finns relocating abroad due to increased 
import penetration is also likely to discipline union wage demands (Mezzetti and 
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Dinopoulos, 1991). Although, Naylor (1999) argues that the overall effect of foreign 
competition may depend on exports too. 
Furthermore, increased foreign competition can provide greater incentives for 
management to oppose rent-sharing trade unions. Employers may adopt various anti- 
union tactics aimed at reducing the appeal of unions to workers and increasing the 
costs of union organising by directly confronting union presence at the workplace. 
By the same token, the pressure to compete with international rivals may motivate an 
extensive restructuring of production and work systems as well as reorganisations of 
the labour force, which can be detrimental to union organisation within industries. 
Rising global competition may also induce firms, governments and the public in 
general to take on negative attitudes toward labour unions, regarding union 
organisation as upholding economic inefficiency. 
In general, changes in the demand for unionisation, management practices, work 
methods and attitudes toward trade unions are likely to arise from increased foreign 
competition causing union sectors to become intrinsically less unionised (regardless 
of changes in industry composition). 
3-3-2 The empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is, therefore, carried out in two separate steps. 
1. Import competition as a compositional effect is quantified using a basic shift share 
technique. The shift share analysis represents a simple and straightforward approach 
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for separating out the decline of union coverage caused by import competition 
changing the employment composition of manufacturing industries (the 
compositional effect) and behavioural. changes occurring within industries (such as 
changes in firm, industry and labour force characteristics). 
2. We use an econometric analysis to model the non-compositional influences of 
import competition on union coverage. A pooled multivariate regression model, 
taking into account the main industry deteiminants of unionisation, is specified. 
Since the pattern of trade may depend on union strategies (Naylor, 1999) we also test 
for the potential endogeneity of trade flows 
3-4 Foreign competition as a compositional factor 
In order to examine the changing composition of employment according to foreign 
competition, we merge data for 4-digit industries on coverage and import penetration 
ratios from the combined coverage-industry trade dataset to industry employment7 
from the Census of Production. A basic shift share analysis is then used to 
decompose the change in coverage between 1983 and 1995 as follows. 
n=H n=H n=H 
AC= 1 ?5- 03)E, 83 + 95 _Ei83)Ci83 +I (Ci95 _ Ci83 )(Ei95 _Ei83 (3) 
., 
d(c II_. J(Ei' i=L i=L i=L 
74 digit employment data is available from 1983 onwards. 
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In equation (3), C is coverage, L and H represent the group of Industries with low 
and high foreign competition 8 respectively and Ej is the proportion of workers 
employed in each category. The first term on the right hand side measures the change 
in industry coverage attributed to behavioural changes among manufacturing sectors, 
keeping employee composition constant at the 1983 level. The second term denotes 
the compositional effect of foreign competition and is defined as the change in 
coverage caused by an import-led shift in employment composition, assuming 
coverage is not subject to any behavioural change. The last temi is an interaction of 
the two effects and is typically expected to be quite small. 
Results from the shift share computations in table 3.2 below show that import 
competition as a compositional factor is trivial, accounting for around 2.1% of the 
overall decline in coverage between 1983 and 1995. Clearly, most of the fall in union 
coverage is explained by behavioural changes amongst industries rather than by the 
reallocation of workers brought about by import competition. 
Table 3.2: Fall in coverage explained by compositional and behavioural changes 
% Explained by behavioural changes 99.7 
% Explained by compositional effect of import competition 2.1 
Source: Computed using equation (3) 
Note: The percentages do not sum to 100 because of the interactive term9. 
We must point out that the shift-share technique is a descriptive tool and does not 
account for many factors determining industry coverage. A further limitation is that it 
only gives a 'snap-shot' of the manufacturing sector at two points in time, 1983 and 
8 High (low) import competition refers to industries with import penetration ratios greater (less) than 
the median import share. 
9 The interaction of the between and within effects yields a positive impact of 1.8% on coverage. 
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1995. In addition, the results may be sensitive to the time period chosen and the 
manner in which industries are grouped into different categories. 
3-5 Estimating the non-compositional impact of 
import competition on union coverage 
3-5-1 Simple univariate analysis 
Given the very small compositional-effect of import penetration and the underlying 
limitations of the shift-share analysis, this section investigates whether increased 
foreign competition in the product market in the 1980s and early 1990s could explain 
union decline in UK manufacturing industries, irrespective of any shift in industry 
composition. Typically, this can be achieved through a regression analysis. Consider 
the following pooled OLS10 univariate model, 
cit : --a +, Bmit +Pit 
i= 4-digit manufacturing industries; t= year (1983-1995) 11 
(4) 
where c is the proportion of workers in the industry covered by a major union 
agreement is industry import share andpi, is a random error term. t-: ) I'Mi 
10 Although the dependent variable, coverage (ci, ), is bounded between 0 and 1, we do not control for 
this via a non-linear transformation such as the logit, since in general, the data has a continuous 
pattern (rather than a discrete one). 
We consider the period 1983-95 in order to be consistent with the analysis in the previous section. 
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We could formulate equation (4) in terms of the group (industry) means to show how 
import competition influences coverage when it differs between industries and in 
terms of the deviations from the group means to capture the effect of changing 
import penetration within industries (Greene, 1997). These are shown by expressions 
(5) and (6) respectively. 
Ci =a+fib Mi +iýi 
cit 
- 
ci (m, 
- 
Mi) + P, 
- 
Pi 
It follows that the overall effect of foreign competition, given by the pooled 
estimator 8, is a weighted average of the between-groups estimator, 8b, and the 
within-groups estimator, 8,,. Note that 8b uses the cross-section (or between) 
information in the data while, 8,, is based on the time series (or within) variations. As 
such, before proceeding to the formal econometric investigation, the descriptive 
analysis below takes a closer look the between and within variations in the dataset. 
3-5-1-1 Import competition between industries 
The theoretical predictions imply that disproportionate declines in coverage would be 
in industries with the greatest rise in import penetration and conversely, the smallest 
decline or even gain in coverage should be observed where import penetration has 
fallen. Hence, one way of analysing the effect of foreign competition on coverage Is 
in terms of the changes in import penetration across industries. Table 3.3 below ranks 
4-digit industries by the change in import penetration between 1983 and 1995. 
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Table 3.3: Ranking industries by the change import penetration between industries 
SIC80 Description Change in import share Change in coverage 
Highest increase in import penetration 
4560 Fur goods manufacturing 366 
-15 
4290 Tobacco 326 
-1 
4959 Miscellaneous manufacturing 239 
-0.4 
4920 Musical Instruments 181 
-5 
4321 Spinning and doubling on the cotton system 112 
-15 
3442 Electrical instruments 82 
-14 
3289 Marine precision components 77 
-19 
2564 Essential oils and flavouring materials 58 
-12 
2471 Flat glass manufacturing 57 
-1 
3444 Manufacturing components other than active 54 
-11 
components 
Smallest increase in import penetration 
4214 Cocoa, chocolate, sugar confectionery 1.8 
-14 
3302 Electronic data processing equipment 1.8 
-2 
4725 Packaging products of board 1.4 
-13 
4751 Printing and publishing of newspapers 1 
-66 
4723 Stationery manufacturing 0.8 
-7 
4130 Preparation of milk and milk products 0.7 
-13 
3204 Fabricated constructional steelwork 0.6 
-14 
3111 Ferrous metal foundries 0.6 
-40 
2479 Glass products 0.4 
-8 
4396 Rope, twine and net 0.1 3 
Biggest decrease in import penetration 
2235 Miscellaneous drawing, cold rolling and 
-264 -26 
forming of steel 
3283 Compressors and fluid power equipment 
-125 -29 
4385 General carpet, rugs and matting 
-106 -3 
4910 Jewellery and coins 
-102 -4 
3275 Machinery for working wood 
-101 -23 
3290 Ordnance, small arms and amunition 
-92 -62 
3710 Measuring and precision equipments 
-87 -15 
3288 Industrial valves 
-73 -1 
2599 General chemical products 
-69 -5 
3435 Electrical and general equipment for 
-61 -12 
industrial use 
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SIC80 Description Change in import share Change in coverage 
Smallest decrease in import penetration 
3137 Bolts, nuts, washers, rivets, springs and non 
-2.5 -23 
precision chains 
4832 Plastic serni manufactures 
-2.3 -6 
4533 Women's tailored outwear 
-2 1 
4650 Miscellaneous wooden articles 
-1.5 -7 
2247 Non ferrous metals and their alloys 
-1.3 -11 
4557 Household textiles 
-1.2 -4 
4510 Footwear 
-0.9 -11 
4350 Jute and polypropylene yams and fabrics 
-0.6 -2 
4538 Gloves 
-0.2 18 
4196 Bread baking and flour confectionery 
-0.1 -24 
Source: Combined coverage-industry trade dataset 
Notes. 
- 
Figures show changes in percentage points 
The table presents industries with the highest and smallest increase as well as the 
greatest and lowest decrease in import penetration. The statistics reveal that between 
1983 and 1995 coverage declined in almost all industries. The magnitudes of the 
change in coverage are fairly comparable across the different groups and, in general, 
we do not detect any systematic difference between industries with the highest 
increase in import penetration and those where the rise in foreign competition has 
been minimal. A similar observation can be made when examining the change in 
coverage where import penetration has declined. In essence, the ranking of industries 
does not generate an unambiguous observable pattern between the changes in 
coverage and import competition between industries. Union coverage appears to 
have fallen in all industries more or less irrespective of how import penetration 
differs across manufacturing sectors, suggesting that the between-industry variations 
are not very significant. 
58 
Furthermore, we consider the importance of the differences in import penetration 
between industries for union coverage by examining the group/industry means. 
Figure 3.3 below plots industry coverage and import share averaged over the period 
1983-95. 
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Figure 3.3: Mean coverage and import share by industry, 1983-95 
The regression line corresponds to equation (5). Its estimated coefficients are given 
below,, with the standard errors in parentheses. 
ei - 0.15 - 0.02 m-i 
(0.012) (0.016) 
(7) 
The coefficient on import share implies that changing import penetration between 
industries has a negative effect on coverage, however , it is only significant at 17%. It 
confirrns the view that the variations across industries are not particularly large. 
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3-5-1-2 Import competition within industries 
In order to examine the within variations in the data and the influence of import 
competition on union coverage when it changes within industries, figure 3.4 plots the 
deviations of the coverage and import penetration from their respective industry 
means 
, 
i. e. cit 
-ci and mi, -m,, 
Fitted values 
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Figure 3.4 Deviation of coverage and import share from group means 
The regression line, which relates to equation (6), is given by 
C-i ) =- 0.002 - 0.00 7(m i, - M-i ) 
(0.002) (0.006) 
(8) 
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The slope coefficient (standard errors in parentheses) in equation (8) is not 
statistically different from zero, suggesting that the within 12 
-industry changes are not 
important. In essence, there seems to be no significant link between changing import 
competition within industries and within-industry change in union coverage. 
3-5-1-3 Univariate pooled OLS regression 
So, using the combined within and between information in the data we estimate the 
total non-compositional effect of foreign competition from the pooled univariate 
regression model (4). The estimated coefficients and standard errors are as follows. 
cit = 0.15 
- 
0.01 mit 
(0-004) (0.003) (9) 
In equation (9) import competition has a statistically significant negative impact on 
union coverage, irrespective of any compositional change. The coefficient on import 
share shows that industry coverage decreases by 0.01% for every percentage rise in 
foreign competition. From the descriptive analysis in the earlier sections, it can be 
argued that the significant foreign competition effect on coverage is more likely to be 
explained by the cross-section variations in import penetration rather than the within- 
industry changes. However, a major caveat of the univariate regresssion is that it 
suffers from omitted variable bias. There are many other factors that affect 
unionisation and these will need to be taken into account. 
12 The within industry changes can also be gauged from a first differenced regression of coverage on 
import penetration. The results are as follows: 
Acit 
= 
-0.01 - 0. OOIA Mit 
. 
The slope coefficient is not (0-002) (0.001) 
significant, confirn-iing the above observations about changing import competition within industries. 
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3-5-2 Multivariate econometric model 
The basic union coverage equation (4) can be augmented by including a vector of 
control variables (X) as follows, 
cit =a+ p mit + Xit fil +, Uit (10) 
As such, we match 13 the combined coverage-trade dataset to other industry variables 
at the 4-digit SIC level taken from the NESPD, the Labour Force Survey and the 
Census of Production. The control variables included are essentially drawn from 
previous studies 14 on the determinants of unionisation and some of the main 
explanations of union decline reviewed in section 3-2. As we discuss below, the 
pattern of union coverage is likely to be a function of age, gender, part-time 
employment, education and training, occupation, region, sector, size of 
establishment, market structure and the export performance of the industry. 
Age. Two age variables are constructed using data from the NESPD: the proportion 
of workers aged 25 or below and the proportion of workers between the age of 25 
and 45. Younger workers may feel less loyal to management than older workers and 
may show a greater propensity to unionise. On the other hand, to the extent that 
younger workers are more educated they may not feel the need to be unionised in 
order to progress in their careers. They may also tend to overlook the historical role 
of labour unions. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the a priori sign of the regression 
coefficients of the age variables. 
" See table 3A. I in the appendix describing the construction of the final dataset used for estimation. 
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Gender. We include the proportion of female workers in the industry as a proxy for 
gender. The higher the proportion of women the lower the extent of unionisation in 
the industry. It is argued that women are less attached to the labour market since they 
are often in part time employment and are not employed continuously due to 
marriage or family commitments. The data source for this variable is the NESPD. 
Part-time employment. There is a negative association between part time 
employment and unionisation. Part time workers are basically less concerned about 
joining trade unions than full time workers. Because of the under-representation of 
part-time employees in the NESPD, we compute the proportion of part time workers 
in the industry from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Education and Training. Proxies for education and training are also taken from the 
LFS. We include the proportion of workers in the industry with further and higher 
education., the proportion of workers with secondary education and the proportion of 
workers with job-related training. Better-educated and well-trained workers have 
greater individual bargaining power. They may also identify more closely with 
management and are less inclined to seek union representation. There may be a 
positive correlation between job-related training and unionisation if trade unions 
encourage firms to provide more training than they otherwise would (Booth and 
Chatterp, 1998). This is because workers would be more willing to take up jobs in 
unionised firms and benefit from increased performance, productivity and pay as a 
consequence of the higher levels of job-related training. 
14 Bam and Elsheikh (1979); Farber (1983); Hirsch and Berger (1984); Booth (1986,1995); Magnam 
and Prentice (2003). 
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Occupation. The NESPD provides information on the proportion of white-collar and 
blue-collar workers. Skilled workers are generally less unionised than manual 
workers. They are more educated, better paid and able to negotiate with employers 
individually. They may also be more closely associated with management. We 
expect a negative sign for the regression coefficient of the proportion of white-collar 
workers and a positive sign for blue-collar workers. 
Region. The model includes the proportion of workers from ten different regions in 
the UK. These are defined in table 3.4 below and the main source for these variables 
is the NESPD 
Sector. The vector X also contains a variable measuring the proportion of workers in 
the private sector. This is taken from the NESPD. The higher the proportion of 
workers in the private sector, the lower the level of unionisation in the industry. 
Privatisation is often cited as a causal factor explaining the decline of trade unions in 
Bntaln. 
Size of establishment. Another explanation for falling unionisation in the UK is the 
increased prominence of small firms. So we include the proportion of small firms 
(firms with 25 workers or less) from LFS. Trade unions are more interested in 
organising larger than smaller establishments because of economies of scale and 
similarly, employees in larger firms are more likely to engage in collective 
bargaining to determine their pay and conditions than in smaller firms. Hence, the 
greater the proportion of small firms in the industry the lower union coverage will be. 
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Market structure. Concentration ratios from the Census of Production are used to 
proxy the domestic market structure. Data on two different measures of 
concentration are available: the 4-firm concentration ratio from 1983 to 1991 and the 
herfindahl ratio from 1993 to 1995. In order to arrive at a consistent measure of 
market structure, we construct dummy variables corresponding to different levels of 
concentration in the industry. This is made possible as both indices have values 
ranging between 0 and 1, where a value closer to 1 indicates a high degree 
concentration. Three dummy variables are created, relating to concentration ratios in 
the following ranges: less or equal to 0.2; greater than 0.2 but less or equal to 0.5; 
and greater than 0.5. The latter is used as the reference dummy. 
High industry concentration may be associated with greater levels of unionisation as 
trade unions are attracted to greater wage gaining opportunities in the presence of 
high oligopolistic and monopolistic rents. In less competitive industries, firms have a 
greater ability to pass cost increases on to consumers and are in better positions to 
allow union practices (Bain and Elsheikh, 1979). The smaller number of firms and 
the existence of barriers to entry in concentrated sectors also imply that once 
organised it is easier for labour unions to maintain jurisdictional control over the 
industry. However, it is plausible that firms in less competitive industries are more 
willing and have more resources to resist union organisation (Disney et al., 1996). 
Export performance. We include export share to control for the export perfon-nance 
of the industry. Exports may lead to increased labour demand and higher union 
wages (Naylor, 1999), thereby raising the demand for and the extent of unionisation 
in the industry. On the other hand, improved export performance may necessitate 
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cost reductions and changes in technology and production methods, which may not 
be conducive to union organisation at the workplace. 
Time dummies. Finally, the model incorporates time dummies to capture the 
influence of public policy, especially the drastic changes in industrial relations 
legislation and, the general macroeconomic and political climate of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. As explained in section 3-2, these factors generally had an adverse 
impact on trade unions in the UK. 
Table 3.4 shows the definitions, data sources, mean values and standard deviations of 
all variables used in the present analysis. 
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Table 3.4: Definition of variables, data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Source Mean Standard 
n=2060 Deviation 
Coverage Proportion of workers covered by a NESPD 0.15 0.15 
major collective agreement 
Age25 Proportion of worker aged 25 or below C4 0.2 0.08 
Age25-45 Proportion of worker above 25 but below 4C 0.46 0.08 
45 years old 
Female Proportion of female workers M industry C4 0.28 0.17 
White collar Proportion of skilled workers in industry cc 0.18 0.09 
Blue collar Proportion of unskilled workers 0.55 0.17 
Private Proportion of workers in the private 0.98 0.12 
sector 
London Proportion of workers living in London 0.08 0.08 
South East Proportion of workers living in South 0.15 0.12 
East 
East Proportion of workers living in East 0.04 0.05 
South West Proportion of workers living in South 0.07 0.07 
West 
West Midlands Proportion of workers living in West 0.12 0.12 
Midlands 
East Midlands Proportion of workers living M East 0.10 0.12 
Midlands 
Yorkshire Proportion of workers living in 0.11 0.11 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
North West Proportion of workers living in North 0.15 0.13 
West 
North Proportion of workers living in North 0.05 0.06 
Wales Proportion of workers living in Wales 0.04 0.05 
Part-time Proportion of workers employed part- LFS 0.09 0.09 
time 
Further Proportion of workers with 44 0.10 0.09 
further/higher education 
Secondary Proportion of workers with secondary 44 0.36 0.14 
qualifications 
Job related Proportion of workers with j ob-related 44 0.10 0.08 
training training 
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Variable Definition Source Mean Standard 
n=2060 Deviation 
Small firms Proportion of small firms in industry (no. 46 0.30 0.33 
of employees less or equal to 25) 
Concentration2O Dumrny=1 if 4-firm concentration Census of 0.50 0.50 
ratio/herfindhal ratio less or equal to than Production 
0.2 
Concentration50 Dummy= 1 if 4-firm. concentration 44 0.33 0.47 
ratio/herfindahl ratio greater than 0.2 and 
less or equal to 0.5 
Import Import penetration ratio See section 0.47 0.99 
penetration 3-2 
Export share Export share 44 0.48 1.05 
Source: Mean and standard deviations of variables computed from compiled dataset 
Note. 
- n is the number of observations 
3-5-2-1 Endogenous trade 
It is argued that trade flows are dependent on wage costs and more specifically, on 
the wage strategies adopted by trade unions (Naylor, 1999). Hence, prior to 
estinlation, we test for the potential endogenous nature of trade by applying the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). There 
are three stages to the test. First we obtain the residuals from separate OLS 
regressions of import penetration and export share on all industry characteristics in 
the dataset and one period lagged values of the trade variables. Second, the predicted 
residuals are included amongst the explanatory variables in the union coverage 
ing OLS. Fi ally, an F-test for the Joint equation (10) and the model is estimated usi in 
significance of the residuals of import penetration and export share is performed. If 
they are jointly significant, the null hypothesis that import penetration and export 
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share are exogenous is rejected. In this instance, our data does not provide sufficient 
evidence 15 for the endogeneity of trade. The F statistic is equal to 1.60 and has a p- 
value of 0.2. 
3-5-2-2 Results from pooled OLS regression 
Results from the pooled OLS estimation of equation (10), using our industry-level 
dataset, are presented in table 3.5 below. Specification (1) is the univariate regression 
of coverage on import penetration. Specification (2) shows the model augmented by 
variables depicting the general characteristics of the labour force. The effects of finn 
size and privatisation are accounted for in column (3). Specification (4) includes 
other industry characteristics such as the concentration dummies and export share. 
Lastly, the time dummies are added in column (5). We generate robust standard 
errors to control for minor deviations Erom the least squares assumptions and 
problems related to outliers and influential observations. 
15 This finding also concurs with previous studies considering endogenous trade, for example Gaston 
and Trefler (1994), Freeman and Katz (199 1) and Karier (199 1). 
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Table 3.5: Results from pooled OLS estimation 
12345 
Import penetration 
-0.011 -0-008 -0.010 -0.005 -0.004 
(2.7 3) (2.8 9) (2.44)* (1.49) (1.07) 
Export share 
-0.005 -0.006 
(1.47) (1.75) t 
Female 
-0.065 -0.017 -0.026 -0.001 
(2.58)* (0.73) (1.15) (0.03) 
Age25 
-0.079 -0.086 -0.093 -0.111 
(1.47) (1.68) t (1.79) t (2.14)* 
Age25-45 
-0.053 -0.035 -0.059 -0.020 
(1.08) (0.76) (1.29) (0.44) 
Part time 
-0.124 -0.068 -0.082 -0.043 
(2.6 1) ** (1.55) (1.85) t (0.95) 
Further 
-0.059 -0.075 -0.077 -0.041 
(1.37) (1.83) (1.83) t (1.00) 
Secondary 
-0.065 -0.038 -0.040 0.024 
(2.54)* (1.53) (1.56) (0.95) 
Job related training 
-0.073 -0.079 -0.073 0.007 
(1.68) t (1.83) t (1.56) (0.16) 
White collar 
-0.324 -0.269 -0.265 -0.300 
(5.84)** (5.23)** (5.20) ** (5.94) ** 
Blue collar 0.050 0.043 0.052 -0.024 
(1.87) t (1.64) t (1.99)* (0.75) 
London 0.057 0.073 0.101 0.029 
(1.12) (1.51) (2.09)* (0.63) 
South East 
-0.049 -0.014 -0.023 -0.048 
(1.12) t (0.35) (0.56) (1.15) 
South West 
-0.092 -0.055 -0.059 -0.046 
(1.7 1) t (1.11) (1.21) (0.93) 
North 0.115 0.050 0.039 0.031 
(1.80) t (0.92) (0.71) (0.58) 
North West 
-0.067 -0.026 -0.030 -0.033 
(1.67) t (0.71) (0.81) (0.86) 
East 
-0.148 -0.077 -0.082 -0.084 
(2.75)** (1.52) (1.59) (1.61) t 
East Nfidlands 0.073 0.094 0.112 0.128 
(1.42) (1.92) t (2.30)* (2.62) ** 
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12345 
West Midlands 0.054 0.066 0.053 0.075 
(1.25) (1.63) t (1.29) (1.84) t 
Yorkshire 0.101 0.129 0.121 0.139 
(2.03)* (2.84)** (2.69)** (3.08)** 
Wales 
-0.091 -0.222 -0.207 -0.146 
(1.04) (3.29)** (2.94)** (2.13)* 
Small firms 
-0.038 -0.035 -0.047 
(4.28)** (4.02)** (2.08)* 
Private 
-0.446 -0.470 -0.446 
(11.96)** (11.78)** (11.41)** 
Concentration20 0.043 0.044 
(5.32)** (5.64)** 
Concentration50 0.045 0.045 
(4.95)** (5.04)** 
1984 
-0.004 (0.24) 
1985 
-0.008 (0.50) 
1986 
-0.027 (1.72) t 
1987 
-0.059 (3.88)** 
1988 
-0.064 (4.20)** 
1989 
-0.038 (1.95) t 
1990 
-0.062 (3.30)** 
1991 
-0.056 (2.85)** 
1993 
-0.095 (5.63)** 
1994 
-0.104 (5.94)** 
1995 
-0.124 (8.3 1) ** 
Constant 0.151 0.284 0.678 0.678 0.693 
(38.04)** (5.27)** (11.28)** (11.14)** (11.04)** 
Observations 2091 2066 2066 2060 2060 
R-squared 0.01 0.24 0.33 0.34 0.40 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
tsignificant at 10% * significant at 5% 
,- 
** significa nt at 1% 
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Overall, the econometric model performs well, providing some key insights into the 
determinants of changing union coverage within manufacturing industries during the 
period 1983-95. 
Labourforce characteristics. From column (4), rising proportions of youths aged 25 
or below, part-timers, non-manuals and educated employees appear to reduce the 
extent of union coverage while the proportion of blue-collar workers is positively 
correlated with unionisation. The introduction of time dummies in column (5), 
however, only leaves the variable age25 and the proportion of white-collar workers 
statistically significant. Although most of the variables for region are insignificant, 
we note that industry coverage is higher in the Midlands and Yorkshire but lower in 
Wales and the east of England. 
Other industry characteristics. The prominence of small firms and privatisation 
reduced coverage significantly over the period 1983-95. For instance, a rise of 1% in 
the proportion of workers employed in the private sector decreases coverage by 
0.45%. On the other hand, we find that a low degree of industry concentration is 
associated with a greater proportion of workers covered in the sector. 
Time dummies. The time dummies are generally strongly significant at the 1% 
level 16 
. 
The coefficients are negative and increase in magnitude over time relative to 
the base year (1983). This finding is consistent with the notion that legislative 
changes and the political and macroeconomic conditions adversely affected trade 
unions in Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
16 1984 and 1985 are not significant. 1986 and 1989 are weakly significant at 10%. 
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Trade Variables. The coefficient on export share is weakly significant in 
specification (5), suggesting that the need to reduce costs and inefficiency may act as 
an incentive for finns to drive unions out. 
As discussed previously, the univariate regression of import penetration on union 
coverage generates a negative and significant foreign competition effect on coverage. 
The size of the coefficient decreases slightly when we include variables portraying 
the characteristics of the workforce and proxies for privatisation and small firms but 
remains negative and is significant at the 5% level. Column (3) predicts that union 
coverage in manufacturing industries is reduced by 0.01%, on average, for every 
percentage increase in the share of imports. However, the coefficient is not robust to 
the introduction of other industry characteristics and time dummies. Whilst we still 
observe a negative import coefficient in specifications (4) and (5), its magnitude is 
more than halved and it is not statistically significant. 
3-5-2-3 Industryfixed effects 
The pooled OLS estimator of the effect of foreign competition on coverage will be 
biased if unobserved industry fixed-effects are correlated with import penetration. To 
control for the unobservables, we include a full set of 4-digit industry dummies. As 
such, the regression model with industry fixed-effects can be written as 
cit 
--::::: ai +P mit + Xit, 
8, + Pit (11) 
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The results in table 3.6 indicate that import penetration is not statistically significant. 
This is consistent with our earlier descriptive analysis indicating a lack of the 
variations in foreign competition within industries. The least squares dummy variable 
model estimated here, in effect, generates the within-effects estimator of the impact 
of foreign competition on coverage. No evidence of an export effect on coverage is 
found. On the other hand, the time dummies are strongly significant, especially from 
the mid 1980s onwards. Other significant coefficients relate to part-time 
employment, educated and white-collar workers, the proportion of employees in the 
private sector and industry concentration. Note that the signs of the coefficients on 
the concentration dummies have changed from positive to negative. It is possible that 
although, on the whole, lower levels of concentration may be positively correlated 
with coverage, lower concentration within industries leads to a smaller extent of 
unionisation. 
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Table 3.6: Results from OLS estimation with industry fixed effects 
1 2 3 
Import penetration 
-0.003 
-0.002 -0.002 
(1.38) (1.34) (0.93) 
Export share 
-0.001 0.001 
(0.36) (0.15) 
Female 
-0.052 -0.053 -0.064 
(1.02) (1.07) (1.35) 
Age25 0.040 0.045 0.033 
(0.70) (0.80) (0.59) 
Age25-45 
-0.149 -0.110 -0.055 
(3.42)** (2.54)* (1.32) 
Part time 
-0.058 -0.056 -0.054 
(1.65) t (1.66) t (1.63) t 
Further 
-0.202 -0.162 -0.074 
(5.4 1) ** (4.92)** (2.20)* 
Secondary 
-0.176 -0.123 -0.045 
(8.77)** (6.03)** (2.3 1)* 
Job related training 
-0.010 -0.012 0.058 
(0.23) (0.31) (1.60) 
White collar 
-0.209 -0.183 -0.123 
(4.2 1) ** (3.93)** (2.6 1) ** 
Blue collar 0.073 0.055 0.014 
(3.35)** (2.62)** (0.51) 
London 0.048 0.058 
-0.009 
(0.58) (0.69) (0.10) 
South East 
-0.153 -0.092 -0.063 
(1.78) t (1.07) (0.72) 
South West 
-0.097 -0.024 0.033 
(1.16) (0.30) (0.40) 
North 
-0.065 -0.056 -0.005 
(0.71) (0.63) (0.05) 
North West 
-0.102 -0.060 -0.010 
(1.10) (0.65) (0.10) 
East 
-0.199 -0.143 -0.079 
(1.85) t (1.35) (0.72) 
East Midlands -0.075 -0.017 0.071 
(0.82) (0.20) (0.82) 
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West Midlands 0.038 0.015 0.085 
(0.40) (0.16) (0.93) 
Yorkshire 0.034 0.075 0.146 
(0.34) (0.75) (1.42) 
Wales 
-0.102 -0.105 -0.021 
(1.06) (1.12) (0.22) 
Small firms 
-0.024 -0.016 
(4.3 1) ** (1.07) 
Private 
-0.335 -0.324 
(7.54)** (7.3 4) ** 
Concentration20 
-0.039 -0.033 
(3.20)** (2.80)** 
Concentration50 
-0.021 -0.017 
(1.92) (1.59) 
1984 
-0.007 (0.82) 
1985 
-0.013 (1.54) 
1986 
-0.024 (2.9 1) ** 
1987 
-0.053 (6.7 1) ** 
1988 
-0.060 (7.13)** 
1989 
-0.055 (4.82)** 
1990 
-0.078 (6.7 8) ** 
1991 
-0.060 (4.57)** 
1993 
-0.084 (5.98)** 
1994 
-0.101 (7.45)** 
1995 
-0.100 (7.4 8) ** 
Constant 0.618 0.759 0.678 
( 5.52)** (8.29)** (7.19)** 
Observations 2066 2060 2060 
R-squared 0.75 0.78 0.81 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
f significant at 10% * significant at 5%, - ** significant at I% 
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3-5-2-4 Are these results robust? 
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we estimate an employment- 
weighted version of our model using OLS. Employment-weighted regressions are 
intended to control for industry size and also the presence of any outliers and/or 
influential observations. The results are presented in table 3.7. The weighted 
regression without industry fixed effects generates a statistically insignificant import 
penetration coefficient. This is consistent with the unweighted results from the same 
specification (column (5)) in table 3.5, although it should be noted that there is a 
change in the sign of the coefficient. The negative effect of export perfort-nance has 
magnified and is now strongly statistically significant as compared to the export 
coefficient in column (5) from table 3.5. The inclusion of industry fixed effects in the 
weighted regression gives rise to a negative and significant import competition 
effect. The coefficient has also increased in magnitude. This is in contrast to the 
corresponding import coefficient from the unweighted specification (3) in table 3.6, 
which indicates the absence of any significant impact of import penetration on union 
coverage. When controlling for industry fixed effects, the coefficient on export share 
in the weighted regression is significant and positive. VA-lilst the change of sign 
(from negative to positive) is somehow consistent with the unweighted fixed effects 
results 
, 
the level of statistical significance is not. 
In sum, the evidence on the impact of international competition on union coverage 
appears to be rather mixed. On the other hand, there is a striking consistency of the 
time dummy coefficients. They remain highly significant and robust in all 
specifications. 
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Table 3.7: Results from employment weighted regressions 
Without industry fixed effects With industry fixed effects 
Import penetration 0.002 
-0.015 
(0.41) (3.15)** 
Export share 
-0.041 0.031 
(6.03) ** (2.46)* 
Female 
-0.116 -0.292 
(3.21)** (3.96)** 
Age25 
-0.276 -0.059 
(3.23)** (0.92) 
Age25-45 
-0.282 -0.139 
(3.35)** (2.52)* 
Part time 0.253 
-0.078 
(2.41)* (1.82) t 
Further 
-0.081 -0.128 
(1.06) (2.60)** 
Secondary 0.110 
-0.093 
(2.45)* (3.27)** 
Job related training 
-0.272 -0.006 
(3.3 5) ** (0.12) 
White collar 
-0.402 -0.325 
(4.01)** (4.07)** 
Blue collar 
-0.111 0.096 
(2.04)* (2.65)** 
London 0.326 
-0.191 
(3.25)** (1.94)' 
South East 
-0.097 -0.321 
(1.52) (3.68)** 
South West 0.208 
-0.164 
(2.06)* (1.27) 
North 0.032 
-0.215 
(0.33) (1.80), 
North West 0.032 
-0.204 
(0.59) (2.19)* 
East -0.500 -0.298 
(5.92)** (2.25)* 
East NEdlands 0.266 -0.068 
(3.80)** (0.76) 
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Without industry fixed effects With industry fixed effects 
West Midlands 0.075 0.020 
(1.15) (0.22) 
Yorkshire 0.162 0.035 
(2.56)* (0.39) 
Wales 
-0.163 -0.210 
(1.16) (1.74) 
Small firms 0.041 
-0.006 
(1.07) (0.38) 
Private 
-0.447 -0.182 
(8.94)** (2.52)* 
Concentration20 0.048 
-0.052 
(3.89)** (1.39) 
Concentration50 0.063 
-0.051 
(4.5 1) ** (1.44) 
1984 0.014 
-0.003 (0.67) (0.31) 
1985 0.008 
-0.009 (0.38) (1.07) 
1986 
-0.001 -0.027 (0.01) (2.95)** 
1987 
-0.027 -0.046 (1.32) (5.24)** 
1988 
-0.035 -0.058 (1.64)' (5.3 1)** 
1989 
-0.092 -0.065 (3.23)** (5.27)** 
1990 
-0.119 -0.094 (4.04)** (7.2 1)* 
1991 
-0.128 -0.048 (3.93)** (2.63)** 
1993 
-0.105 -0.049 (3.96)** (2.80)** 
1994 
-0.116 -0.062 (4.37)** (2.94)** 
1995 
-0.137 -0.081 (5.5 4) ** (4.06)** 
Constant 0.906 0.919 
(9.80)** (9.84)** 
Observations 1952 1952 
R-squared 0.44 0.90 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at I% 
Weighted sample size is smaller due to missing observations for employment 
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3-6 Summary and conclusion 
During the 1980s and 1990s trade unionism in the UK fell markedly whilst, at the 
same time, there was rising competitive pressure Erom imports in the product market. 
So, in this chapter we examined the potential link between unionisation and import 
competition using 4-digit industry level data from the manufacturing sector for the 
period 1983-95. For the purpose of analysis, we used major coverage from the 
NESPD as our main measure of unionism and computed trade variables from a 
specially compiled industry trade dataset. 
The empirical analysis was divided into two parts, distinguishing between the 
compositiona and non-compositional effects of import penetration. Using a basic 
s1 
-share technique, we found that foreign competition as a compositional factor 
explained only around 2.1 % of the total decline in union coverage between 1983 and 
1995. Clearly, behavioural changes among industries were more important. 
In order to examine the effect of import competition on coverage, irrespective of any 
compositional shifts, we specified a multivariate regression model that included 
controls for some of the main determinants of unionisation. Our pooled OLS 
regessions (both excluding and including industry fixed effects) did not generate 
statistically significant coefficients on import penetration. However, we also 
estimated weighted regressions and here some evidence of a negative and significant 
import competition effect on coverage was revealed when controlling for industry 
fixed effects. 
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Hence, the findings in this chapter lead us to conclude that there could be a role for 
foreign competition in the decline of unionisation in the UK. Though, it seems likely 
that the influence of import penetration may have been overshadowed by legislative 
changes and the hostile political and macroeconomic climate, especially from the 
mid-1980s onwards, and to some degree by privatisation and changes in workforce 
composition. 
Finally, it is should be noted that our analysis focused on coverage by major 
agreements only. To the extent that collective bargaining at the national/industry 
level has become less important relative to local agreements, it is sensible to think 
that the decline of major coverage observed throughout the 1980s and 1990s could 
have been mostly due to govenunent policy aiming at decentralising union 
bargaining, hence the lack of overwhelming support for a significant import 
competition effect. Thus, in chapter 4, we provide further evidence on the 
relationship between foreign competition and unionisation by looking at 
establishment-level data on union recognition, which encompasses all types of union 
agreements. 
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APPENDIX 3A 
Table 3A. 1: Construction of the final industry-level dataset 
Import penetration and export share computed from the industry trade data, 
covering the manufactured goods sector for the period 1982-95 
ja 
Union coverage in manufacturing industries (1982-95) 
+ 
Variables such as age, gender, occupation, sector, region fi: om the NESPD 
J3 
Other industry variables (part-time employment, education, training and firm size) 
from the US 
J3 
Industry concentration and employment from the Census of Production 
Note: Arrows mdicate "merged to" 
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The Influence of Foreign 
Competition on Trade Union 
0 Recognition at the Workplace 
4-1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to extend the industry-level analysis presented in chapter 3 and 
provide further evidence on the link between unionisation and foreign competition by 
blislunent-level data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey USMg eStan C, I 
(WIRS). More specifically, we examine the influence of international competition on 
the probability of trade unions achieving recognition for bargaining purposes. The 
study offers four key advantages. First, the use of finn-level data enables to capture 
the micro-processes behind the impact of foreign competition on union presence and 
influence at the workplace. Second, unlike the previous chapter, the union measure 
here comprises all types of union agreements. Third, we are able to look at foreign 
competition in both manufacturing and services and fourth, the empirical analysis 
investigates the significance of international competition at (or around) the 
establishment set-up date. This is important to the extent that the likelihood of union 
recognition may be dependent upon product market conditions surrounding the time 
of plant set-up (Disney et al., 1995; 1996). 
According to Disney et al. (1995,1996) and Machin (2000), the failure of trade 
unions to gain recognition at new workplaces set up in the 1980s and early 1990s is a 
key rationale for union decline in Britain. This may suggest a role for globalisation 
and increased international competition observed in product markets in recent 
decades. Foreign competition may reduce the expected level of quasi-rents' to be 
allocated between unions and employers, thereby causing greater management 
resistance to union presence and less aggressive union organising activities at the 
workplace. It may also moderate the bargaining strength of trade unions directly, 
decreasing the union wage premium and workers' attraction to union representation. 
Hence, in this chapter, we hypothesise that trade unions are less likely to attain 
recognition in the presence of foreign competition. Three measures of international 
competition are considered. First, we focus on management responses to a question 
in WIRS about whether the finn's products or services are traded internationally. 
Since firms operating primarily in international markets have to compete with 
foreign rivals, this serves as a fitting basis on which the influence of foreign 
competition on the likelihood of union recognition can be analysed. Second, for the 
purpose of comparison, we employ trade variables at current time, corresponding to 
the relevant year of survey, in place of the WIRS foreign competition variable. Third, 
' Abowd and Farber (1990) define, quasi-rents as revenue less costs of materials and labour. 
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age-dated trade measures are used to model foreign competition at the establishment 
set-up date. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4-2 sets out the 
theoretical issues concerning the relationship between foreign competition and union 
recognition. Section 4-3 describes the data and provides some summary statistics. 
Section 4-4 explains the econometric modelling. The results are presented in section 
4-5 and finally, section 4-6 concludes. 
4-2 Theoretical Issues 
4-2-1 Foreign competition and the probability of recognition 
The probability of trade unions achieving recognition for bargaining purposes at the 
workplace can be modelled as a function of workers' support for union 
representation and employer opposition to union organising. Abowd and Farber 
(1990) relate these two factors to the expected level of quasi-rents to be allocated 
between trade unions and employers. This provides an important channel through 
which foreign competition may affect union recognition. As such, the Layard et al. 
(1991) product market model shows that, by lowering the amount of quasi-rents 
available to be captured by trade unions, foreign competition reduces the union mark 
up and the benefits of union organisation. The model also implies that firms 
expecting relatively lower levels of quasi-rents because of international competition 
may resist trade unions more strongly. In particular, they cannot afford to share, with 
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, ,F 
the unions, the minimum rent needed to continue operating (Abowd and Farber, 
1990; Disney et al., 1996). Management may typically seek to oppose union presence 
at the workplace in ways that would reduce the attraction of unionisation to 
employees and increase the costs of union organisation. In fact, Abowd and Farber 
(1990) argue that in times of increased competition managers may spend more 
resources than is necessary fighting unions in order to keep the finn in business 
and/or maintain their own positions as managers. 
Foreign competition may also reduce union bargaining power directly, hence 
decreasing workers' perceived benefits of unionisation and future union organising 
efforts. Chapter 2 identifies the main channels through which international 
competition influences the bargained wage outcome. Theoretical models such as Hill 
(1984), Grossman (1984), Lawrence and Lawrence (1985), Staiger (1988) and 
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) predict that foreign competition may (under given 
circumstances) undennine the bargaining strength of labour unions, forcing them to 
moderate their wage demands. Although, Naylor (1999) argues that, in the context of 
intra-industry trade, union wages may rise. 
4-2-2 The importance of establishment set-up date,, union 
recognition and foreign competition 
Union recognition in Britain can be widely thought of as a once-for-all decision 
made at some point close to the time of establishment set-up rather than 
being 
continually reviewed (Disney et al. 1995,1996). This is supported by previous 
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stu es 2 indicating that instances of derecognition at existing workplaces have 
generally been a rare feature of the industrial relations picture in the UK. Beaumont 
and Harris (1995) point out that the extent of derecognition involved less that 10% of 
establishments in the late 1980s and in fact, in a large majority of cases there was no 
change in union status. In this light, it can be argued that the likelihood of union 
recognition may be influenced by the extent of foreign competition in the industry 
around the time the firm was set up. For instance, if foreign competition at the time 
of plant set-up decreases the benefits of unionism and increases the costs to firms of 
'living' with unions, a lower probability of union recognition can be expected. 
Therefore 
, 
it is important that we consider whether international competition at the 
establishment set-up date could have impeded trade unions in gaining recognition at 
the workplace during the 1980s and 1990s. 
4-3 Data characteristics 
4-3-1 The WIRS Time-Series dataset 
The empirical analysis in this chapter uses establishment-level data from the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) Time-Senes dataset, formed by 
pooling the four WIRS cross-section surveys (1980,1984,1990 and 1998). Although 
there is a small number of establishments that are observed in more than one time 
period, the dataset is not a panel. It is constructed by matching data items (not plants) 
2 For example, Claydon (1989), Gregg and Yates (1991), Smith and Morton (1993), Gall and McKay 
(1994), Beaumont and Harris (1995), Towers (1997) and Machin (2000). 
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present in the 1998 main management questionnaire to similar questions identified in 
at least one of the three previous cross-section surveys. Hence, it contains a wide 
range of consistently defined variables, which can be used to analyse the change in 
specific issues pertaining to the state of employee relations in the LJK during the time 
period 1980 to 1998. The sampling of establishments is based upon the Census of 
Employment 3. This is built from comprehensive tax records from employers in 
almost all industrial sectors and is believed to be a virtually complete and accurate 
sample frame of UK organisations, and establishments (Millward, 1991). However, 
workplaces with 25 workers or less are excluded 4 in WIRS because small plants 
typically lack the fonnal industrial relations institutions and practices. Thus, the 
WIRS Time-Series dataset comprises 80495 observations, corresponding to 
workplaces with 25 or more employees surveyed in the cross-section series. 
The dataset also contains workplace weights from each of the four surveys. These are 
important given that the stratified sample design of WIRS implies that workplaces 
have differing probabilities of selection depending on the size and industry strata. 
And so, to maintain the profile of the sample with that of the population, the data 
must be weighted. 
3 The sampling ftame, for the 1980,1984 and 1990 surveys is the relevant Census of Employment 
three years before. The 1998 survey uses the Inter-Departmental Business Register 
(IDBR) and this is 
derived in large part from the Census of Employment. 
4 Smaller workplaces were surveyed in 1998 but are not included in the Time-Series dataset to 
maintain a consistent basis of comparison. 
5 2040,2019,2061 and 1929 observations for the 1980,1984,1990 and 1998 surveys respectively. 
120 
4-3-2 The measures of foreign competition 
Our aim is to investigate the impact of foreign competition on union recognition. In 
this context, we consider three measures of foreign competition. 
1. The first is a question in VaRS about whether the finn operates in the international 
market. Since firms operating primarily in international markets have to compete 
with foreign rivals, this serves as a fitting basis on which the influence of foreip 
competition on the likelihood of union recognition can be analysed. The precise 
question asked to the prMCIpal management respondent in each establishment is: "Is 
the market of your (main) product or service primarily local, regional, national or 
international? ". In effect, responses to the question can be used to create a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm faces foreign competition in the product market by 
assigrang the value 1 to all answers corresponding to 'international' and zero 
otherwise. 
Because this is an unorthodox measure of foreign competition, it is worth discussing 
the relative advantages and lirMtations of using this variable in our analysis. The first 
disadvantage is that the question only appears in the management questionnaire from 
1984 onwards and in consequence, we have to exclude the 1980 cross-section 
survey. Second, the variable only provides qualitative infonnation and the subjective 
nature of the responses may be a source of concern. Third, the question measures 
foreign competition at current time, i. e. the year in which the survey was carried out, 
and so cannot be related to the establishment set-up date. But it does have some key 
merits. For instance, it has previously been used as a measure of 
foreign competition, 
121 
notably by Stewart (1990). Furthermore, this measure is a reflection of managers' 
perception of the extent of foreign competition in the product market, which may 
have some bearing on the decision to resist labour unions at the workplace. Another 
advantage is that the question applies equally to manufacturMg and services. The 
variable also provides a means of comparison with other more common, trade-related 
measures of foreign competition. In addition, we are encouraged by its statistically 
significant correlation with industry trade variables in manufactunng6 
. 
This is shown 
in table 4.1 below. It reports the estimated coefficients from separate univanate logit 
regressions 7 of the WIRS foreign competition dummy variable on import penetration 
ratios and export shares for the 4-digit industry affiliation of each workplace in the 
survey. 
Table 4.1 Estimated coefficients of univariate, logit regressions of the foreign competition 
dummy variable from WIRS on import penetration and export share 
Import penetration Export share 
0.93** 
(0.19) 
0.99** 
(0.18) 
Notes: Regressions weighted by workplace weights. Standard errors M parentheses. ** significant at 
1% level. The regressions are perforrned using data from sample 2 described in sub-section 4-3-3 
below. 
2. The foreign competition measure from WIRS reflects international competition in 
the product market at the time of the survey. Thus, for the purpose of comparison we 
also employ industry trade variables at current time (i. e. at the relevant year-of- 
survey). 
6 Trade variables, taken from the industry trade data described in chapter 3, are only available 
for the 
manufacturing sector. 
7 Blanchflower and Machin (1995) use the same approach to test the correlation between a qualitative 
variable for market structure and 
industry concentration ratios. 
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3. In order to evaluate the importance of the foreign competition around the 
establishment set-up date, age-dated import penetration and export shares are used. 
4-3-3 Sample construction 
Three separate samples of plants from the WIRS Time-series dataset are created 
(referred to as sample 1,2 and 3 hereafter). We examine the effect of foreign 
competition using the WIRS measure alone from sample 1. This is constructed by 
excluding all observations from the 1980 survey since, as mentioned above, the 
WIRS foreign competition variable is only available from 1984 onwards. The sample 
contains information on private sector plants from manufacturing and services 8. 
Dropping missing values yields a sample size of 2505 observations. 
Samples 2 and 3 are created by mapping 4-digit industry trade variables for 
manufacturing, from the trade dataset described in chapter 3, to the corresponding 
industries firms in the survey are affiliated to. Thus, sample 2 matches trade variables 
measured at current time to manufacturing plants in the 1984,1990 and 19989 
surveys. It consists of 982 observations when excluding missing values. In sample 3 
we merge trade variables dated at the time of plant set-up to the WIRS dataset. A 
similar approach to Disney et al. (1996) is adopted. Establishment age is determined 
by a question in the survey about the number of years the firm has been operating at 
8 The broad service sectors subject to foreign competition are banking, finance and business services; 
distribution, hotels and catering; transport and communications; and other services. 
9 Trade information is only available until 1995, therefore, we use values for the year 1995 to proxy 
foreign competition in 1998. Given the rising trend in import penetration (as seen from figure 3.2 in 
chapter 3) this is likely to underestimate the true impact of foreign competition. Further, we do not 
include observations from the 1980 WIRS survey so as to remain consistent with sample 
1. 
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the current address. Because this information is grouped establishments are assigned 
to the midpoint of the relevant age-band. The main reservation of using this age 
variable is that it measures the number of years since the establishment moved from 
a previous address and not its actual age. But, as Disney et al. (1996) argue, moving 
location may also imply instating a largely new workforce such that the decision 
-about recognition may be linked to the time of the move. The trade data contains 
information from 198210 onwards and so, we only consider firms born in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Using the same method, age-dated unemployment rates from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) are also included. Sample 3 contains 12911 observations with all 
missing values dropped. 
4-3-4 Some descriptive statistics 
From the above samples, table 4.2 shows the proportion of firms recognising unions 
for bargammg purposes by different measures of international competition. Overall, 
we find that union recognition decreases with international competition. According 
to the WIRS measure of foreign competition, the proportion of establishments 
recognising unions in the presence of foreign competition is 0.30 compared to 0.38 
where firins do not face any competition from abroad. This is mirrored across private 
sector manufacturing and services although it would appear that the difference in 
union recognition between plants facing international competition and those facing 
domestic competition is greater in the services sector. 
'0 The first age band is 'less than five years' which implies that the sample is made up of plants 
observed from the pooled 1984,1990 and 1998 WIRS cross-section surveys. 
1 The number of manufacturing firms in the sample set up after 1980 is 254 such that when dropping 
missing values a small sample size of only 129 observations is obtained. 
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The table also gives recognition according to various levels of import penetration in 
manufacturing. There is a smaller proportion of establishments recognising trade 
unions at higher levels of import penetration. Union recognition falls from 0.58 for 
the 1" quartile of import penetration at current time to 0.34 in the 4h quartile. The 
corresponding figures for import share at the establishment set-up date are 0.46 and 
0.10 respectively. It should be noted that recognition is lower, the greater the extent 
of foreign competition at the establishment set-up date than at current time. 
Table 4.2 Proportion of plants recognising unions by international competition 
All Establishments Private Manufacturing Private Services 
WIRS measure 
Intemational 0.30 0.39 0.18 
Domestic 0.38 0.43 0.37 
Import Penetration 
at current time 
4'hQuartile 0.34 
3d Quartile 0.37 
2d Quartile 0.45 
1" Quartile 0.58 
Age-dated Import 
Penetration 
4thQuartile 0.10 
3 rd Quartile 0.11 
2'dQuartile 0.34 
I't Quartile 0.46 
Source: Computed ftom matched WIRS time-series-industry trade dataset 
Notes: 
1. International refers to firms operating primarily in international markets and facing competition 
ftom foreign rivals. Domestic refers to establishments facing domestic competition by serving markets 
at the local, regional or national level. 
2. Figures correspond to the weighted proportion of establishments that recognise trade unions 
for 
bargaining purposes. 
3. Import penetration only availablefor manufacturing. 
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However, while the descriptive statistics point to a possible negative association 
between international competition and union recognition, it is important that we take 
into account other factors that are likely to determine the probability of unions 
achieving recognition. 
4-4 Econometric methodology 
4-4-1 The variables used 
We postulate that the probability of union recognition at the workplace is likely to be 
lower in the presence of foreign competition in the product market. The empirical 
test of our main hypothesis involves the estimation of an econometric model that 
explicitly allows for the effect of international competition and also incorporates 
several other explanatory variables. The dependent variable, recognition, is described 
by a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if an establishment recognises trade unions 
for bargaining purposes and zero otherwise. 
As discussed in sub-section 4-3-2. three approaches to modelling the effect of foreign 
competition on union recognition are considered. First, we examine foreign 
competition at current time by making use of the survey question in WIRS regarding 
whether establishments operate in an international environment. Second, for the 
purpose of comparison we use trade variables at current time in place of the WIRS 
foreign competition measure. The third method emphasises the influence of 
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international competition around the time of establishment set-up through age-dated 
trade measures. 
Control variables, reflecting the following sets of factors, are included. 
The post-1980 environment. Existing evidence on the main determinants of 
recognition identify establishments set up after 1980 as being the least likely to 
recognise trade unions for bargaining purposes (Disney, 1995 1996; Machin, 2000). 
It is argued that legislative changes and the political and macroeconomic climate at 
the time were generally hostile to trade unions. We model these conditions in two 
ways. 
1. A dummy variable for firms set up after 1980 is included in the model. This 
variable also captures the influence of international competition at the 
establishment set-up date during the 1980s and 1990s when age-dated measures 
of foreign competition are not included in the model. 
2. Union membership, measured by the proportion of firms with union members by 
I 
2-digit industries, and age-dated unemployment rates are used as proxies for the 
conditions in the labour market and the state of the macroeconomy- 
Characteristics of the establishment and market structure. The probability of 
recognition is also determined by the characteristics of the establishment. We include 
controls for foreign ownership, the proportion of part time employees, establishment 
sizel single independent establishments and whether management is part of an 
employer's association. Foreign ownership may decrease the likelihood of 
recognition because there is a greater threat of relocation. Trade unions are also less 
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likely to be present at workplaces employing large proportions of part-time workers. 
On the other hand, the larger the size of the firm the greater the possibilities for 
achieving recognition. Similarly, trade unions may be more willing to organise 
establishments with multiple sites than single independent firms because of the 
benefits of economies of scale. Employer's associations tend to promote positive 
relations between management and labour unions, thereby increasing the chances for 
unions to be recognised for bargaining purposes. The model also contains a proxy for 
domestic market structure, constructed from a question in VVIRS about whether the 
firm has no competitors, few (five or less) competitors or many competitors. In less 
competitive market structures, high levels of quasi-rents may act as an incentive for 
unions to pursue aggressive organising activities but, then again, firms may have 
more resources and be more willing to resist labour unions. 
Table 4.3 gives the definitions and sources of all the explanatory variables used. 
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Table 4.3: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Established after 1980 Dummy =I if establishment set up M WIRS 
the 1980s and 1990s 
50-99 employees Dummy =I if establishment employs 
between 50 and 99 employees 
100-199 employees Dummy =I if establishment employs 
between 100 and 199 employees 
200499 employees Dummy =I if establishment employs 
between 200 and 499 employees 
500-999 employees Dummy =I if establishment employs 
between 500 and 999 employees 
1000+ employees Dummy =1 if firm employs more 
than 1000 employees 
Single site Dummy =1 if single independent 
firm 
Part-time proportion Proportion of part time employees in 
establishment 
Affiliated to employer's association Dummy =1 if management affiliated 
to an employer's association 
Foreign ownership Dummy =1 if any foreign ownership 
Domestic competition Dummy =I if firm has many 
competitors 
International competition Dummy =1 if firm operates 
primarily in international markets 
Union membership Proportion of establishments with 
uMOn members by 2-digit industries 
Unemployment Age-dated unemployment rate Labour Force 
Survey 
Import penetration 4-digit import penetration ratios 
See chapter 3 
Export share 4-digit export share 
11 
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4-4-2 Specifications 
Three specifications of the model are considered. 
Specification I 
Recognition 
=f (established after 1980 dummy, firm size, single establishment, part- 
time proportion, employer's association, foreign ownership, domestic competition, 
international competition dummy, year-of-survey dummies, 2-digit industry 
dummies) 
Specification 2 
Recognition 
=f (established after 1980 dummy, firm size, single establishment, part- 
time proportion, employers association, foreign ownership, domestic competition, 
import penetration and export share at current time, year-of-survey dummies, 2-digit 
industry dummies) 
Specification 3 
Recognition =f (age-dated import penetration and export share, age-dated 
unemployment rates, proportion offirms in industry with union members, firm size, 
single establishment, part-time proportion, employer's association, foreign 
ownership, domestic competition, foreign competition dummy, year-of-survey 
dummies, 2-digit industry dummies) 
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Specification I includes foreign competition as a current characteristic of the 
establishment, i. e. whether it operates primarily in the international market and faces 
competition from foreign rivals. In specification 2, the VVIRS foreign competition 
measure is replaced by trade variables at current time. Both models include the 
'established after 1980' dummy variable. Specification 3 assesses the importance of 
foreign competition at the establishment set-up date for the probability of recognition 
by incorporating age-dated import and export shares. These relate to firms set-up in 
the 1980s and 1990s and are used in place of the 'established after 1980' dummy. 
Another time-varying variable namely, unemployment rates and the proportion of 
firms in the industry with union members are included. Note that specifications 1,2 
and 3 are estimated Erom sample 1 (containing establishments from all sectors) and 
the manufactunng samples 2 and 3 respectively. Also, the controls for firm 
characteristics are unchanged in all three specifications and we include dummy 
variables for the year-of-survey and 2-digit industries to capture time and industry 
specific effects. 
4-4-3 Estimation method 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value zero or one probit 
regressions of the above specifications are estimated using the maximum likelihood 
method. We specify heteroscedasticity-consistent robust 
12 standard errors. A 
potential source of concern when including trade flows in the model is that they may 
be endogenous. In particular, wage strategies adopted by trade unions may influence 
12 Huber/White/Sandwich estimate of standard errors from STATA 
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the pattern of trade (Naylor, 1999). However, no empirical support for the 
endogeneity of the trade variables is found from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in 
chapter 3. Hence, we do not use instruments for import and export shares in our 
regressions. 
4-5 Empirical results 
4-5-1 Foreign competition at current time 
Table 4.4 reports the results for specification 1. Column (1) represents all 
establishments in sample 1. The sectoral differences between private manufacturing 
and private services are shown in columns (2) and (3). Our primary interest is in the 
coefficient on the international. competition dummy. It is negative and statistically 
significant in all three cases, albeit only weakly significant in manufacturing. The 
results indicate an overall negative influence of international competition on the 
probability of union recognition in UK establishinents. Converting the probit 
coefficients from column (1) into marginal 13 effects reveal that an establishment 
operating primarily in international markets is, on average, 16.1 % less likely to 
recognise labour unions for bargaining purposes. 
" The marginal effect shows the change in the probability of union recognition caused by a 
discrete 
change from 0 to I in a dunnny variable or an infimitesimal change Mi a continuous 
independent 
variable. It is computed by fljýpCXfl) where Pj is the coefficient on the variable for which the marginal 
effect is being calculated, e. g. the foreign competition 
dummy, and ýOCXP) is probability density 
function of the standard normal distribution evaluated at the means of the 
independent variables. 
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In private manufacturing and services, the marginal effects are of the order of 9.1 % 
and 20.4% respectively. The bigger magnitude of the foreign competition effect in 
the services sector compared to manufacturing confmns our earlier descriptive 
analysis of the data in sub-section 4-3-4. 
The coefficients on the control variables are generally as expected. Finn size and 
management's affiliation to employer's associations are positively correlated with 
union recognition. The coefficient on foreign ownership is negative and significant in 
the pooled and manufactunng samples. Single independent establishments tend to be 
less unionised and the greater the proportion of part-time workers, the lower the 
likelihood of recognition in manufacturing. The domestic competition dummy is 
largely Insignificant except in manufacturing where it is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. We also report a significant and negative establishment age effect. 
From column (1), the marginal effect of the 'established after 1980'-dummy variable 
is 0.172, indicating that a plant established after 1980 is 17.2 % less likely to 
recognise unions for bargaining purposes 14 
. 
The coefficient is larger for private 
manufacturing as compared to services. 
14 Disney et A (1996) obtain a marginal effect of 16.4% for fmns established 
in the 1980s and 
Machin (2000) generates a marginal effect of 11.2% for fmns set up in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Table 4.4: Maximum likelihood estimation of specification 1 
All 
Establishments 
(1) 
Established after 1980 
50-99 employees 
100-199 employees 
200499 employees 
500-999 employees 
1000+ employees 
Single site 
Part-time proportion 
Affiliated to employer's association 
Foreign ownership 
Domestic competition 
International competition 
Constant 
Year dummies 
2-digit industry dummies 
-0.436 [-0.172] 
(4.19)** 
0.153 [0.061] 
(1.61) 
0.538 [0.2071 
(5.23)** 
0.873 [0.3231 
(7.80)** 
1.197 [0.4021 
(8.74)** 
1.328 [0.4271 
(8.53)** 
-0.672 [-0.261] 
(6.6 1) ** 
-0.285 [-0.114] 
(1.23) 
0.665 [0.254] 
(6.26)** 
-0.262 [0,104] 
(2.17)* 
0.101 [0.040] 
(1.06) 
-0.407 [-0.161] 
(3.8 1) ** 
0.261 
(0.76) 
Yes 
Yes 
Private Private Services 
Manufacturing 
(2) (3) 
-0.864 [-0.302] 
(5.05)** 
0.324 [0.0901 
(1.79) 
1.021 [0.230] 
(5.3 0) ** 
1.279 [0.286] 
(6.3 8)* * 
2.164 [0.356] 
(8.28)** 
2.135 [0.334] 
(6.68)** 
-0.599 [-0.202] 
(3.66)** 
-2.564 [-0.7791 
(2.30)* 
0.688 [0.187] 
(4.25)** 
-0.361 [-0.1171 
(2.02)* 
0.238 [0.0721 
(1.66) t 
-0.283 [0.0911 
(1.73)t 
-0.176 
(0.50) 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.264 [-0.098] 
(2.09)* 
0.110 [0.042] 
(0.99) 
0.314 [0.121] 
(2.56)* 
0.622 [0.242] 
(4.37)** 
0.373 [0.146] 
(2.12)* 
0.815 [0.316] 
(3.90)** 
-0.676 [-0.235] 
(5.26)** 
-0.263 [-0.9911 
(1.13) 
0.678 [0.264] 
(4.77)** 
-0.224 [-0.082] 
(1.40) 
0.022 [0.008] 
(0.19) 
-0.600 [-0.204] 
(4.11)** 
1.418 
(1.77) 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 2505 1038 1467 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.32 0.12 
x2 for inclusion of industry effects 37.12** 29.48** 
10.29** 
Notes: 
1. Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2. Marginal effects in square brackets 
3. t significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
4. Regressions weighted by workplace weights 
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Table 4.5 presents the regression results for specification 2. As can be seen, the main 
predictions from the control variables are quite comparable to those from private 
manufacturing in table 4.4. On examination of the trade variables, column (1) reveals 
a weakly significant and negative coefficient on import penetration although when 
we include export share, time and industry dummies in column (2) the trade 
measures are not significant. As such, it can be argued that, in manufacturing at least, 
the evidence on the effect of foreign competition at current time on union recognition 
is somewhat mixed. While the coefficient on the international competition dummy 
variable in specification 1 is weakly significant (at the 10% level), the results 
obtained from using the trade measures in specification 2 are not particularly robust. 
In contrast, the 'established after 1980' dummy is consistently significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 4.5: Maximum likelihood estimation of specification 2 
(1) (2) 
Established after 1980 
-0.823 [-0.287] 
-0.843 [-0.285] 
(4.70)** (4.62) ** 
50-99 employees 0.310 [0.086] 0.372 [0.088] 
(1.61) (1.96)t 
100-199 employees 0.882 [0.206] 0.945 [0.198] 
(4.5 1) ** (4.88)** 
200499 employees 1.219 [0.275] 1.343 [0.267] 
(6.06)** (6.46)** 
500-999 employees 1.810 [0.327] 2.172 [0.324] 
(7.26)** (8.01)** 
1000+ employees 2.059 [0.331] 2.433 [0.322] 
(7.55)** (7.40)** 
Single site 
-0.456 [-0.150] -0.568 [-0.174] 
(2.67)** (3.27)** 
Part-time proportion 
-2.295 [-0.695] -2.900 [-0.813] 
(2.35)** (2.58)** 
Affiliated to employer's association 0.806 [0.215] 0.727 [0.181] 
(4.70)** (4.28)** 
Foreign ownership 
-0.278 [-0.089] -0.275 [-0.082] 
(1.51) (1.44) 
Domestic competition 0.355 [0.106] 0.300 [0.088] 
(2.39)* (2.01)* 
Import penetration 
-0.351 [-0.106] -0.356 [-0.106] 
(1.89)t (1.25) 
Export share -0.005 [-0.012] 
(0.04) 
Constant 
-0.272 -0.690 
(1.29) (1.94) 
Year-of-survey dummies No Yes 
2-digit industry dummies No Yes 
Observations 986 982 
Pseudo W 0.26 0.33 
x2 for inclusion of industry effects 
38.87** 
Notes: 
L Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2. Marginal effects in square brackets 
3. t significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; significant at I% 
4. Regressions weighted by workplace weights 
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4-5-2 Foreign competition at the establishment set-up date 
Table 4.6 shows the results from the Maximum Likelihood estimation of 
specification 3, which includes age-dated trade variables in place of the 
establishment age dummy variable. Column (1) indicates that import competition at 
the establishment set-up date, in the 1980s and 1990s, has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the probability of union recognition. However, the inclusion of 
age-dated export share, age-dated unemployment rates and proportion of firms with 
union members in the industry generates insignificant coefficients on the foreign 
competition measures. The foreign competition dummy variable, included to proxy 
international competition at current time, is also not statistically significant. As for 
the coefficient on the cyclical indicator, unemployment rate, it displays a negative 
sign but is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, there is a 
significant positive association between the proportion of workplaces with union 
members in the industry and union recognition. 
Thus, it likely that the declining probability of recognition in manufacturing plants 
set up after 1980 may have been driven by the lack of union power to organise 
workplaces, arising from falling union membership in the labour market. This would 
lend support to the view that management took advantage of the anti-union 
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s to reassert their prerogatives at the workplace and 
marginalize the union movement. However, we should not totally dismiss the 
implications of international competition at the time of plant set on the sole basis of 
the statistical insignificance of the foreign competition coefficients. After all, this 
could simply be the result of the small sample size used to estimate specification 3. 
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Table 4.6: Maximum likelihood estimation of specification 3 
W (2) 
50-99 employees 0.321 [0.108] 0.213 [0.071] 
(0.65) (0.44) 
100-199 employees 1.120 [0.398] 1.291 [0.462] 
(2.4 1) * (2.67) ** 
200499 employees 0.789 [0.284] 0.717 [0.257] 
(1.28) (1.19) 
500-999 employees 3.614 [0.811] 3.591 [0.811] 
(4.04)** (3.89)** 
1000+ employees 0.645 [0.260] 0.506 [0.201] 
(0.44) (0.33) 
Single site 
-1.967 [-0.462] -1.944 [-0.456] 
(3.99)** (4.06)** 
Part-time proportion 
-2.570 [-0.839] -2.660 [-0.850] 
(0.87) (0.85) 
Affiliated to employer's association 0.432 [0.150] 0.512 [0.178] 
(1.03) (1.18) 
Foreign ownership 
-0.913 [-0.224] -1.006 [-0.237] 
(1.73) t (1.89) t 
Domestic competition 0.127 [0.035] 0.121 [0.037] 
(0.30) (0.30) 
International competition 
-0.528 [0.152] -0.613 [-0.177] 
(1.30) (1.49) 
Age-dated import penetration 
-1.152 [-0.366] -0.969 [-0.313] 
(1.89)t (0.43) 
Age-dated export share 
-0.213 [-0.059] 
(0.10) 
Age-dated unemployment -0.073 [-0.025] 
(0.57) 
Union membership 2.881 [0.915] 
(2.26)* 
Constant 0.518 
-0.685 
(0.48) (0.34) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 129 129 
Pseudo-R2 0.47 0.50 
x2 for inclusion of industry effects 19.69** 
14.53* 
Notes: ]. Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parentheses; 2. Marginal effects in square brackets; 
3. ýy *, ** significant at I O? lo, 5% and I% respectively; 4. Regressions weighted by workplace weights 
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4-5-3 Testing for functional specification errors 
In order to check the reliability of the functional form of our models, we perfonn a 
link test for ftinctional specification error. Functional mis-specifications can occur 
for two reasons. First, if the probit regression assumed here is not the right function 
to use and second, if we have not included all relevant variables and/or included any 
variable that should not be in the model. The link test uses the predicted value of the 
dependent variable (Hat) and the predicted value squared (Hatsq) as regressors in the 
model. If the model is properly specified, the variable hat should be significant as it 
is the predicted value from the model but Hatsq should not have much predictive 
power other than by chance. Table 4.7 below shows the coefficients and t-ratios of 
the variables Hat and Hatsq for the different specifications and samples used. Hat is 
strongly significant in each case whilst hatsq is not statistically different from zero. 
Therefore, we report no evidence of functional mis-specification. 
139 
Table 4.7: Results from the link test 
All establishments Private manufacturing Private services 
Specification 1 
Hat 0.995 0.991 0.944 
(15.66)** (13.67)** (7.33)** 
Hatsq 
-0-008 
-0-104 
-0.69 
(-0.07) (-1.83) (-0.38) 
Specification 2 
Hat 0.996 
(11.92)** 
Hatsq 
-0.04 
(-0.57) 
Specification 3 
Hat 0.946 
(6.42) ** 
hatsq 
-0.07 
(-0.77) 
Notes: 
1. * *Significant at I %, - 
2. t-ratios in parentheses 
3. Link test performed in STA TA using command 'linktest' 
4-6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has tested the hypothesis that foreign competition reduces the 
probability of trade unions gaining recognition for bargaining purposes. We argued 
that international competition may constrain union bargaining power, decreasing the 
union wage gain and workers' attraction to unionism. It may also lower the expected 
level of quasi-rents available to be shared between the firm and the union, thereby 
causing increased employer opposition to trade unions and diminished union 
organising activities. The empirical analysis was based on establishment-level data 
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from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (VVIRS) and considered the 
influence of foreign competition at current time and at the establishment set-up date. 
The modelling of foreign competition at current time was achieved by using a 
question in the survey about whether the establishment operates primarily in 
international markets. Since firms operating in international markets have to compete 
with foreign rivals, this served as a fitting basis on which the influence of foreign 
competition on the likelihood of union recognition could be analysed. As such, we 
found that the probability of recognition was 16% lower in firras operating in 
international markets. Splitting the data by sector revealed that firms facing foreign 
competition in private services were relatively less likely to recognise trade unions 
compared to their counterparts in private manufacturing. However, we could not 
confirm the negative foreign competition effect in private manufacturing. The use of 
trade variables corresponding to the relevant year-of-survey in place of the WIRS 
measure failed to produce robust predictions. 
Meanwhile our results strongly supported existing evidence (Disney et al., 1995; 
1996; Machin, 2000) that trade unions failed to achieve significant recognition in 
establishments set up after 1980, especially in private manufacturing. This could 
suggest a role for foreign competition at (or around) the establishment set up date in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, we used age-dated trade measures to proxy 
international competition at the time of plant set-up in manufacturing. 
Unemployment rates and the proportion of establishments with union members by 2- 
digit industries were included to account for the effects of the macroeconomic cycle 
and labour market conditions at the time. The coefficients on the foreign competition 
variables were not statistically significant most probably because of the small sample 
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size. On the other hand, the results pointed to a strong impact of labour market forces 
on the likelihood of recognition. 
The conclusions from this chapter are consistent with those in chapter 3. The mixed 
results indicate that foreign competition could indeed have had an impact on 
unionisation in UK manufacturing during the 1980s and 1990s. In general, the 
evidence mostly emphasises the importance of legislative changes. It seems likely 
that the anti-union policy pursued by successive Conservative govemments presented 
employers with the opportunity to reaffirm their prerogatives and establish 
management control at the workplace. The limited statutory rights for labour 
organisations provided increased incentives for management to exclude unions from 
the workplace either by offering workers higher benefits and better working 
conditions as an alternative to unionism, by restructuring production and work 
systems or by simply resisting union presence more strongly. These measures, aimed 
at marginalizing the union movement, would have diminished the enthusiasm of the 
workforce towards trade unions even further over time. Finally, it is plausible that the 
ineffectiveness of union organisation could also have played a part in the decline of 
union presence and influence. 
Despite only a weak link, at most, between foreign competition and unionisation, it is 
still possible that trade openness may impact upon trade unions' ability to extract 
rents and modify their strategic bargaining behaviour, which would be reflected in 
the union wage premium. In chapter 5, we use micro-level panel data to investigate 
whether foreign competition has significantly reduced the union wage gap of 
manufacturing workers. 
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Foreign Competition and 
the Union Wage Gap The 
Case of UK Manufacturing 
5-1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of openness to international trade on union 
bargaining power, as measured by the union-nonunion wage differential. From a 
review of the theory in chapter 2, we find that the influence of foreign competition 
on the union mark up may not be predicted a prion. Trade shocks may either reduce 
or even enhance union bargaining strength and so, determining which effect is likely 
to dominate calls for empirical research. There is so far very scant evidence on the 
topic for the UK, hence, we aim to provide an empirical contribution and extend the 
existing literature. 
A specially constructed individual-level data set is used, combining labour market 
information on individual workers from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset 
(NESPD) with disaggregated industry trade data for the period 1982 to 1995. Given 
the long time series of our dataset, it is possible to explain the movement of the 
foreign competition effect on union wage setting over time. Moreoever, because of 
the potential limitations of the estimation methods used for measuring the union 
wage gap, we consider results from three different approaches so as to reach a better 
assessment of the true impact of openness on the union mark up. The simultaneity 
between trade flows and wages is also explicitly tested. Finally, we argue that the 
effect of foreign competition on union bargaining may have dissimilar implications 
for blue-collar and white-collar workers. This is because both intemational 
competition and union bargaining tend to affect the wages of the skilled and 
unskilled differently. For instance, whilst trade unions are able to generate higher 
wage premiums I for the unskilled workers, there is the notion that globalisation may 
have adversely influenced the labour market outcomes 2 of unskilled workers relative 
to the skilled. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5-2 reviews the 
empirical literature from previous UK and US studies. Section 5-3 provides a 
description of the data and explains the empirical strategy. We report the empirical 
results in section 5-4. Section 5-5 summarises the main findings of the chapter. 
1 Booth (1995) and Blancliflower and Bryson (2002) provide a review of the empirical evidence on 
the union wage differential. 
2 See Greenaway and Nelson (2001) for a comprehensive survey of studies on globaliSation and 
labour markets. 
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5-2 A review of the empirical literature 
5-2-1 Studies using UK data 
Three previous studies, namely Stewart (1990), Konings and Vandenbussche (1995) 
and Brown and Sessions (2001), examine the implications of international 
competition r the wage outcome of the union-firm bargaining process in the UK. 
Stewart (1990) considers a sample of private sector establishments employing semi- 
skilled manual workers from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. He 
estimates a basic single wage equation with a union dummy equal to I if the 
establishment recognises trade unions for bargaining purposes and zero otherwise. A 
qualitative openness variable indicating whether the firm operates primarily in the 
international market is used as a proxy for foreign competition. The effect of 
international competition on the union mark up is captured by the interaction 
between the union and foreign competition variables. The model includes a number 
of controls for establishment size and other firm characteristics, workforce 
composition, sector and foreign ownership. As such, results from the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the wage equation suggest that the influence of trade unions 
on wages is significantly restrained by foreign competition to the extent that unions 
ý11 are unable to establish any wage differential in finns that operate primarily in 
international markets while there is a significant positive union wage gap in 
establishments that do not face foreign competition. 
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Konings and Vandenbussche (1995) use data from the EXSTAT company account 
dataset complemented with survey information on union presence and foreign 
competition for a panel of establishments during the period 1982-89. They consider 
separate union and non-union wage equations and model foreign competition by a 
qualitative variable indicating whether the fim-i has experienced an increase in 
international competition. The other main explanatory variables included are 
employment, output, industry wage, and domestic competition. They employ the 
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) approach for estimating panel data with 
endogenous variables. While no significant effect of an increase in foreign 
competition on union and non-union wages is found for the entire sample, there 
appears to be a significant negative influence of increased foreign competition on 
wages in unlonised establishments in the manufacturing sector. The authors explain 
this finding by the Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, on the premise that unionised 
manufactunng firms employ more blue-collar workers. 
Brown and Sessions (2001) investigate the union response to international 
competition by combining 2-digit industry trade data with micro data on 
manufactunng employees from the British Social Attitudes Surveys over the period 
1985 to 1991. Their empirical methodology is based upon the inter-industry wage 
differentials approach (Dickens and Katz, 1987) whereby, in a first stage, they 
regress individual wages on a vector of worker characteristics and 2-digit industry 
dummies to obtain the inter-industry wage premium (i. e. the wage component 
explained by the individual's affiliation to a particular industry). Then, in the second 
stage, they estimate an industry wage premium equation containing a number of 
industry-level variables likely to detennine the industry premia, such as industry 
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concentration, union density, capital-labour ratio, and foreign competition. Foreign 
competition is measured by the ratio of net imports to industrial GDP. In order to 
avoid any potential simultaneity bias they instrument the trade variable by lagged 
values. One of the key findings of the study is that foreign competition significantly 
reduces the union, but not the non-union, industry wage premia. Brown and Sessions 
argue that non-union wages are set competitively whereas unions may accept wage 
concessions such as to maintain the employment prospects of their members. 
5-2-2 Studies using US data 
Several empirical studies analyse the relationship between foreign competition and 
union wage bargaining using US data. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) estimate 
cross-industry wage regressions for 1960,1970,1980 and 1984 using aggregate 
industry data for US manufacturing. The model includes import share amongst a 
range of other explanatory variables depicting industry and worker characteristics. 
They find a significant negative effect of import share on wages for the years 1980 
and 1984, however, are unable to provide robust evidence as to whether the impact is 
different in unionised and non-unionised industries. 
Another early study by Mishel (1986) uses a pooled sample of union1sed 
establishments across the manufacturing sector over the period 1968-72. A standard 
wage equation for production workers augmented by import penetration is estimated. 
The results reveal a strongly significant and negative import effect on union wages 
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although the growth in import share is not associated with the pay of unionised 
production workers. 
Macpherson and Stewart (1990) examine the impact of foreign competition on the 
union wage gap of blue-collar manufacturing workers by matching individual level 
data from the US Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the period 1975-81 to 
industry import penetration. Their main empirical strategy involves the estimation of 
separate union and non-union wage equations together with a union status model 
using the Heckman two-step method. They find that that a 10% increase in import 
share decreases the union wage differential by about 2% but the negative foreign 
competition effect on wages appears to depend on the extent of unionisation in the 
industry, declining as union density rises. 
Partridge (1993) uses a sample of production workers from the CPS, observed over 
the period 1984 to 1987. He estimates separate wage equations for individual union 
and non-union workers and measure the impact of trade by industry import 
penetration ratio and export share. Controls for a range of individual and industry 
characteristics are also included. The results indicate that trade has little influence on 
non-union wages but the effect on union wages depends on union density in the 
industry. Increased import competition (export share) reduces (increases) union 
wages at low union densities with the opposite occurring in highly unioMsed 
industries. Partridge argues that at low union densities, import penetration (exports) 
decreases (increases) product market profits/rents such that union wages tend to fall 
(rise). On the other hand, the union wage adjustment to foreign competition at high 
union densities is consistent with Lawrence and Lawrence's (1985) predictions. 
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Greater imports (exports) leads to slow (rapid) product demand growth and less 
(more) investment in new plant and equipment. Thus, unions can extract higher 
(lower) wage settlements as it is more difficult (easier) to substitute capital for 
labour. 
Gaston and Trefler (1995) investigate the role of internatIonal trade and protection on 
wage determination using data from various sources on trade and trade policy 
measures, such as import and export flows, tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB). 
These are combined to data from the 1984 CPS on individual earnings and other 
worker characteristics from the manufacturing sector. They adopt the inter-industry 
wage differential approach and generate OLS as well as Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimates to allow for endogenous trade and protection. The main instruments used 
are factor shares and other exogenous regressors in the wage premium equation. 
They find that increased import penetration and high levels of tariffs lead to lower 
union wages. The coefficients on export and NTBs are neither robust nor statistically 
significant. 
Blumenfeld and Partridge (1996) employs union contract data from the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics collective bargaining agreement file to examine the impact of 
international trade on the wage bargaining outcome in the manufactunng sector for 
the period 1972-85. Their empirical specification for the average union wage rate 
includes the changes in ninport and export shares as well as the trade share levels in 
order to distinguish between the short run and long run effects of foreign 
competition. The trade statistics are obtained from the NBER industry trade database. 
Results from OLS and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimations indicate that 
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changes in import and export shares are negatively related to union wages. This is 
explained by the reasoning that increased trade activity raises the extent of 
uncertainty amongst management and trade unions, inducing both parties to display 
risk averse behaviour. The union may, therefore, accept lower wages in exchange for 
future employment guarantees. There is little long run influence of foreign 
competition in industries with low import and export shares while in industries with 
increased exposure to trade, the long run impact of international competition depends 
union density. Import (export) share reduces (increases) union wages in less 
unionised industries. This is consistent with the rent-sharing argument. The effect of 
import (export) is positive (negative) in more unionised industries as a result of trade 
unions trading off higher (lower) wages for lower (greater) employment. On the 
whole, the average net impact of import and export in the long run is relatively small 
compared to the short run. 
Cebula and Usha Nair-Reichert (2000) focuses on the effect of import penetration on 
the union-nonumon wage differential, using individual-level data from the CPS and 
NBER industry trade data for manufacturing industries from 1975 to 1984. They use 
the inter-industry wage differential approach and a generalised 2SLS estimation 
technique to correct for heteroscedasticity and simultaneity between imports and the 
union wage gap. The results from this study suggest that foreign competition 
significantly reduces the union wage effect. Moreover, a greater extent of union 
orgamsation does not appear to dampen the effect of import competition on the union 
wage differential. It is argued that trade unions favour employment 
during periods of 
nsing international competition. 
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Finally, Shippen. and Lynch (2002) estimate separate union and non-union wage 
equations using matched data on individual workers from the CPS and industry-level 
data on imports and exports from the NBER during 1983-94. Pooled regression 
results for the whole sample indicate that import share significantly reduces the 
average union wage. However, there is evidence of the negative import effect 
declining over time. On separating the dataset into 3 sub-samples (1983-86,1987-90, 
1991-94), they find that increased pressure from international trade has no adverse 
impact on union wages after 1986. Shippen and Lynch attribute their findings to the 
predictions from Grossman's (1984) model. It is possible that, in the face of 
declining union density, senior union members vote to maintain wage premiums at 
the expense of future employment prospects for younger workers. The results also 
reveal that import competition has no influence on the wage growth of union workers 
over the penod 1983-94. 
5-3 Data and empirical methodology 
The review of the literature presented above draws attention to the fact that, unlike 
the US, there is a remarkable lack of empirical research on the relationship between 
international competition and union bargaining in the UK. Moreover, two out of the 
three UK studies only use qualitative measures of foreign competition and although 
Brown and Sessions (2001) consider industry trade data, it is not at a disaggregated 
level. Also previous researchers using UK data do not specifically look at individual 
wages and more importantly, they do not analyse the 
implications of foreign 
competition for the union wage gap of individual workers. 
One of the contributions 
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of our study is the individual-level dataset used. This section, therefore, explains the 
construction of the data, outlining the main variables and some descriptive statistics. 
It also describes the econometric modelling and estimation strategy adopted in order 
to examine the effect of foreign competition on the union wage gap in the UK. 
5-3-1 Data 
The main data 3 sources are: the New Earnings Survey Panel Data-set (NESPD) and 
the specially assembled trade data from the OECD's Intemational Trade by 
Commodities Statistics (ITCS, Revision 2). We also include industry level variables 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Census of Production. The fina14 data 
used for the empirical analysis in this chapter is compiled as follows. 
1. Detailed information on earnings, union status and other individual 
characteristics, pertaining to a sample of workers observed from 1982 to 1995 
and whose earnings are not affected by absence are extracted from the NESPD. 
2. These are merged at the 4-digit level of industry aggregation to import and export 
shares contained in the trade data set. The combined NES/trade data is restricted 
to manufacturing industries because of the lack of disaggregated trade 
information on other sectors of the UK economy and 1992 is omitted because of 
other missing data. 
3. As discussed in chapter 3, the NESPD provides very little information on 
individual characteristics apart from age and gender, so we combine Industry- 
level (4-digit SIC) proxies for j ob-related training and the level of education from 
3A detailed description of these databases is given in chapter 3. 
' See appendix 5B for a summary of how the final data is constructed. 
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the LFS. A variable for industry union membership density is also included. 
4. The data is merged to other industry characteristics taken from the Census of 
Production. In particular, concentration ratios and the average size of 
establishments are used as proxies for the domestic market structure and firin size 
respectively. 
In chapter 3, we underlined that the UK industrial classification scheme changed in 
1992. Hence, the industry-level variables were not originally in single encompassing 
4-digit codes. For the period 1982-91 the variables were classified according to the 
1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 80) whilst for the years 1993-95 they 
were consistent with the 1992 industrial codes (SIC 92). Since the NESPD classifies 
industries based on SIC80 from 1982 to 1995 we use concordances 5 to map all data 
based on SIC92 to SIC80 prior to merging. 
We do not construct a single compatible dataset that combines all the variables from 
the different sources. The data is split into two sub-samples for the time periods 
1982-91 and 1993-95 for the two main reasons. Firstly, there are a few potentially 
nil important variables that are not available for the whole of the period 1982-95. For 
instance, establishment size is only observed from 1982 to 1991 and union density 
from 1993 to 1995. Also, we do not have a consistent measure of industry 
concentration over time: four-firm concentration ratios are available 
from 1982 to 
1991 and the Herfindahl ratio from 1993 onwards. 
5 Made available by the office for National Statistics. 
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Secondly, in their study of the union wage differential in Britain during the years 
1975 to 1995, Andrews et al. (1998a) highlight two phases in the movement of the 
union mark up over time (see figure 5.1 in sub-section 5-3-2-2). They show that the 
union wage effect remained fairly constant throughout the 1980s and early 1990s but 
there was a sharp rise from 1993 onwards. The considerable rise in the union mark 
up during the 1993-95 period was confirmed by estimates from different data 
sources. We test the hypothesis that the earnings functionS6 in the 1982-91 and 1993- 
95 periods are statistically the same using a Chow test. The null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% level7, strengthening the case for analysing the data separately in 
terms of two distinct time periods. This, in effect, also enables us to examine the 
foreign competition effect over time. 
In order to examine the effects of foreign competition on the union wage gap for 
different skill groups, we split the data further into skilled and unskilled 
occupations 8. Our main motivation is explained by the fact that both intemational 
competition and union bargaining tend to affect the wage outcomes of skilled and 
unskilled workers differently. There is the notion that globalisation may have led to a 
deterioration of the returns to labour market participation of blue collar workers 
relative to those of white collar workers (Greenaway and Nelson, 2001). On the other 
hand, trade unions have traditionally been more active within manual occupations, 
producing higher wage premiums for unskilled workers compared to the skilled 
(Booth, 1995; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2002). 
6 The same specifications are used for 1982-91 and 1993-95 when performing the Chow test. 
7 Fý14.74 and Prob >F=0.000 
8 Skilled includes managers and administrators, professional, associate professional and technical 
occupations. 'fhe unskilled sample contains plant and machine operatives and other manual 
occupations. 
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Overall, we consider four sub-samples 9 altogether, each consisting of an unbalanced 
panel of individual workers. Table 5.1 summarises the number of observations and 
individuals in the different sub-samples, after dropping all mi issing observations. 
Table 5.1: Number of observations in the different sub-samples 
Unskilled Skilled 
Observations Individuals Observations Individuals 
1982-91 181060 54448 50943 16781 
1993-95 23955 13832 16937 9453 
Source: Computed from compiled dataset 
5-3-2 The variables 
5-3-2-1 The dependent variable 
The earnings data collected in the NESPD include individual workers' weekly, 
hourly and annual pay. Information on weekly and hourly wages is divided into gross 
and basic pay. The total gross earnings are inclusive of overtime rates while the basic 
wage of the employee excludes the amount earned from working overtime. Note that 
hourly earnings are recorded for employees whose pay is not affected by absence. 
We use the log of basic hourly earnings (at 1990 prices) as the dependent variable. It 
is argued that the hourly pay is more consistent with the theoretical literature on 
union wage effects, which is specifically based on wage rates and not the number of 
hours worked (Andrews et al., 1998a). 
9 There is no evidence suggesting that globalisation impacts on male and female earnings 
differently. 
Hence, we do not stratify the samples according to sex. 
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5-3-2-2 The union status variable 
The main union status variable used in this study is union coverage, indicating 
whether the individual is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. This is a 
more appropriate proxy for the influence of trade unions over wages than 
membership. The NESPD contains a constant measure of coverage over time, 
although one key linlitation of the variable is that it identifies workers covered by a 
major union agreement only and excludes company/district/local bargainmg. This 
has important implications for estimating the union wage differential. As discussed 
in chapter 3, major agreements represent only two thirds of all UK agreements and 
have fallen rapidly throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, it would appear that 
local agreements have become more prominent over the years, particularly due to 
government decentralisation policy (Andrews et al., 1998a). More significantly, 
Andrews et al. (1998a) find that the major coverage differentials are considerably 
lower than wage premiums achieved from coverage by company/district/local 
agreements. Cooperation between unions and firms may lead to higher rents at the 
local level. In addition, assuming high union density at the establishment, trade 
unions can be more powerful and successful in extracting part of the firm's rents 
when bargaining occurs locally. Therefore, union mark ups based on major coverage 
may be misleading and the true overall coverage differential severely 
underestimated. 
But a main advantage of the major coverage variable is that it is consistently 
recorded on an annual basis by the NESPD 
during the whole of the period analysed 
by the present study. As a result, it provides a potentially rich source of information 
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that can be used to examine the relationship between foreign competition, 
unionisation and earnings over time. Moreover, Andrews et al. (1998a) argue that the 
major coverage differential broadly reflects the movement over time of the overall 
coverage differential, albeit being around one-third to two-thirds smaller in 
magnitude. Figure 5.1 below, reproduced from Andrews et al. (1998a), plots major 
coverage differentials from the NESPD and the coverage differentials from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1991 and 1995 and the US for years 
1993 to 1995 estimated by OLS and using identical specifications. 
E3 Major coverage (NESPD) 
Ink BHPS US 
15 
I 
. 
05 
0 
Figure 5.1: Coverage differentials from Andrews et al. (1998a) 
Notwithstanding the outlier (from the US specification), the pattern in the coverage 
differentials from the BHPS and US in the 1990s matches the movement in the 
major coverage differential from the NESPD over the same period. It can be argued 
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that, in general, the use of major coverage may provide a guide to the trends in the 
effect of foreign competition on union wage bargaining. 
5-3-2-3 The explanatory variables 
Worker characteristics. The observable individual characteristics available in the 
NESPD are: age, gender, tenure (whether worker employed in current job for more 
than 12 months), the type of job (whether employee is employed fall time or part 
time), sector (private or public), the industry affiliation of workers and location. A 
variable indicating whether the individual is a trainee is included in the 1993-95 sub- 
samples. 
Industry-level variables. An important criticism of the NESPD is that it contains no 
measures of the worker's educational attainment. Hence, we include industry level 
proxies for the average quality of the labour force, computed from the LFS. These 
are: the proportion of workers in each 4-digit industry with higher and further 
education, the proportion of workers with secondary education and the proportion of 
workers with j ob-related training. 
We also include industry union membership density amongst the explanatory 
variables. The estimated coverage differential may be biased if membership is not 
included. The greater the level of union presence in the industry, the higher the wage 
rate paid to labour. Membership density may also reflect the influence of bargaining 
arrangements such as closed shops. The variable is, however, not available for the 
1980s and appears in the 1993-95 period only. 
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Finn size is an important determinant of pay and because of the positive correlation 
with unionism, differentials may be biased upwards if controls are not included 
(Andrews et al., 1998b). We use the average size of establishment in the industry, 
constructed from the Census of Production, as a proxy. This is defined as the log of 
the ratio between industry employment and the number of establishments. 
Unfortunately, the figures are only available for the period 1982-9 1. 
Concentration ratios are used to capture the characteristics of domestic market 
structure and proxy domestic competition. As discussed previously, we do not have a 
consistent single measure of industry concentration over time. The four-firin 
concentration and the Herfindahl ratios from the Census of Production are used for 
the periods 1982-91 and 1993-95 respectively. Economic theory suggests that 
concentrated industries pay higher wages not only because of monopoly rents but 
also to attract better quality and more productive workers. Moreover, concentrated 
industries use sophisticated technologies, well-trained and skilful labour units such 
that higher marginal productivity of labour may explain the relatively higher wages 
paid. An alternative hypothesis is that threatened unionisation in less competitive 
industries may induce firms to share part of their economic profits with their 
employees. 
We introduce an interaction between the union status and concentration variables in 
view of testing union rent-seeking in concentrated industries. Because of the high 
oligopoly rents and the greater ability of firms in concentrated industries to pass on 
cost increases to consumers, there is more scope for labour unions to achieve higher 
wage premiums. Also, given the small number of firms, unions find it easier to 
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extensively organise concentrated industries and maintain jurisdictional control. 
However, the union wage advantage may be restricted by a larger reduction in 
employment and typically the employer's willingness and ability to resist union 
pressure may be greater in less competitive markets. Further, unions may not be able 
to add much to the already existing high pay in concentrated industries and higher 
levels of concentration may actually hinder the wage gaining ability of trade unions 
(Lewis, 1963; Weiss, 1966). 
Foreign competition variables. The extent of foreign competition in the industry is 
captured by the trade variables, import penetration ratio and export share. Import 
penetration is defined as the ratio of imports over domestic demandlo. Export share is 
the ratio between exports and domestic output. Construction of these variables is 
explained in greater detail in chapter 3. The use of trade flows as proxy for 
international competition is consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Table 5.2 summarises the definitions of all variables used in the analysis and the 
main data sources. 
10 Domestic demand is equal to imports plus domestic production minus exports. 
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Table 5.2: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source Years available 
Individual charateristics 
In w Log of Hourly Earnings NESPD 1982-95 
Union Dummy 
=1 if worker covered by major 
bargaining agreement 
Age Age of worker 
Age square Age square 
Male Dummy =1 if worker male 
Full time Dummy =1 if worker employed full time 
Tenure Dummy 
=1 if worker has been employed in 
current job for more than 12 months 
Private Dummy =1 if worker employed in private sector 
Trainee Dummy =1 if worker is a trainee 1993-95 
Industry dummies 
Metal Worker employed in metal manufacturing 4C 1982-95 
Metal goods Worker employed in metal goods manufacturing 46 44 
Other minerals Worker employed in other minerals 
Instrument Worker employed in instrument engineering 
Chemicals Worker employed in chemicals manufacturing 
Mechanical Worker employed in mechanical engineering 
Electronic Worker employed in electronic and electrical 
engineering 
Office Worker employed in office machinery 
Motor Worker employed in motor vehicles 
Other transport Worker employed in other transport equipment 
Food Worker employed in food and beverages 
Textiles Worker employed in textiles manufacturing 
Clothing Worker employed in clothing industry 
Leather Worker employed in leather manufacturing 
Wood Worker employed in wood manufacturing 
Paper Worker employed in paper manufacturing 
Plastic Worker employed in plastic and rubber 
manufacturing 
Other Worker employed in other manufacturing 
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Variable Definition Source Years available 
Location dummies 
London Worker resides in London 
South East Worker resides in South East 
East Worker resides in East 
South West Worker resides In South West 
West Midlands Worker resides M West Midlands 
East Midlands Worker resides In East Midlands 
Yorkshire Worker resides in Yorkshire and Humberside 
North West Worker resides In North West 
North Worker resides in North 
Scotland Worker resides In Scotland 
Wales Worker resides in Wales 
 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
44 
46 
44 
44 
64 
44 
Industry characteristics 
Density Union membership density in industry 
Training Proportion of workers with job-related training in 
industry 
Further Proportion of workers with higher/further 
education 
Secondary Proportion of workers with secondary education 
Size Average siZe of establishment 
in industry = log ( employment 
number of establishments 
Concentration 4-firm. concentration ratio (1982-91) 
Herfindahl. ratio (1993-95) 
US 
4( 
Census of 
Production 
1993-95 
1982-95 
1982-91 
66 
1993-95 
Foreign competition 
Import Import penetration ratio 
import 
import + grossoutput 
- 
export 
ITCS(OECD) 
(gross ouput 
from Census of 
Production) 
1982-95 
Export 
Export share 
export 
grossoutput 
Notes: 
NESPD. 
- 
New Earnings Survey Panel Data set; LFS. - Labour Force Survey; ITCS. - International Trade 
by Commodities Statistics 
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5-3-2-4 Some descriptive statistics 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show some descriptive statistics for covered and uncovered 
workers from the. different sub-samples. We find that, on average, unskilled union 
workers are better remunerated than their non-union counterparts while skilled 
employees are paid less in the union sector than in the non-union sector. Overall, 
workers in union jobs share similar characteristics. They are, on average, more likely 
to be older", male and working in full time positions. They also tend to remain in the 
same job for a longer period than non-union workers but are less likely to work in the 
private sector. More workers with secondary education are unionised as compared to 
those with further/higher education. On the other hand, the degree of industry 
concentration is roughly the same for union and non-union workers. The summary 
statistics also demonstrate that the average establishment size is larger in the union 
sector as compared to the non-union sector. Additionally, individuals in union jobs 
appear to face lower levels of foreign competition although when considering the 
change in trade shares from the 1982-91 to the 1993-95 period, we note that some of 
the biggest increases actually occurred in the union sector. For example, the rise in 
import and export shares has been particularly sigruficant for covered skilled 
workers. But the increase in international competition for unskilled workers, union 
and non-Unlon, has been more or less comparable. Another observation transpiring 
from the data is that skilled workers are, in general, relatively more exposed to trade 
openness than unskilled workers. 
11 Although, the 1982-91 sample shows that skilled union workers are marginally younger on average. 
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5-3-3 Econometric Modelling 
The relationship between unionisation and wages can be examined in terms of a 
general model comprising separate union and non-union wage equations, 
ln w,, i = X,, i A+ qi (1) 
In Wni: ": ýXni A+ 
-ni 
and a union status equation of the fonn 
ui *= 7iyi +, r2(ln w-i 
- 
ln w,, d + ei (3) 
where wi is the wage rate for individual i, X and Y are sets of worker, finn and 
industry characteristics determining wages and union status, the subscripts u and n 
stand for union and non-union respectively and E is a random error term. Uj* is a 
latent union status indicator. Assuming an individual worker i is unionised if U*j >0 
and s/he does not belong to a union otherwise, Uj* can be defined by a discrete 
vanable Ui such that, 
Ui =I if U*>O and 
Uj =0 otherwise 
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The model implies that estimation of the wage equations (1) and (2) will be subject 
to the sample selection rule since we observe union wages only if U*i >0 (Ui = 1) 
and non-union wages if U*i 
_<O (Ui = 0). In other words, the availability of data is 
determined by the union status of workers, i. e. whether the each individual worker is 
part of a union agreement or not. As such, the regression functions for the separate 
wage equations can be written as: 
E (In wi IX,, U*i > 0) = Xj ß +E (ei JU,. * > 0) and, 
E (ln w, i IX, i, U*i 
-: 
5'0) = XniA+ E (ew jUjý 
-: 
5-0) 
As we explain in section 5-3-4 below, the union and non-union samples are not 
drawn from a random population of workers. As a consequence, E (, -, i JU: >0) ; ýý 0 
and E (ejjU: 
-: 
5'0) 
-; ýý 0. Under classical assumptions, the conditional expectations of 
the error terms take the values zero and are systematically omitted as regressors 
when the sample regression functions are estimated by simple OLS. Thus, unbiased 
estimates of the union wage gap can be obtained by using sample selection 
estimation methods such as the Heckman two-step methodology. 
An important characteristic of the model is that it allows for different slope 
coefficients in the wage equations. However, we are pri anly interested in the 
impact of foreign competition on the union wage differential and not particularly in 
how the influence of the regressors differ across by union status. So by imposing a 
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restriction for the constancy of the coefficients on the control variables, i. e. A 
we can model the effect of foreign competition on the union wage gap via an 
augmented single wage specification of the fonn, 
In wit = Xlit)fll + X2 it )62+ ly Uit + Ai Importit +A2Exportit + 51 (U*Import)it 
(U*Export)it + time vit 
i=1,2,... N workers 
2,... Tyears 
if worker covered by major collective bargaining agreement 
u 
_O 
otherwise 
(4) 
In wi is the log of individual hourly wages, Uj denotes the union status of worker i, 
taking the value I if the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 
the value 0 otherwise. 45 shows the union wage premium. Time specific effects are 
captured by time dummies contained in the variable time while ej is a random error 
tenn. X, is a vector of worker characteristics and X2 consists of the industry level 
variables. 
Importi and Exporti are import penetration ratio and export share by the individual's 
industry of affiliation. The impact of international competition on union bargaining is 
captured by the combined effect of import competition and export performance on 
the union wage gap, that is the sum of d, and 92, the coefficients on the variables 
168 
U*Import and U*Export respectively. The latter are interactions between the 
individual's union status, Uj and the trade variables, Importi and Exporti. The use of 
both import and export follows from Naylor's (1999) argument, outlined in chapter 
2, regarding the importance of two-way trade for the bargained wage outcome. In 
particular, increased openness may enable labour unions in exporting firms to 
demand higher wages, whilst those in non-exporting establishments may be forced to 
accept wage concessions. Thus, the overall effect of trade on the union wage effect 
will depend on the strength of the two forces. 
Recall that the restriction imposed on the single wage equation (4) implies that the 
earmngs determination process is the same for union and non-union workers. In other 
words, the union wage differential (6) is conditional on the assumption that the 
effects of the regressors do not differ across by union status. For example, the effect 
of age on wages is the same regardless of whether or not an individual is covered by 
a union agreement. 
One advantage of the single equation is that the union wage gap is easily estimated. 
In the case of separate wage equations for the union and non-union sectors an 
average wage differential between covered and uncovered workers has to be 
calculated. This procedure raises the issue of which mean is appropriate to evaluate 
the average differential: should it be over covered workers, uncovered workers or a 
weighted average of the two groups? This is commonly known as the 
'index number 
problem' and as shown in Andrews et al. (1998b), it is of considerable importance 
for the estimation of the union mark up. 
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5-3-4 Estimation strategy 
The estimation strategy aims at generating results Erom three main approaches: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Instrumental Variable technique (IV) and Fixed- 
effects panel estimation (FE). We describe the application of each estimation method 
below and give an account of their limitations. 
5-3-4-1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Equation (4) is estimated using OLS first. We specify heteroscedasticity-consistent 
robust 12 standard errors that also control for other minor deviations from the classical 
assumptions of least squares regressions and problems about outliers and influential 
observations. In line with Moulton (1986; 1990), adjustment 13 is made for within- 
group correlation between errors, ansing from industry-level variables being 
combined with data on individual workers. 
OLS may not necessarily yield unbiased estimates for the union mark up because the 
union status of workers may be endogenous if individuals are self-selected into the 
union or non-union sector. For instance, high wages in unionised firms are likely to 
attract higher quality workers with unobserved productivity-enhancing 
characteristics, causing a positive correlation between union status and the specific 
effects of the individual. Consequently OLS estiMates of the union wage differential 
12 Huber/White/Sandwich estimate of standard errors from STATA. 
13 This is done by using the 'Cluster' option in STATA. 
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will not only reflect the influence of unionism on wages but also that of the 
unobservables. The estimated union differential will be biased upward. On the other 
hand, suppose that most union workers have lower unobserved abilities. Those with 
higher ability would then prefer to leave the union sector and bargain for themselves 
if the scale of remuneration at the union recognised workplace did not match their 
capability. The remaining workers would be negatively selected into the union 
sector, as they require the union to maintain their level of pay. In this case, the 
workers' fixed effects are negatively correlated with their union status, and OLS 
estimates are downward biased, understating the 'true' effect of unionism on wages. 
Union endogeneity may also arise as a result of queuing and employer selection. If 
there are more workers wanting to work in the union sector than there are jobs 
available., employers may choose to hire only the best of the workers queuing for 
union jobs (Abowd and Farber, 1982). This leads to a positive bias in the OLS 
estimated union premium. By extension, estimating the effect of foreign competition 
on the union mark up using OLS would not produce unbiased results. Hence, we 
provide estimates from two different approaches dealing with union endogeneity 
namely, IV and fixed-effects methods. 
5-3-4-2 Instrumental Variable (IV) method 
The problem of endogenous selection can be solved by a simultaneous equation 
approach that involves the use of either IV or sample selection models. As shown 
earlier, the latter requires the simultaneous estimation of a union status model and 
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separate union and non-union wage equations. Given our single equation modelling 
procedure in equation (1), we adopt the IV technique 14 
. 
This approach makes use of 
instruments or proxies that are correlated with the union status of workers (U) but 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term (ei). Our choice of instruments is motivated 
by previous studies like Farber (1983), Bain and Elias (1985) and Booth (1986) 
which identify the attributes of the individual and the industry to which the worker is 
affiliated to as key microeconomic detenninants of union status. Moreover, the 
econometric literature often uses lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
instruments. Hence, for the purpose of estimation, we instrument coverage by the 
available worker and industry characteristics in the data and the one-period lagged 
union status. However, since the variables that qualify as instruments need to be 
highly correlated with the union status variable, they may in turn be correlated with 
the unobserved individual characteristics (Jakubson, 1991; Greene, 1997). If this is 
the case, then the IV estimator will not be consistent. Another disadvantage of the IV 
methodology is the lack of robustness and reliability. IV estimates are also very 
susceptible to inclusion of additional variables, assumptions about error terms and 
the data used (Lewis, 1986; Booth, 1995). 
5-3-4-3 Fixed-effects estimation 
The availability of longitudinal data allows us to consider an alternative to the cross- 
sectional IV corrections for union endogeneity. Assuming unmeasured personal 
charactenstics are time invariant, we estimate equation (4) using the fixed-effects 
14 Robust standard errors are specified and adjustments are made for within group correlation. 
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method such as to control for the unobserved individual attributes and eliminate the 
source of self-selection. The FE estimation is subject to two main caveats, 
originating from the fact that panel estimates are based on individuals changing 15 
union status over time. The first is measurement error bias. It is argued that some of 
the observed changes in union status may not be true changes but rather the 
consequence of mere misclassification or misreporting (Mincer, 1983; Freeman, 
1984; Chowdhury and Nickell, 1985). Moreover, the number of misclassified 
workers will be greater in longitudinal data than in one period cross sectional data 
and because of the relatively small number of workers changing union status, a 
greater proportion of incorrect observations will be present in panel data. Thus, the 
measurement error bias will be severely inflated in fixed-effects estimates (Freeman, 
1984). The second drawback concerns potential endogenous changes in union status. 
If workers moving from union to non-union jobs or vice versa are motivated by 
wages, estimates of the union wage effect will suffer ftom the common problem of 
simultaneity bias (Jakubson, 1991; Booth, 1995). Generally speaking, the fixed- 
effects estimators will be biased downward as a consequence of the potentially very 
large measurement errors present in longitudinal data while the possibility of non- 
random changes in union status could produce estimates that are biased in either 
direction, upward or downward (Freeman, 1984; Swaffield, 2001; Disney and 
Gosling, 2003). 
In sum, OLS estimates are biased because of unobserved worker heterogeneity whilst 
the use of IV may not yield convincing results due to concerns about the choice of 
15 See table 5B. 2 in the appendix for the number of workers changing union status in the data. 
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instruments and the lack of robustness of the estimates. On the other hand, 
measurement errors and endogenous changes in union status will lead to biased 
fixed-effects estimates. In view of these estimation difficulties, it is therefore 
necessary to examine the results from all three different methods so as to reach a 
better assessment of the interactions between foreign competition, unionisation and 
wages. 
5-3-4-4 Is trade endogenous? 
Before proceeding to the empirical estimation and results, we consider the possible 
endogeneity of trade. Trade flows arguably depend on wage costs and as seen from 
the theoretical review in chapter 2, Naylor (1999) suggests that the pattern of trade 
may be determined by union wage strategies. This poses a potential simultaneity 
problem between- trade, wages and the union-mark up. In order to test whether the 
foreign competition variables need instrumenting, we perform a standard augmented 
regression test, also known as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). The test follows the same procedure explained in chapter 3 
whereby the residuals obtained from OLS regressions of import penetration and 
export share are included in the original wage determination model. The latter is then 
estimated by OLS and an F-test for the joint significance of the incorporated 
residuals of the foreign competition variables is performed. This is equivalent to the 
test of the null hypothesis that import penetration and export share are exogenous. 
The test statistics and high p-values in table 5.5 suggest that the null cannot be 
rejected in any of the different sub-samples considered. As such, we do not find 
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sufficient statistical support for the endogeneity of trade from our data and so the 
estimation of equation (4) is carried out using the methods described in the previous 
sections without instrumenting for the international competition variables. The test 
results in this section are consistent with the findings in chapter 3 and also Gaston 
and Trefler (1994) who conclude that the endogeneity of trade flows plays no role in 
influencing the response of wages to trade. Similarly, Freeman and Katz (1991) 
argue that the simultaneity bias between trade and wages is typically small and 
Karier (1991) reports that import and export shares are not strongly influenced by 
wage levels or the union wage differential. 
Table 5.5: Results from DV*IH test for endogeneity of import penetration and export share 
1982-91 
Unskilled Skilled Unskilled 
F value = 1.8 
Prob >F=0.17 
F value = 2.03 
Prob >F=0.18 
F value = 2.17 
Prob >F=0.11 
1993-95 
Skilled 
F value = 0.97 
Prob >F=0.38 
Note: Null hypothesis, HO: import penetration and export share are exogenous; large p-values 
indicate that HO is not rejected 
5-4 Results 
This section explains the empirical results reported in the appendix tables 5A. I to 
5A. 6. Two wage specifications are considered. The column labelled (1) shows the 
basic wage equation (4) estimated without the foreign competition variables. This is 
meant to capture the effect of coverage on wages in a closed economy setting. 
We 
introduce import penetration and export share in column (2). 
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Individual characteristics. The effects of individual characteristics on wages are, on 
the whole, consistent throughout the different specifications although for some 
variables the coefficients do vary with the estimation methods and time period 
considered. We find that male workers (skilled and unskilled) are paid more than 
their female counterparts. Earnings are positively related to age while apprentices are 
paid less than fully trained employees. On average, fall time employment 
significantly increases' 6 the hourly wage rate of the unskilled, though the results are 
mixed 17 in the case of skilled workers. According to the 1993-9518 samples, working 
in the private sector generates higher pay for the unskilled but there appears to be no 
significant relationship between sector and skilled pay. In general, tenure has a 
significant'9 positive effect on unskilled eamings. The effect on skilled earnings is, 
however, rather mixed. For the period 1982-91, OLS generates a positive and 
significant coefficient on tenure while the IV coefficient is negative. The OLS results 
do not show any significant effects of tenure on skilled earnings during 1993-95 but 
IV remains negative and significant. Fixed effects estimates are statistically 
insignificant in both time periods. 
Industry characteristics. In most cases, the greater the proportion of workers with 
further/higher education and job related training, the better the pay. Secondary 
education appears to be positively correlated with the earnings for the unskilled in 
particular. The unskilled wage rate rises with union membership density although 
16 This IS confirmed by the OLS and IV estimates. 
17 IV estimations show no significant results. The fixed effects estimates are significant and negative. 
OLS coefficients are positive and significant for the 1993-95 sample 
but insignificant for 1982-9 1. 
18 No association between sector and wages is found for the period 1982-9 
1. 
19 IV estimates are not significant for the period 1993-95 though. 
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only our OLS estimates show a positive and statistically significant influence of 
density on skilled pay. There is also a positive association between the average size 
of establishments in the industry and individual earnings. We find SUpport20 for the 
concentration-earnings hypothesis, as pay appears to be rising with the extent of 
industry concentration. When considering the interaction between coverage and 
industry concentration, the evidence from the unskilled sub-samples (1982-91 and 
1993-95) suggests that trade unions cannot add to the already high wages paid in 
concentrated manufacturing industries. However, there are indications of successful 
union rent seeking in concentrated industries by skilled workers, especially during 
the 1982-91 period. 
Foreign competition and wages. Table 5.6 shows the regression results for the effects 
of import penetration and export share on unskilled and skilled earnings. 
Table 5.6: International competition and wages 
Unskilled Skilled 
1982-91 1993-95 198 2-91 199 3-95 
Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export 
OLS 
-4.7** 2** -0.2** -0.2 -6.3* 10.0** -0.2 -0.5 
(6.4) (2.9) (3.3) (0.8) (2.0) (2.8) (1.2) (1.1) 
IV 
-3.6** 1.8* 0.2 -0.8 -7.6* 12.8** 0.0 -1 
(4.2) (2.3) (0.7) (1.3) (2.1) (3.1) (0.1) (1.1) 
Fixed effects 
-0.7 -0.4 0.0 -0.0 -3.8** 
4.9** 0.1 
-0.0 
(1.4) (0.7) (0.3) (0.1) (3.2) (3.7) (0.7) (0.1) 
Source: Column (2) from tables 5A. 1- 5A. 6 in the appendix 
Notes. 
- 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** significant at 5% and I% respectively; coefficients are in % 
and correspond to the effect on wages of a 10% rise in import penetration and export share. 
20 Except for panel estimates. 
177 
The results are interpreted as follows. A 10% rise in Import competition causes a 
decline in unskilled earnings by up to 4.7% and lowers skilled wages by 3.8% to 
7.6% for the period 1982-91. There is no significant import competition effect on 
skilled earnings for the years 1993-95 while OLS suggests a negative impact of 0.2% 
on unskilled wages for a 10% rise in import share. Export performance is, in general, 
positively associated with wages, though the impact is limited to the 1982-91 period 
only. The effect on skilled earnings, of a 10% increase in export share, ranges 
between ahnost 5% to 13%. OLS and IV estiMates show that the unskilled wage rate 
rises by around 2%. 
Import penetration and export share actually increased 21 by 8 and 6 percentage points 
respectively from 1982 to 199 1. According to our results, this would have produced a 
combined negative trade effect, reducing the earnings of the unskilled by up to 2.6% 
(calculated from the OLS estimates above). In contrast, skilled workers would have 
gained from a positive combined effect of import penetration and export performance 
of up to 1.6% (from the IV estimates) during the same period. In effect, these 
findings are broadly consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson predictions. Blue-collar 
operations are dominated by import competition from developing countries in the 
South, which explains the negative trade effect on unskilled pay. On the other hand, 
in industrialised countries like the UK, skilled workers are likely to be involved in 
ore, positively capital intensive net-exporting sectors of the economy. They are, theref I 
rewarded by increased trade. Besides, skilled workers earn a better return to human 
21 Figures from the industry trade data reveal an aggregate rise in import penetration and export share 
in the manufacturing sector from 26% and 25% to 34% and 31% respectively between 
1982 and 199 1. 
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capital and are more highly remunerated for export performance than unskilled 
employees. The positive effect of openness on skilled wages also reflects the North- 
North intra-industry trade element (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) that characterises 
the markets of developed economies. Since intra-industry trade is related to aspects 
like innovation, research and development and product differentiation, it tends to 
benefit skilled workers most. The 1993-95 period, however, reveals very little 
evidence of a significant international competition effect on wages. While the result 
is unexpected, it could be due to the short time period and insufficient variability in 
the data. Similarly, the relative insignificance of the fixed-effects estimates, shown in 
table 5.6, could stem from a general lack of time variation. 
Coverage. Assuming a closed economy (column (1)), the coverage differential for 
unskilled workers lies in the range 22 of 1.5% to 12.3% for the period 1982-91 and 
- 
3% to 9% for the period 1993-95 23. In the case of skilled employees, the 1982-91 
sub-sample reveals that their average hourly wage rate is lowered by as much as 3% 
to 19.7% by virtue of being covered by a major bargaining agreement. Only the IV 
estimate is statistically significant for the 1993-95 skilled sub-sample, showing a 
union wage gap of around 
-13%. The skilled group is composed of managers, 
administrators, professionals and workers in technical positions who are better off 
bargaining for themselves, hence the negative influence of union coverage on skilled 
22 The variations across specifications may be due to the fact that controlling for union endogeneity 
via IV often results in a moderate to substantial rise in the OLS estimates of the union wage gap 
(Robinson, 1989) while fixed effects has been found to halve the coverage differential relative to OLS 
(Andrews et al., 1998a). 
23 The exclusion of controls for firm size in the 1993-95 sub-samples may cause an upward 
bias in the 
estimated differentials (Andrews et al., 1998b). 
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pay. In general, the results confirm previous empirical studies (Booth, 1995) 
suggesting that trade unions are more successful in securing higher wages for blue 
collar relative to white-collar workers. We find that the OLS estimates of the union 
mark up are smaller in magnitude than the IV coefficients. This concurs with the IV 
literature on union wage effects, which usually reports higher estimates compared to 
OLS (Robinson, 
- 
1989). It could imply that workers are negatively selected into 
unions and that OLS is biased downwards. The fixed-effects coefficients, on the 
other hand, are much smaller possibly due to measurement error bias and/or non- 
random changes in union status (Swaffield, 2001). 
V- 
fureign competition and the union wage gap. Now, tuming to the effects of 
international trade on the union mark up, table 5.7 below summarises the estimated 
coefficients on the union dummy (5) and the interaction between coverage and 
import (, 5ý) and coverage and export (9, ) from column (2) In the result tables. 5, 
and 9, are estimates of the influence of import penetration and export share on the 
union wage differential. Three sets of estimations are presented: OLS, IV and fixed- 
effects. Results from OLS and IV are more or less comparable. The fixed-effects 
coefficients are relatively small, possibly due to measurement error and/or selectivity 
(i. e. non-random changes in union status) causing a downward bias in the estimates 
(Swaffield, 2001). They are also not significantly different from zero, which could be 
attributed to a lack of variation within observations. 
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Table 5.7: International competition and the union wage gap 
OLS IV Fixed Effect 
Unskilled 
1982-91 8.5 13.9** 1.4** 
(17.3 ) (13.5) (4.9) 
-9.5** 
-0.4 
(4.3) (6.0) (0.5) 
CY2 
= 3.7 ** 92 
= 4.3 ** g2 = 0-8 
(2.8) (3.2) (1.0) 
1993-95 
tY = 6.8 9.2** 
(5.8) (4.3) (2.4) 
0.7** 1.6* 
-0.2 
(2.8) (2.5) (0.8) 
g2 J2 
= 0.2 92 = 
-0.2 
(1.3) (0.1) (0.3) 
Skilled 
1982-91 
-7.7** -19.5** -2.2** 
(3.6) (4.9) (2.2) 
10.5 13 1.3 
(1.1) (0-3) 
iY2 
-26.9** tY2 = -22.3 
92 
= 
-6.9 
(2.5) (1.7) (1.5) 
1993-95 
-1.2 -13.4* 2.5 
(0.4) (2.4) (1.0) 
91 
= 0.8 91 = -0.4 151 = 0.2 
(0.7) (0.3) (0.3) 
92 
= 
-2.1 
g2 
= 1.3 g2 = -0-9 
(0.6) (0.3) (0.4) 
Source: Colurnn (2) from tables 5A. 1- 5A. 6 in the appendix 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. t, significant at 10%, 5% and I% respectively. Coefficients are 
in %. cY, and 92 correspond to the effect on the union wage gap of a 
10% rise in import penetration 
and export share respectively. 
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From table 5.7, the OLS and IV estimates dunng the period 1982-91 show that a 
10% increase in import competition reduces the average union wage differential for 
unskilled workers by 5.9% and 9.5% respectively whilst the impact of a 10% 
increase in the industry's export share is between 3.7% (OLS) and 4.3% (IV). We 
find that foreign competition influences the skilled union wage differential mainly 
via export. The OLS results reveal that a 10% increase in export share reduces the 
skilled union wage gap by 26.9% while the IV estimate indicates a reduction of 
22.3%, albeit being weakly significant at the 10% level. There is, however, a 
different picture emerging for the period 1993-95. While we observe no significant 
export effect, the impact of import competition on the unskilled union wage gap is 
generally positive and significant, ranging from 0.7% (OLS) to 1.6% (IV). There is 
no significant foreign competition effect on the union mark up for skilled workers. 
5-4-1 An analysis of the results 
Although our results are not directly comparable to previous UK studies, in 
particular, because of the different samples, empirical methodologies and foreign 
competition measures used, they are generally in line with some of the theoretical 
predictions discussed in chapter 2. For instance, the negative import effect on the 
union wage gap of unskilled workers during the 1982-91 period is consistent with the 
product market/rent-sharing model of Layard et al. (1991) and Vandenbussche and 
Konings (1998). Import penetration increases product market competition and 
reduces the monopoly power of domestic firms, thereby 
lowering profits/quasi-rents 
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and the union-mark up. Moreover, Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) argue that import 
penetration may threaten domestic plants with closure by significantly decreasing the 
demand for domestically manufactured goods. Import competition can also lead to 
labour intensive production, typically involving unskilled workers, being lost to 
foreign producers (Staiger, 1998) while Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) show that 
domestic multinationals may credibly threaten to relocate abroad when faced with 
increased import competition. These factors imply that labour unions may be forced 
to accept lower wages in order to safeguard future employment. Conversely, 
improved export perfon-nance is linked to high product and labour demands, enabling 
trade unions to negotiate higher wages for the unskilled without the fear of future job 
losses (Naylor, 1999). 
On the whole, the combined impact of the actual 8 percentage Point rise in Import 
penetration and the 6 percentage point increase in export share during the period 
1982-91 would have generated a negatiVe trade effect on the unskilled union wage 
differential. It appears that in the 1980s the perceived risks of job loss associated 
with import competition was considerably greater than the employment opportunities 
arising from increased export share. As such, labour unions chose to moderate wage 
demands and maintain unskilled union jobs. 
Following the earlier discussion of the results on foreign competition and wages, 
it is 
perhaps not surprising that (during the 1982-91 period) the skilled union mark up 
is 
primarily influenced by exports. Although, contrary 
to unskilled workers, there is a 
negative export effect on the skilled union wage gap. 
This may relate to the 
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following. According to Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) an increase in the demand 
for domestic goods (for instance, caused by improved export perfon-nance) may lead 
to higher industry growth and investment. However, a larger share of new investment 
in the production process entails a higher elasticity of factor substitution and greater 
labour demand elasticity. As a result, the union wage gap is curtailed. It can be 
argued that manufactured exports in the 1982-91 period did not lead to sufficiently 
high demands for skilled labour such as to outweigh the elasticity effect and enable 
trade unions to extract positive wage premiums. Trade unions may also face the 
threat of multinationals relocating closer to their export markets abroad if domestic 
wage demands are too high (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991). Hence, union workers 
may accept lower wages in exchange for future job guarantees. Similarly, Naylor 
(1999) contends that trade unions may deliberately adopt low wage strategies in 
order to allow export to take place and at the same time, ensure higher levels of 
employment. The negative export effect on the skilled union wage gap may also 
reflect the idea that organisations are forced to improve performance, productivity 
and the way they ftinction, reducing costs, X-inefficiency and especially managerial 
slack in order to compete with international rivals in export markets. In particular, 
unionised manufacturing firms are subject to more managerial disecononues than 
non-unionised firms which, are often claimed to be more competitive and efficient 
intemationally (Konings & Vandenbussche, 1995). It is, therefore, likely that trade 
unions may opt for an adjustment in pay to offset any cuts in employment, which 
would accompany the rationalisation and restructuring of managerial operations in 
unionised establishments. 
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The contrasting results obtained for the period 1993-95 represents a key findIng of 
the study. The absence of any adverse foreign competition effect on the union wage 
differential by the mid 1990s could be due to the hypothesis that the decline of trade 
unions over time left behind smaller unions with more senior workers who voted to 
maintain wages (or even increase earnings In the case of the unskilled) at the expense 
of future employment of younger workers (Grossman, 1984). However, we do not 
nil austract from the possibility that some of the statistical insignificance of the trade 
effects, especially for the skilled sub-sample, may simply be the result of small 
sample size and a lack of variation in the data. 
5-4-2 The effect of international competition over time 
We examine the movement of the effect of foreign competition on the union- 
nonumon wage differential over time further by splitting the 1982-91 samples into 3 
time periods: 1982-85,1986-88, and 1989-91. The effects of import penetration and 
export share on the union mark up, estimated by OLS and IV regressions, are 
summarised m table 5.8. 
It follows that a 10% rise in import competition and export share reduces the union 
wage gap for unskilled workers by 3.2% (OLS) to 6.2% (IV) during the period 1982- 
85. There is a notable decline in the negative foreign competition effect between 
1986 and 1988 and no significant impact of international competition on the 
unskilled union mark-up is observed from 1989 to 1991. Results 
from table 5.7 for 
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the period 1993-95 indicate that foreign competition has a positive influence on the 
unskilled coverage differentials. 
A similar observation can be made for the group of skilled workers. Whilst the 1982- 
85 period reveals a negative influence of foreign competition on the skilled union 
wage gap, there are suggestions that, from the mid-1980s onwards 
, 
it was not 
adversely affected by international competiti ion. 
Table 5.8: International competition and the union wage effect over time 
Unskilled Skilled 
1982-85 1986-88 1989-91 1982-85 1986-88 1989-91 
OLS 
-6.9** -3.9** o5l -0.2 91 = 27.4* -0.7 =13.2 
(3.8) (-2.4) (-0.1) (2.23) (-0.05) (1.0) 
'Y2 3.7** '52 2.6ý '52 2.5 tY2 =-58.2** tY2 = 
-10.7 g2 =- 15.4 
(2.3) (1.8) (1.1) (4.62) (47) (-1.0) 
IV 
-9.8** -9.6* -3.4 20 -0.4 
46.9* 
(4.3) (4.8) (1.4) (-0.0) (2.8) 
t52 3.6* 152 3.9 152 3.6 tY2 -43.8* '52 10.2 t'Y2 = -36.9* 
(2.0) (2.6) (1.6) (-2.8) (-0.6) (-2.1) 
Source: OLS and IV estimations of wage equation (1) 
Notes. significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; coeff 
- 
t-statistics in parentheses; t' *' ** icients are 
in % and correspond to a 10% rise in import penetration and export share; 
ý, 
and ý2 are estimates 
of the coefficients on U*Import and U*Exportftom wage equation 
(2). For the IV estimation, union 
status and the interaction variables are instrumented 
by lagged values and the variables contained in 
X, andX2from equation (I). 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below plot the combined effect of import competition and export 
share on the skilled and unskilled union wage 
differentials between 1982 and 1995 
using the estimates in tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
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Figure 5.2: The effect of international competition on the unskilled union wage gap over time 
OLS 6 IV 
20 
0 
-20 
-40 
-60 
Figure 5.3: The effect of international competition on the skilled union wage gap over time 
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1982-85 1986-88 1989-91 1993-95 
Year 
1982-85 1986-88 Year 
1989-91 1993-95 
It is clear that the disciplining effects of international competi ition on union wage 
setting fell consistently as the 1980s progressed and by the mid 1990s, there was no 
significant impact on the skilled union mark up whilst unskilled workers benefited 
from a positive foreign competition effect. We postulate the following plausible 
explanations for observed trend. 
1. As discussed earlier, the decline of trade unionism in the UK during the 1980s and 
1990s probably resulted in smaller unions with more senior median members 
choosing to maintain or even increase their wage demands at the expense of future 
employment prospects for younger workers. 
2. It is possible that the de-unionisation of British manufacturing resulted in weak 
unions having to make way for stronger ones (Andrews et al., 1998a) that were more 
capable of standing up to the challenges posed by globalisation. 
3. To some extent, the trend in the mid-1990s could also reflect the end of 
'Thatcherism'. 
4. Finally, the lack of significant foreign competition effect in the later years could 
be due to small samples and limited variation in the data, especially for the skilled 
sub-samples. 
5-5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the effect of foreign competition on the union wage 
differential of skilled and unskilled workers in UK manufacturing during the period 
1982 to 1995. We used a specially constructed ndIvIdual level 
data set that 
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combined worker characteristics with 4-digit industry data on import penetration and 
export share. The econometric modelling consisted of a basic single wage equation 
and because of the problem of endogenous selection of workers into unions, we 
generated estimates from OLS, IV and fixed-effects regressions in order to provide a 
better assessment of the true effect of foreign competition on the union mark up. 
OLS and IV yielded comparable results while the fixed-effects coefficients were 
relatively small, possibly due to measurement error and/or selectivity. In addition, 
they were mostly insignificant, which we attributed to a lack of time variation in the 
data. 
The empirical results suggested that foreign competition generally served to 
moderate union wage demands during the 1982-91 period. In the case of unskilled 
workers, a positive export effect was more than offset by a negative impact of import 
penetration on the union wage gap. Presumably, the loss of domestic market share to 
foreign rivals and the threat of multinationals relocating elsewhere as a result of 
increased import competition had greater negative implications for union wage 
setting relative to the benefits of improved export perfon-nance. Import competition 
did not affect the skilled union mark up but the negative impact of export share 
indicated that unionised firms needed considerable reductions in costs and 
management diseconomies in order to compete internationally and gain further 
access to markets abroad. 
The disciplining effect of openness gradually faded away over time and by the mid 
1990s labour unions' wage setting ability was no longer weakened by foreign 
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competition. There was no significant impact on the skilled union mark up and 
unskilled union workers gained from a positive international competition effect 
during the 1993-95 period. One plausible explanation could be that smaller but 
stronger unions that were able to fight further reductions in bargained wages and 
successfully compete in an increasingly global economy. Incidentally, this also 
coincided with the end of 'Thatcherism'. 
The main limitation of the analysis in this chapter is that the union variable from the 
NESPD relates to coverage by a major union agreement only and excludes 
company/district/local bargaining. This may have important implications since major 
agreements represent only two thirds of all UK agreements and have fallen steadily 
over time whilst local agreements have become more prominent, particularly 
following the government's decentralisation policy. Further, major coverage 
differentials are considerably lower than wage premiums achieved from coverage by 
company/district/local agreements (Andrews et al., 1998a). Therefore, studying the 
effect of foreign competition on union mark ups based on major coverage only may 
potentially produce underestimated coefficients and misleading conclusions 
(especially in the later years when major agreements would have collapsed even 
further). Nonetheless, we argue that our measure of union status is consistently 
recorded during the time period considered and perhaps more significantly, major 
coverage differentials broadly reflect the movement of the overall coverage 
differentials over- time. And so the use of major agreements is likely to provide a 
good guide to the trends in the effect of foreign competition on the union wage gap. 
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APPENDIX 5A 
Table 5A. I: Results from OLS regressions 1982-91 
Unskilled Skilled 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.047 0.047 0.086 0.086 (86.70)** (85.65)** (41.64)** (41.36)** 
Age square 
-0.001 
-0.001 
-0.001 
-0.001 (80.99)** (79.98)** (35.95)** (35.71)** 
Male 0.292 0.293 0.245 0.248 
(94.33)** (93.88)** (24.41)** (24.28)** 
Full time 0.129 0.128 0.022 0.033 
(23.96)** (23.80)** (0.52) (0.77) 
Tenure 0.101 0.101 0.010 0.010 
(49.43)** (48.68)** (2.13)* (2.11)* 
Sector 
-0.016 -0.011 -0.030 -0.025 (2.8 0) ** (1.93) (2.09)* (1.72) 
Establishment size 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.015 
(22.80)** (22.00)** (5.16)** (4.8 9) * 
Training 0.164 0.179 0.121 0.126 
(8.19)** (8.83)** (2.35)* (2.3 8) * 
Further education 0.358 0.352 0.390 0.400 
(18.03)** (17.25)** (8.47)** (8.16)** 
Secondary education 0.237 0.222 0.078 0.077 
(18.33)** (17.15)** (2.34)* (2.30)* 
Concentration ratio 0.090 0.091 0.124 0.130 
(11.21)** (11.28)** (5.26)** (5.36)** 
Union coverage 0.077 0.085 
-0.101 -0.077 (18.20)** (17.25)** (5.18)** (3.62) 
Coverage *concentration 
-0.093 -0.097 0.080 0.103 (10.36)** (10.78)** (2.00)* (2.55)* 
Import penetration ratio 
-0.047 -0.063 (6.43)** (1.99)* 
Coverage*import 
-0.059 0.105 (4.2 8) (1.05) 
Export share 0.020 0.100 (2.93)** (2,76)** 
Coverage*export 0.037 
-0.269 (2.76)** (2.53)* 
Constant 
-0.285 -0.269 -0.457 -0.526 (14.37)** (13.07)** (5.64)** (6.2 8) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 184810 181060 52500 50943 
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 
Notes: 
1. OLS regressions with STATA's robust and cluster options 
2. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
3. * significant at 5%, - ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5A. 2: Results from OLS regressions 1993-95 
Unskilled Skilled 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.040 0.040 0.075 0.076 (29.29)** (28.71)** (20.47)** (20.50)** 
Age square 
-0-0005 
-0-0005 
-0.001 -0.001 (27.51)** (26.90)** (17.36)** (17.43)** 
Male 0.259 0.258 0.216 0.219 (42.37)** (41.82)** (17.49)** (17 31)** 
Full time 0.160 0.157 0.123 . 0.132 
(14.27)** (13.81)** (2.77)** (2.89)** 
Tenure 0.099 0.099 0.010 0.012 
(16.20)** (16.01)** (1.06) (1.18) 
Trainee 
-0.339 
-0.343 -0.488 -0.494 (17.72)** (17.71)** (16.88)** (16.65)** 
Sector 0.176 0.172 0.008 0.007 
(6.92)** (7.02)** (0.21) (0.16) 
Membership density 0.310 0.303 0.124 0.118 
(14.66)** (13.80)** (3.48)** (3.23)** 
Training 0.130 0.127 0.278 0.289 
(3.3 7) (3.20)** (4.27)** (4.3 8) 
Further education 0.532 0.521 0.223 0.189 
(15.01)** (14.39)** (3.80)** (3,03)** 
Secondary education 0.202 0.211 
-0.155 -0.184 (7.14)** (7.10)** (2.99)** (3.4 1) 
Concentration 0.069 0.082 0.148 0.145 
(2.9 6) ** (3.28)** (3.8 6) ** (3.5 0) ** 
Coverage 0.072 0.068 
-0.021 -0.012 (6.2 0) ** (5.80)** (0.73) (0.40) 
Coverage *concentration 
-0.201 -0.212 -0.384 -0.424 (3.94) (4.10)** (2.42)* (2.52)* 
Import penetration 
-0.002 -0.002 (3.34)** (1.20) 
Coverage*import 0.007 0.008 
(2.7 9) (0.72) 
Export share 
-0.002 -0.005 (0.75) (1.05) 
Coverage*export 0.010 
-0.021 (1.28) (0.61) 
Constant 
-0.098 -0.085 0.254 0.248 (2.27)* (1.98)* (2.5 1) (2.43)* 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24898 23955 17750 16937 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.25 
Notes: 
L OLS regressions with STA TA 's robust and cluster options 
2. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
3. * significant at 5%; ** significant at I% 
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Table 5A. 3. Results from Instrumental Variable regression (M 1982-91 
Unskilled Skilled 
(1) (2) (1) 
Age 0.039 0.039 0.077 0.077 (59.62)** (58.82)** (29.39)** (29.11)** 
Age square 
-0.0001 
-0.0001 
-0.001 
-0.001 (57.20)** (56.41)** (25.92)** (25.65)** 
Male 0.305 0.306 0.235 0.238 (85.05)** (84.63)** (17.66)* (17.47)** 
Full time 0.121 0.119 0.023 0.026 (18.19)** (18.04)** (0.42) (0.48) 
Tenure 0.050 0.049 
-0.080 -0.081 (17.21)** (16.81)** (11.54)** (11.46)** 
Sector 
-0.018 -0.010 -0.008 -0.004 (2.65)** (1.47) (0.36) (0.19) 
Establishment size 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.017 
(20.11)** (19.73)** (4.4 9) (4.47)** 
Training 0.217 0.229 0.255 0.223 
(10.25)** (10.68)** (4.36)**, (3.70)** 
Further education 0.380 0.370 0.438 0.478 
(17.49)** (16.61)** (8.29)** (8.58)** 
Secondary education 0.240 0.225 
-0.002 0.008 (16.74)** (15.60)** (0.04) (0.21) 
Concentration ratio 0.129 0.126 0.160 0.164 
(14.02)** (13.67)** (5.77)** (5.72)** 
Union Coverage 0.123 0.139 
-0.197 -0.195 (14.24)** (13.54)* (5.4 1)* (4.8 9) ** 
Coverage *concentration 
-0.199 -0.203 0.253 0.286 (12.91)** (12.92)** (4.2 0) (4.9 1) ** 
Import penetration ratio 
-0.036 -0.076 (4.24)** (2.09)* 
Coverage*import 
-0.095 0.130 (5.9 6) (1.08) 
Export share 0.018 0.128 (2.28)* (3.0 8) 
Coverage*export 0.043 
-0.223 (3.17) ** (1.72) 
Constant 0.116 0.131 0.016 
-0.022 (5.9 6) (6.6 1) ** (0.19) (0.25) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 133145 130423 36742 35681 
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.25 0.25 
Notes: 
1. IV regressions with STA TA 's robust and cluster options 
2. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
3. ' significant at 10%, - * significant at 5%; significant at I %; 
4. Union status and the interaction variables are instrumented by lagged values and the variables 
contained in X, and X2from wage equation (I). 
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Table 5A. 4: Results from Instrumental Variable regression 1993-95 
Unskilled Skilled 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.042 0.042 0.071 0.070 (23.89)** (23.68)** (17.20)** (16.79)** 
Age square 
-0.0001 
-0.0001 
-0.001 
-0.001 (22.87)** (22.60)** (14.72)** (14.36)** 
Male 0.273 0.274 0.228 0.232 (36.56)** (36.60)** (15.29)** (15.32)** 
Full time 0.154 0.153 0.110 0.107 
(9.92)** (9.77)** (2.04)* (1.94) 
Tenure 0.007 0.003 
-0.116 -0.114 (0.57) (0.24) (6.11)** (5.9 0) ** 
Trainee 
-0.316 
-0.317 -0.473 -0.474 (7.77)** (7.8 1) (9.7 2) (9 6 1) 
Sector 0.192 0.193 0.018 . 0.018 
(6.5 8) (6.72)** (0.33) (0.33) 
Membership density 0.304 0.278 0.034 0.021 
(10.61)** (9.5 6) (0.72) (0.43) 
Training 0.154 0.165 0.249 0.261 
(3.16) ** (3.3 3) ** (3.10)** (3.2 0) ** 
Further education 0.482 0.437 0.169 0.136 
(10.77)** (9.66)** (2.20)* (1.69) 
Secondary education 0.163 0.157 
-0.246 -0.264 (4.18) (3.8 8) (3.82)** (3.99)** 
Concentration 0.093 0.111 0.168 0.179 
(2.95)** (3.33)** (3.06)** (3.05)** 
Coverage 0.090 0.092 
-0.133 -0.134 (4.4 1) (4.29)** (2.45)* (2.40)* 
Coverage* concentration 
-0.316 -0.339 0.159 0.137 (3.75)** (3.97)** (0.51) (0.42) 
Import penetration 0.002 0.0001 
(0.71) (0.12) 
Coverage*import 0.016 
-0.004 (2.48)* (0.32) 
Export share 
-0.008 -0.010 (1.34) (1.09) 
Coverage*export 0.002 0.013 
(0.13) (0.30) 
Constant 
-0.043 -0.019 0.542 0.558 (0.75) (0.32) (4.2 5) (4.26)** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13208 12947 10180 9929 
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 
Notes: 
L IV regressions with STA TA's robust and cluster options 
2. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
3. * significant at 5%; ** significant at I% 
4. Union status and the interaction variables are instrumented by lagged values and the variables 
contained in X, and X2ftom wage equation (1) 
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Table 5A. 5: Fixed-effects estimates 1982-91 
Unskilled Skilled 
(1) 
Age 0.053 0.052 0.087 0.087 (40.47)** (39.85)** (28-88)** (28.88)** 
Age square 
-0.001 
-0.001 
-0.001 -0.001 (90.84)** (89.12)** (58.41)** (57.48)** 
Male 0.192 0.194 0.207 0.206 (11.97)** (12.02)** (5.4 1) (5.38)** 
Full time 0.006 0.005 
-0.157 -0.151 (1.41) (1.09) (10.06)** (9.49)** 
Tenure 0.046 0.046 0.004 0.005 
(33.93)** (33.50)** (1.46) (1.82) 
Sector 0.003 0.003 
-0.013 -0.012 (0.69) (0.76) (2.05)* (1.76) 
Establishment size 0.003 0.003 0.0001 
-0.0001 (5.6 6) ** (5.45)** (0.10) (0.29) 
Training 0.038 0.042 0.002 
-0.007 (3.0 5) ** (3.32)** (0.10) (0.27) 
Further education 0.018 0.025 0.005 0.009 
(1.50) (1.98)* (0.21) (0.40) 
Secondary education 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.008 
(1.13) (1.12) (0.04) (0.51) 
Concentration ratio 0.043 0.038 0.006 0.015 
(7.40)** (6.39)** (0.46) (1.19) 
Union coverage 0.015 0.014 
-0.030 -0.022 (5.92)** (4.93)** (3.27)** (2.18)* 
Coverage *concentration 
-0.003 -0.002 0.051 0.060 (0.49) (0.36) (2.8 6) ** (3.3 0) ** 
Import penetration 
-0.007 -0.038 (1.41) (3.17) 
Coverage*import 
-0.004 0.013 (0.48) (0.30) 
Export share 
-0.004 0.049 (0.69) (3.6 6) 
Coverage*export 0.008 
-0.069 (0.96) (1.54) 
Constant 0.073 0.082 0.176 0.139 
(1.59) (1.78) (1.67) (1.32) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 184810 181060 52500 50943 
Number of individuals 55285 54448 17233 16781 
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.38 0.38 
Notes: 
1. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
195 
Table 5A. 6: Fixed-effects estimates 1993-95 
Unskilled Skilh-A 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.014 0.014 0.084 0.086 (0.69) (0.71) (9.30)** (9.20)** 
Age square 
-0.0004 
-0-0004 
-0.001 -0.001 
4 
(7.97)** (7.74)** (11.39)** (11.06)** 
Male 
-1.702 
-1.701 (13.56)** (13.52)** 
Full time 
-0.083 
-0.084 
-0.195 -0.191 (6.55)** (6.45)** (8.23)** (7 63)** 
Tenure 0.025 0.026 0.007 . 0.005 
(4.97)** (4.92)** (1.13) (0.74) 
Trainee 
-0.124 
-0.131 -0.141 -0.133 (6.73)** (6.85)** (4.13) (3.74) 
Sector 0.080 0.075 0.038 0.041 
(1.38) (1.25) (0.45) (0.48) 
Membership density 0.043 0.035 
-0.007 -0.014 (2.88)** (2.15)* (0.32) (0.60) 
Training 0.054 0.061 
-0.016 -0.010 (2.43. )* (2.63)** (0.53) (0.31) 
Further education 
-0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.016 (0.39) (0.42) (0.33) (0.47) 
Secondary education 
-0.014 -0.012 0.008 0.023 (0.72) (0.57) (0.26) (0.72) 
Concentration 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.018 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.60) (0.65) 
Coverage 
-0.030 -0.031 0.019 0.025 (2.49)* (2.4 1) (0.80) (1.04) 
Coverage *concentration 0.003 0.001 
-0.107 -0.118 (0-07) (0.02) (1.00) (1.01) 
Import penetration 0.0001 0.0005 (0.28) (0.65) 
Coverage*import 
-0.002 0.002 (0.83) (0.26) 
Export share -0.0001 -0.0002 (0.06) (0.07) 
Coverage*export 
-0.002 -0.009 (0.26) (0.40) 
Constant 3.027 3.079 0.673 0.588 
(3.9 5) (4.00)** (2.19)* (1.86) 
Observations 24897 23955 17750 16937 
Number of individuals 14113 13832 9668 9453 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 
Notes: 
L Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at I% 
3. Male dropped in the skilled sample due to multicollinearity 
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APPENDIX 5B 
Table 5B. 1: Construction of the final data 
Earnings, union status and other individual characteristics of manufacturing 
workers observed over the period 1982-95 from the N-ESPD 
Z 
Import penetration and export share from the industry trade data 
Other industry variables from the US and the Census of Production 
1982-91 
II 
Skilled Unskilled 
1993-95 
II 
Skilled Unskilled 
Notes: Arrows indicate "merged to" 
Flow chart shows selection ofsub-samples usedfor estimation 
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Table 5B. 2: Number of workers changing union status 
Number of changes in union status 
Year Skilled Unskilled 
1982-83 396 4730 
1983-84 386 3586 
1984-85 313 3082 
1985-86 346 3523 
1986-87 423 3887 
1987-88 366 3855 
1988-89 401 3972 
1989-90 388 3290 
1990-91 584 1400 
1993-94 161 690 
1994-95 172 703 
Note: Changes are calculated between 1982 & 1983,1983 & 1984 and so on. 
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Conclusion 
This study has provided empirical evidence on the implications of increased openness 
to international trade for trade unions in the LTK. The objectives of the thesis were 
twofold. First, to investigate the link between international competition and the decline 
of unionisation in Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, to examine the 
impact of trade on the wage bargaining strength of trade unions as measured by the 
union wage gap of individual workers. The main conclusions from the empirical 
chapters are surnmarised as follows. 
Chapter 3 presented an industry-level analysis of the link between union coverage by 
major agreements and import competition, using data from NESPD and a specially 
compiled trade data for UK manufacturing during the period 1983-95. The empirical 
strategy distinguished between the decline in coverage caused by an import-induced 
industry re-composition, shifting employment from the highly unionised sectors to the 
least unionised ones (referred to as the compositional effect) and the influence of 
foreign competition on coverage irrespective of any shifts in employment composition 
(the non-compositional effect). Using a basic shift-share technique, we found that the 
compositional effect of foreign competition was trivial, explaining only around 
2.1% 
of the total decline in union coverage between 1983 and 1995. 
Behavioural changes 
among industries were more important. A multivariate regression model was used to 
examine the non-composition ef I lent fect of international competition. The results 
support for a possible non-compositional role of foreign competition in the decline of 
trade unions in the UK. Though, it would appear that the influence of import 
penetration was possibly overshadowed by legislative and public policy changes, the 
macroeconomic climate at the time and, to some degree, by privatisation and changes 
in workforce composition. However, a major caveat of the analysi I is was that it focused 
on coverage by major agreements only. It is plausible that decline of major coverage 
observed throughout the 1980s and 1990s was primarily caused by govenunent policy 
to decentralise union bargaining. This could explain the lack of overwhelming 
evidence for a significant foreign competition effect. 
Therefore, chapter 4 provided further evidence on the relationship between foreign 
competition and unionisation by looking at establishment-level data from WIRS. It 
used union recognition' as the main union measure, which encompasses all types of 
union agreements. In effect, we tested the hypothesis that foreign competition reduces 
the probability of trade unions gaining recognition for bargaining purposes. Three 
different approaches were employed in order to model the effect of foreign 
competition. First, we used a question in the survey about whether the establishment 
operates primarily in international markets. Since firms operating in international 
markets have to compete with foreign rivals, this served as a fitting basis on which the 
influence of foreign competition on the likelihood of union recognition could be 
analysed. The question applied to firnis in all industrial sectors. As such, we found that 
the probability of recognition was reduced by 16% in firms operating in international 
' Whether an establishment recognises trade unions for collective 
bargai'mmig purposes. 
200 
markets. Splitting the data by sector revealed that firms facing foreign competition in 
private services were relatively less likely to recognise trade unions compared to their 
counterparts in private manufacturing. Second, we used trade variables at current time2 
for manufacturing, in place of the WIRS measure of foreign competition. However, no 
robust predictions about the impact of international competition on union recognition 
were obtained. Third, given that there was evidence of trade unions failing to attain 
recognition in establishments set up after 1980 (especially in private manufacturing), 
we investigated whether this could due to foreign competition at (or around) the 
establishinent set up date in the 1980s and 1990s. This was achieved through the use of 
age-dated trade measures, proxying international competition at the time of plant set- 
up in manufacturing. The coefficients on the foreign competition variables were not 
statistically significant and the results pointed to a strong impact of labour market 
forces (particularly declining aggregate union membership) on the likelihood of 
recognition. 
Thus, chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that foreign competition had, at most, a weak 
impact on unionisation in UK manufactunng dunng the 1980s and 1990s. It seems 
more likely that the anti-union policy pursued by Thatcher's Conservative Government 
restricted the exercise of union power whilst providing employers with the opportunity 
to reaffin-n their prerogatives and marginalize the union movement. Despite these 
results., we argued that it was possible that foreign competition could influence trade 
unions' ability to extract rents and modify their strategic bargaining behaviour, which 
would be reflected in the union wage premium. 
2 Corresponding to the relevant year of survey. 
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In this context, chapter 5 investigated the effect of foreign competition on the union 
wage differential of skilled and unskilled workers in UK manufacturing during the 
period 1982 to 1995. It provided estimates from OLS, Instrumental Variable (IV) and 
fixed-effects regressions such as to provide a better assessment of the true effect of 
foreign competition on the union mark up. While the OLS and IV results were 
consistent, the fixed-effects coefficients did not perforin well, possibly due to 
measurement error, selectivity and a lack of time variation in the data. Overall, 
openness to international trade served to moderate union wage demands during the 
1982-91 period. The loss of domestic market share to foreign rivals and the threat of 
multinationals relocating elsewhere, as a result of increased import competition, had 
greater negative implications for the unskilled union wage premium relative to the 
benefits of improved export performance. The union mark up for skilled workers was, 
for the most part, negatively affected by exports, suggesting that unionised firms 
needed considerable reductions in costs and management diseconomies in order to 
compete internationally and gain further access to markets abroad. 
Interestingly, there was evidence of a decline in the disciplining effect of international 
trade over time. We found no significant trade impact on the skilled union mark up 
during the 1993-95 period while foreign competition appeared to influence the wage 
differentials of unskilled union workers positively over the same time period. A 
plausible rationale for this result could be that the decline of trade unionism In the UK 
left behind smaller but stronger unions that were able to maintain or even increase their 
wage demands in face of an increasingly globalised economy. To some extent, this 
could also reflect the end of 'Thatcherism' 
in the 1990s. 
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main limitation of the empirical analysis in chapter 5 was that we measured union 
status with coverage by a major union agreement from the NESPD. Since major 
coverage differentials are considerably lower than wage premiums achieved from 
coverage by company/district/local agreements (Andrews et al., 1998a), studying the 
effect of foreign competition on union mark-ups based on major coverage only could 
potentially produce underestimates of the true coefficients and misleading conclusions. 
Nonetheless, major coverage represents a consistent measure of union status and 
perhaps more significantly, it is argued that major coverage differentials broadly 
reflect the movement of overall coverage differentials over time, albeit at a lower level 
(Andrews et al., 1998a). And so the use of major agreements is likely to provide a 
guide to the trends in effect of foreign competition on the union wage gap. 
In sum, the thesis has provided some useful insights into the influence of globalisation 
on unionisation and the wage bargaining strength of trade unions. However, the study 
focuses solely on international trade while the remarkable growth of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in recent decades has also been a major driving force of the global 
economy. Thus, the impact of multinationals on union presence and bargaining 
represents quite an interesting avenue for future research. 
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